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Eschatology runs as a persistent theme throughout Robert Jenson’s two 
volume systematic theology1. He sets out to describe the last things that 
Christians can look forward to, the future that God has in store for the 
redeemed.  But as he does so he makes a remarkable claim – that this future 
will be a surprise, not just for human beings, but also for God.  He goes on to 
specify who will be surprising whom within the life of the Trinity.  As we 
shall see God the Father trusts the Holy Spirit so much that he has mandated 
him to complete and perfect this fulfilled future in such a way as to surprise 
him also.  He does not require a briefing or an outline plan as to how that will 
come about, and what it will consist of.  The Holy Spirit’s unique role is to 
bring about this unpredictable outcome in an unsupervised manner. 
 
Robert Jenson would identify himself as one of the promoters and advocates 
of the revival of Trinitarian theology in the 20th century.  Herein lies the 
central paradox of Jenson’s unique combination of pneumatology and 
eschatology, for all classical Trinitarian theologies assume a continuous 
exchange of love and knowledge between the Triune persons – because the 
Triune persons are consubstantial they are united in one will.  To put it 
simply, they keep each other informed about all essential matters, especially 
those relating to human salvation history. How then can the third of the 
Triune persons be permitted to keep the other two in the dark about how he 
intends to round off the story of salvation?  This is the central issue addressed 
in this thesis.   
 
Bultmann and the Future 
 
                                                          
1 Robert W. Jenson, Systematic Theology: Volume 2 The Works of God (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1999), 311. [Hereafter expressed as ST] 
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Jenson’s concern and interest in a describable future began early on in his 
career as a theologian.  It was when he was at seminary in America that he 
became fascinated with the theology of Rudolf Bultmann, who called God die 
Ungesichertheit der Zukunft, which literally translates as, “The future one who 
is without history.”  Bultmann further described faith as “openness to the 
future.”  Jenson kept turning this definition over in his mind as he prepared 
to set off for doctoral studies at Heidelberg.  The question that interested him 
was “Which future?”  To this the only possible Bultmannian answer was, “the 
future of being open to the future.”  The prospect that this infinite regress 
opened up was unattractive, and so Jenson set out to address the issue of this 
contentless eschatology, to as he puts it, “discover a promised future that 
could be described.”2  So Robert Jenson’s eschatology is based around an 
attempt to flesh out the promises of the Triune God, to say what can be said of 
the destiny of the world of creatures according to the future intentions of this 
God. 
 
What to Expect at the End 
 
In his Systematics Jenson specifies some of what can be expected as God rings 
down the curtain on the human story.  The first event of the Second Coming 
will be Jesus bringing together the Church and Torah observant Judaism in 
such a way as to overcome the present post resurrection detour, which has 
permitted the independent existence of these two faith communities.  This is 
Jenson’s brilliant solution to the problem of supersessionism.  The Church as 
it exists now is deficient in that it lacks the Jewish membership that was the 
central recruiting agenda of Jesus’ earthly ministry.  Torah observant Judaism 
in its present configuration is deficient in that it lacks the Gentiles whom it 
was supposed to incorporate in its generous embrace.   Conventional Jewish 
apocalyptic expectation in the time of Jesus was that if the Messiah had come, 
and had been done to death, then this would set off the eschatological trip 
                                                          
2 E mail Robert Jenson to Hugh Bowron 10.06.04 
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wire that would end human history, and inaugurate the last judgement.  But 
in a stunning improvisational response to the apparent failure of Jesus’ 
mission, God held back the eschatological trip wire in order to permit a 
further patient and generous time of salvation opportunity. 
 
Furthermore, he permits the two deficient salvation communities of Church 
and Torah observant Judaism to do their independent and divinely mandated 
work in this present age.  But the opening move of the return of Jesus in glory 
will be to end the eschatological detour, and to reunite these two regrettably 
divided faith communities into the one body congruent with his final designs.  
We shall be hearing more about this completed salvation community in the 
discussion of the totus Christus. 
 
Jenson has some further information to offer about the roll out of Heavenly 
consequences at the End.  All causes and controversies will be decided and 
settled by the supreme Judge because, “When history is taken into the 
Kingdom, all its accumulated mutual wrongs must be rectified.”3  Death will 
be abolished.4 Human beings will not be able to sin any more, since they will 
be united to Christ, and will be freed from the entanglements of the libido 
dominandi of this world. 5   
 
And there will be three controls on the promised future.  First, it must include 
the Trinity.6   Second, it will be a polity, since this achieved outcome will be a 
political achievement described in political metaphors such as the 
“Kingdom.”7 Third, its shape and content cannot contradict the Ten 
Commandments, since they are God’s will for the community, and its 
blessedness is defined by the moral will of the Lord. 8  
                                                          
3 ST 2: 325. 
4 ST 2: 330. 
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6 ST 2: 317. 




The fate of the cosmos, the destiny of matter, and the style and content of 
human embodiment as risen, spiritual creatures also receive attention.  The 
universe will continue to be necessary “after the End” as “the stage for the 
fulfilment of that story” (of God with his people), but with the vital difference 
that it will no longer be only background scenery for salvation history, but 
will then have the redeemed as vitally involved in thinking the movements of 
matter and energy since they will be communal agents in the triune life, given 
their close identification with the completed, collective Christ. The very stuff 
of the new creation will have a raised and elevated quality.  Here Jenson 
quotes Isaac Dorner with approval to describe this change, “Matter will have 
exchanged its darkness, hardness, heaviness, immobility and 
impenetrableness for clearness, radiance, elasticity and transparency.”9And 
the appearance of new spiritual bodies of the redeemed will express their 
special spiritual character; one will be able to read their Kingdom identity as 
it were by their appearance.  Also sexual differentiation will continue. 
 
But the main content of the predictable future concerns the totus Christus, a 
concept Jenson sources from Augustine, in which he proposes that in the 
completed process of human salvation all Christians will form the Body of 
Christ as a collective entity, while becoming themselves in the truest sense of 
Christian identity and individuality, with Christ as their head and organising 
principle.  Jenson builds on and develops this concept to make it his central 
proposal for the content of the fulfilled future. What awaits the redeemed in 
the life of the world to come is an intensely Christic communal life in which, 
as they turn to one another and intend one another, they form the totus 
Christus, becoming the members of that body of which he is the head.10 In 
other words they will leave behind the hyper tropic individualism of fallen 
                                                          
9 Isaac Dorner, A System of Christian Doctrine, tr. Alfred cave, J.S. Banks (Edinburgh: T&T 
Clark, 1890), 429. Quoted in ST 2: 351. 
10 ST 2: 339-340. 
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existence to such an extent that they will become the communal Christ, while 
at the same time becoming intensely themselves.   
 
And that in turn means that deification will be the destiny of the redeemed.  
Here prizes are awarded to East and West.  Gregory Palamas was right to say 
that the redeemed will be rendered transparent and translucent by uncreated 
light.11  Whereas Aquinas got it right contra Palamas that the redeemed will 
be able to contemplate the vision of God, to see God directly, because their 
ontological elevation will heal and enhance their minds sufficiently to be able 
to do this, as deification and beatific vision coincide.12  We can note also that 
cosmic temporality will become congruent with the Trinity’s temporality in 
such a way that the redeemed will no longer suffer the alienating effects of 
past, present and future being divided from each other.  No longer will the 
past be fixed and dead, the future threatening, and the fleeting present 
uncontrollable.13 
 
But it is just at this point that one of the highly unusual features of Jenson’s 
proposal comes into view.  He believes that the formation of the totus Christus 
will be the completion of Christ’s resurrection – that his resurrection is an 
event still in process, and that its final outworking will be to some extent a 
surprise for him.  In other words, Christ exists in four successive modalities – 
as an incognito subtle background influence in the prior history and 
Scriptures of his people, in the biological form of existence in which he was 
known in the incarnation, in his present Lordship of the Church as powerful 
indwelling presence, a theme to be explored in depth in chapter two, and in 
the Church’s final form as totus Christus in which Christians as the body of 
Christ become him in a highly collective modality of existence, while 
remaining themselves, with Christ as their head and source of identity.  What 
we can notice here is that the fully developed and deployed totus Christus is 
                                                          
11 ST 2: 342. 
12 ST 2: 344. 
13 ST 2: 345-6. 
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something that will happen to him in the future as much as it will to us.  He 
has changes in store as well.  And we are left wondering to what extent Christ 
was a pre-existent reality in this scheme of things, an issue for later 
exploration in this thesis.   
 
There has been much debate on this score, an issue that will be addressed 
below in chapter Three.  In brief, Jenson believes that Christ existed as latent 
potentiality within the narrative pattern of Old Testament salvation history.  
In particular, he can be located within the servant songs of Isaiah, for as 
suffering servant he both embodies his people Israel as a representative 
person, represents them before God as priestly figure, and prefigures the role 
he will take up from the womb of the Virgin Mary.  This of course begs the 
question whether Christ exists in a purely literary Scriptural mode in this 
phase of his existence.  It also makes clear why protology is a major issue in 
this thesis. 
 
The pre-existence of Christ is a considerable problem for Jenson because he is 
so opposed to any protological explanation for the being and doctrine of God, 
and of the origins of the Triune persons, that he declares that Christ enters the 
womb of the Virgin Mary from the future, because that is where God dwells.  
He believes in the doctrine of election, that Christ elected to be with and to 
deliver sinful humanity from the very beginning, or rather one should say 
from the future.  He makes his electing decision from the future, because that 
is where he comes from; it is the only dimension he fully dwells, apart from 
the Church, in which he dwells by anticipation. 
 
The Antinomy of Hope 
 
The theme of developments in the life of God is one we will return to at the 
end of the introduction.  For now we note a paradox and a difficulty that 
Jenson’s proposal labours under.  The more he spells out the content of the 
fulfilled future the more he potentially undermines what is a highly 
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developed theology of hope.  This is what he calls “the antinomy of hope,” for 
it revolves around the reality that, “Hope ceases when what is hoped for 
arrives.”14  The more the future agendas of the Kingdom are realised the more 
the Kingdom slips through one’s fingers as it moves from dynamic, 
developing, attracting goals to static, timeless, de-energised and limited 
reality.  It is just at this point that we see why the notion of surprise is an 
essential and internal necessity of Jenson’s theology.  The more the content of 
the fulfilled future is spelt out the less it comes to seem like the product of the 
inexhaustible vitality of such an eventful God. 
 
Surprise is also essential because it is part and parcel of his definition of 
personality, particularly the personality and character of God.  The 
resurrection was a surprising outcome, and its essential meaning and results 
for the redeemed are as follows: “The decisive difference between a living 
person and a dead one is that the former can surprise us as the latter 
cannot…That Jesus lives means that his love, perfected at the cross, is now 
active to surprise us…he wills our good in a freedom beyond our 
predicting.”15 
 
Not only is the art of surprising human beings what Jesus and the Holy Spirit 
do supremely well, but also it is an essential ingredient of what love is 
because, “it is the very substance of love to be full of surprises for the loved 
one.  For to love is to fully affirm the freedom of the loved one; it is to be 
committed to respond to this freedom with good, whatever the loved one 
does in it.  So long as I live I cannot bind in advance what I will do with my 
freedom; therefore neither can I know in advance what my lover will do for 
me.”16  In other words, the antinomy of freedom is resolved in love because 
what love requires is a kind of perpetual revolution in relational 
                                                          




developments, a continual forward teleological momentum of unfolding 
relational consequences.   
 
What is being offered here is a theory of human relationships, and of the 
asymmetric relationship between God and human beings that is perhaps 
rather one sided.  For while relationships in both these dimensions can thrive 
on challenge, novelty and spontaneity to refresh and stimulate the 
wellsprings of intimacy, it can also be argued that they require in equal 
measure stability, continuity, predictability and reliability to engender trust 
and loyalty. Classical Christian theologies of eternal life have oscillated 
between the Origenist view of heaven as a kind of advanced research institute 
of continual discovery, and the Thomist preference for contemplative vision 
of the being of God.  Jenson appears to have come down decisively on the 
Origenist side of the line in a view of Divine/human relationships that is both 
dynamic, teleological, and potentially exhausting for its human participants.  
This take on Divine/human relationships in the time before the Parousia 
privileges novelty and spontaneity over the ordinary and the quotidian.  Yet 
in many ways the normal and the quotidian are the arenas of human 





A major component of Jenson’s stress on the event of surprise in his 
eschatology comes from his interest in the theory of dramatic causality.   
Jenson claims Aristotle as a support for his enlisting of the theory of dramatic 
causality, which lays down the requirements of a satisfying story.  It must 
draw together the narrative threads into a suspenseful and surprising ending 
that at the same time leads the reader or theatregoer to conclude that the story 
couldn’t have concluded any other way.  In like manner the Holy Spirit will 
end the human story of salvation and bring the creation to its climax in a way 
that will surprise everyone, while at the same time leaving them deeply 
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satisfied that the way in which it happened was inevitable, and true to the 
characters and the plot line.  Yet at no point does he offer any exegetical 
support from Scripture for such a move. 
 
Did Aristotle actually say this in the Poetics?  A close reading of the Poetics 
does not reveal any reference to this theory.  Chapter nine discusses the 
elements of probability and necessity in a satisfactory and credible plot.  
Incidents should be arranged in such a way as to support the unifying themes 
of the drama.17 Chapter ten outlines the difference between simple and 
complex plots, gives preference to complex plots, and defines them as 
including reversal and recognition.  Chapter eleven defines the terms reversal 
and recognition.  Reversal “is a change of fortune in the action of the play to 
the opposite state of affairs,” and recognition is “a change of fortune from 
ignorance to knowledge.”18  That is about as close as the Poetics gets to any 
discussion of dramatic causality. 
 
The other puzzling feature of the reference to Aristotle as a supporting 
authority is that all the plays which he discussed in that volume were 
tragedies whose plot lines were well known to their audiences, at least to the 
elite of Athenian society – there were no surprises for those who watched 
them.  A Greek tragedy is not a whodunit.  The audience is not tantalised by 
the rising tension and mounting curiosity as to how the author will resolve 
the drama.  Its aim is to achieve catharsis through pity and fear that will 
clarify the incidents of the play, and lead to understanding through emotional 
expansion. 
 
But it does not matter that Aristotle has little to offer Jenson’s interest in the 
biggest surprise ending of them all, because this theme proceeds from the 
                                                          
17 Aristotle, Aristotle's Poetics: A Translation and Commentary for Students of Literature, 
Translation by Leon Golden, Commentary by O. B. Hardison, (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: 
Prentice Hall, 1968), 155. 
18 Ibid., 168. 
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internal necessities of his theology, and principally from his objection to the 
doctrine of God having any metaphysical content.  In what is one of his most 
insistent themes he claims that the theologians of the Patristic era did 
Christian theology a major disservice by importing Greek metaphysics into 
the doctrine of God, thus falling prey to the Greek pre-occupation with saving 
God from the attrition and ravages of time, with the knock on consequence of 
promoting a God who is metaphysically frozen, lacking in eventfulness and 
vitality.   
 
As he puts it, “This being of God is not a something, however rarefied or 
immaterial, but a going-on, a sequentially palpable event, like a kiss or a train 
wreck.” 19  So building on what he perceives to be the Cappadocian schema, 
the Father is the past or the origins of our salvation, the Son is the present 
dimension of it, and the Holy Spirit is the future of our salvation in which it 
will be completed and perfected.  Such a God is known and defined by what 
he does, by the crucial events that flow from his saving activities.  To ask the 
question who is God is to receive the answer, “Whoever rescued Israel from 
Egypt, and whoever raised Jesus from the dead.” 20  
 
Chapter one will assess Jenson's claim that God is “an event, a person, a 
decision, a conversation,” and will question whether Gregory of Nyssa can be 
legitimately claimed as the source of a God who can be described by 
predicates and not by attributes, who has no metaphysical content in his style 
of being, and whose mode of existence proceeds from eschatology and not 
protology.  This appears to run counter to the general assessment of Gregory 
of Nyssa, and rests on the slender foundation of one cited authority.21   It begs 
the question whether this is a fair description of Greek metaphysics.  It also 
                                                          
19 ST 1: 214. 
20 ST 1: 44. 
21 Ekkehard Muhlenberg, Die Unendlichkeit Gottes bei Gregor von Nyssa (Gottingen: 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1966). 
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rides roughshod over the tradition that the three persons in one God are 
described by relations of origin. 
 
The chapter will also deal with the probability that, while Gregory reckons 
there to have been a progressive revelation of God as Trinity, he does not 
assume that this means that there is a sequential replacement of one divine 
person’s activity by another.  Since Jenson believes that God has no essence, 
no metaphysical substance – that he is all eventfulness - then one is left 
wondering if for him the divine persons do deploy themselves in sequential 
array?  Why do the triune persons act as they do, why do they deploy 
themselves as they do.  The tradition has said that this is why metaphysics is 
required in the doctrine of God.  Jenson would deny that he is modalist in his 
Trinitarian theology, but the possibility that this is in fact the case will need to 
be investigated at some depth in chapter one. 
 
There is another problem following on from Jenson’s doctrine of God that will 
require investigation.  What exactly is it that the redeemed human creature 
will participate in?  The problem comes from Jenson’s refusal to allow any 
metaphysical content or description of the Christian God.  Hans Urs Von 
Balthasar got to the heart of the matter when he wrote, “The real “last thing” 
is the triune life of God disclosed in Jesus Christ…And what is this but Being 
itself?  For apart from Being there is “only nothing,” while within it there is 
that mysterious vitality disclosed through Christological revelation, so that 
everything that comes from absolute Being must bear its seal, with revelation 
giving us access to the fount of God’s life.”  22  In other words, if God is all 
eventfulness and happening but no being, then there is no being for humans 
to participate in because apart from being there is nothing.  What the Bible 
speaks of as kabod/glory and shekinah/presence is what metaphysics speaks of 
as being, and these shimmering depths of being are what surrounds God, and 
                                                          
22 Hans Urs Von Balthasar, Theo-Drama Theological Dramatic Theory 5: The Last Act (San 
Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1998), 57. 
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it is this quality of being which we enter as we are drawn into the Triune life, 
which is what heaven consists of. Furthermore, being denotes relations of 
origin amongst the persons.  Chapters two and three will address this issue 
further. 
 
Chapter two will consider Jenson's ecclesiology and Christology, with a 
particular focus in the latter section on Jenson’s rejection of Divine 
impassibility, and the follow on difficulties that this creates for his proposals.  
This thesis will argue in Chapter two that Jenson has done the Patristic 
writers a disservice in this analysis, particularly Cyril of Alexandria, whose 
single subject Christology he claims as his own.  Had he gone right through in 
his analysis of the communicatio idiomatum he would have come to understand 
that Cyril believes Christ experienced human emotions divinely, and thus 
opens the way for a deeper understanding of  what a healed and elevated 
human affectivity will look like in the life of the world to come. 
 
Chapter three will address an Hegelian theme in that Jenson uses his take on 
subject/object relations to posit that the Father and the Son are an opposed 
duo in a tension ridden relationship that requires the Holy Spirit to resolve 
and harmonise their relationship, by interpreting them each to the other, and 
by freeing them to be what they wish to be for one another.  This is quite a 
contrast to the classical Trinitarian take on the relationship of love, obedience 
and blessing that is supposed to characterise the Father/Son relationship, and 
the Holy Spirit as overflowing surplus and abundance of their mutual love.  
In so doing Jenson appears to have given the Holy Spirit a privileged priority 
within the Triune perichoresis, which also hints at his proprium as architect of 
the End.  We can note here how far this is from Augustine's notion of the 
Spirit's proprium as flowing from the Father and the Son. 
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Chapter three is an assessment of Jenson's pneumatology, what Scott Swain 
calls, “the freedom of the Spirit, who is the Lord of possibility” 23 How and 
why is the Holy Spirit the time Lord of the future, who can go about his 
business of writing the final chapter of the human story in an unedited 
manner?  In his attempts to give the doctrine of the Spirit a greater density 
than western theology has permitted, has he over-privileged the third person 
of the Trinity?  Why does it matter so much that he will be full of surprises? 
 
 
But what is of even greater interest to the subject matter of this thesis are the 
considerable problems Jenson’s take on Divine impassibility gets him into 
around the issue of the possible contents of the future fulfilled world of the 
Kingdom.  If the God who is without analogical interval has vacuumed up 
human history, how can he shake off the instances of radical evil occurring 
within it, such as the holocaust, in the future roll out of the new heavens and 
earth, if these events have lodged themselves within his being?   Jenson 
assures us that sin, suffering, evil and death will be abolished in the future 
world of the fulfilled Kingdom.  It is not clear how this can be accomplished if 
God has not put some distance between his inner being and events of radical 
evil within history.  To put it another way, when you have opened God up to 
human history by abandoning the notion of Divine impassibility there are 
some unfortunate flow on effects on the futurity of God, and within the 
content of eschatological fulfilment.  Chapter four will attempt to wrestle this 
issue to the ground. 
  
The conclusion of the thesis will address the strangest and most potentially 
disturbing possibility flowing from the internal necessities of Jenson’s 
pneumatology and eschatology.  On the face of it, Jenson appears to think that 
the End, the fulfilment of the human story in the formation of the collective 
                                                          
23 Scott R. Swain, The God of the Gospel: Robert Jenson’s Trinitarian Theology (Downers Grove, 
Illinois: IVP Academic, 2013), 139. 
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Christ, the totus Christus, will also be an event in the life of God, in other 
words a development in the style and content of the unfolding life of the 
Trinity.  We have noted before that the formation of the totus Christus will be 
the completion of Christ’s resurrection – his resurrection is an event still in 
process, its final outworking will be to some extent a surprise for him.  Will it 
also be the catalyst of change in the life of God? 
 
Jenson is an admirer of some aspects of Hegel’s thinking on religion.  Chapter 
three will acquit Jenson of the possible charge that he has incorporated 
Hegel’s notion of God as the World Spirit who evolves within and because of 
human history.  But the conclusion must address the possibility that Jenson’s 
metaphysically drained God will be changed by the style and content of the 
End.  
 
The conclusion will also consider whether Jenson has delivered a content 
filled eschatology, a key objective of his proposals.  It will make a judgement 
about the effectiveness and credibility of his pneumatology.  Above all it will 
assess his doctrine of God.  Can Jenson’s eschatological proposals stand in the 
light of his conviction that God is without any metaphysical content to his 
being, that the Trinity is without any immanent inner life, that God is not 
wholly other but is rather one who is with us completely in the narrative of 
the gospel?  Stephen Holmes sums up Jenson’s doctrine of God in these 
brilliant sentences:   
 
Barth’s denial of a Logos Asarkos, Rahner’s insistence on the identity of 
the immanent Trinity with the economic Trinity, and Pannenberg’s 
and Moltmann’s desire to see God’s life as open to the gospel history, 
all reach their most extreme, and most coherent, expression in 
Jenson’s theology.  God is the gospel history; the Jewish man Jesus is 
the Second Person of the Trinity; the eternal generation of the Son is 
the event of the incarnation.  The triune God of history is the history 
of God.  Jenson’s greatness – and in my estimation he is one of the 
greatest theologians working today – is that he sees with astonishing 
clarity just how thoroughly classical theology will have to be revised 
if “Rahner’s rule” is to be taken seriously, and does not at any point 
17 
shrink from the revision, because he believes that to speak faithfully 
of the gospel, this revision is necessary.24 
 
The conclusion must decide whether such a revision removes from God the 





                                                          
24 Stephen R Holmes, The Quest for the Trinity: the Doctrine of God in Scripture, History and 
Modernity (Downers Grove, Illinois: IVP Academic 2012), 24. 
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Chapter 1 
What Kind of a God? 
God is an event, a person, a decision, a conversation 
 
For Robert Jenson there is no prior actuality in God – God never was in the past – and it is 
not possible to consider or discuss the being of God, since God is eventfulness – we can 
only know him by what he does.  As Scott Swain memorably puts it, “God is as God does 
in the triune story of salvation.”1   
 
So to consider God as Trinity is to consider the three poles of time, each of which is 
occupied by a Triune person.  “The Father is the ‘whence’ of God's life; the Spirit is the 
‘whither’ of God's life; and we may even say that the Son is that life's specious present.”2  
The Father establishes the personality of God.  As the originating one he fires forward the 
arrow of that teleological stream of events in which God makes himself known to the 
world of creatures, and which in fact is the very stuff of who and what God is.  Since the 
Son lives only in love and obedience to the Father, and to seek and serve the best interests 
of the world of creatures, he provides the existential space in which the Father's ego can 
deploy, and find itself.  The Son's “individuality is his freedom from his merely private 
self.''3  The incarnation is “Jesus' intrusion into the outward flight of the Father's 
consciousness.” 4 
 
We can note here Jenson's determination to speak only of God as he reveals himself in the 
evangelical events of salvation history.  He relentlessly and thoroughly fulfils Rahner's 
rule in such a way that only the economic Trinity counts.  The immanent Trinity, if it exists 
at all, is completely conformed to those decisive events revealed in Scripture by which the 
human race will be saved by the triumph of the love revealed in Jesus.  Nothing else about 
God matters, and we need not concern ourselves with pointless speculation about the kind 
of being that stands behind these events.  Any talk of processions and missions in the 
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2ST 1: 218-219. 
3ST 1: 219. 
4ST 1: 220. 
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traditional sense is ruled out5 because this belongs to the incorrect and unhelpful 
theological world view that developed out of the infiltration of Greek Metaphysics into the 
doctrine of God. 
 
The Son is known by, and exists within, the flow of events that extend from his gestation 
in the womb of Mary, to his death as the hanged man on Golgotha.  We can only speak of 
his pre-existence, a topic to be considered at greater length later in this thesis, in a tentative 
and tenuous way as a latent potentiality within the Old Testament's salvation history.   We 
can wonder in what sense he took his place at the right hand of God after the resurrection, 
because in the Jensonian view of things Jesus rose into the Church, where he is present in a 
very powerful mode of indwelling.  It is this ecclesial mode of his existence that will be our 
primary focus in the next chapter, but for now we can note that we speak of Christ as the 
now of our salvation in the sense that this is where we find him, locate him and experience 
him.  The futurity of God, its forward flight through time, is available to us in this present 
modality of Christ's existence.  The Church is his body in a quite vivid and robust sense. 
 
The Spirit is the completer and perfector of this forward momentum of teleological events.  
He is also the goal of this arrow flight of saving events originally fired forward by the 
Father. There is no other future to be anticipated, feared or longed for – he is the futurity 
of God.  And this is why the Spirit has a certain degree of priority amongst the Triune 
persons, because, “The Spirit is God coming to us from the last future; he is God coming 
from and as the Kingdom.”6   
 
This leaves us asking what the content of that future will be.  We have detailed some of 
these beneficial end time consequences for the human race in the introduction.  We have 
noted also that the Spirit, having raised Jesus from the dead, will complete this process of 
Christic development by bringing the totus Christus to pass.  This will be in a sense the 
completion of the Kingdom.  We can notice here a theme that will be our primary concern 
towards the conclusion of the chapter – that what is being described here is the effects on 
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existence of an immanent Trinity existing in free association from an economic Trinity. 
6ST 1: 219. 
20 
the redeemed rather than the one who generates them – that we are informed about the 
affective, existential and ontological goods and gains of the saved, but little is said about 
the bestower of these gifts.  We are left wondering what or who in this fulfilled future 
makes all this happen, and what process of interaction between Saviour and saved brings 
this about. 
 
However this location of the Triune persons on the three poles of time does help to unpack 
the surprise dimension of the Spirit's ultimate finale.  For if the being of God is a flow of 
events that must hang together in a coherent narrative then this story of salvation, like any 
satisfying narrative, must have its own freedom to develop as the characters determine the 
plot in a dialogical rhythm with the main protagonist – God.  One of the strengths of 
Jenson's proposals is the way in which each human “no” to God is outflanked, outwitted 
and overturned by a surprising riposte from God, in which his continuing “yes” reframes 
and repositions the developing narrative.  God's originality and tactical finesse can work 
the human “no” into the story in such a way that it becomes part of the tapestry of the 
completed future.  If God is a story, then this rattling good yarn must have a curiosity 
inducing and suspense fulfilling ending. 
 
Robert Jenson has described God as an event, a person, a decision and a conversation.  
What does he mean by that?  In these four descriptors he lays out his revisionary 
metaphysics of God's being.  Consider these quotes on the subjects of God's eventfulness: 
 
the one God is an event; history occurs not only in him but as his being...The 
fundamental statement of God's being is therefore: God is what happens between 
Jesus and his Father in their Spirit...God is the event of the world's transformation 
by Jesus' love, the same love to which the world owes its existence...What happens 
to the world with Jesus has three identities that are the origin of time, the goal of 
time, and what within time is what time is about.7    
 
God has no essence or substance, he is what happens to the world, particularly through 
Jesus.   
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We can note though the privileging of certain events, and the leaving out of others, which 
might be thought to be surprising omissions.  The escape of the children of Israel from 
Egypt, and the raising of Jesus from the dead are the two determining events from which 
Jenson reads off his doctrine of God.  Yet it is odd that the incident of the burning bush, 
and the incidents that cluster around the giving of the law on Mount Sinai in a direct 
encounter between God and Moses, are overlooked.  Though God keeps his inner being 
reserved from direct observation in these primary disclosure events, they have the effect of 
irresistibly pressing the issue of who and what kind of a God Moses is dealing with, where 
he came from, and what kind of a covenant partner Israel has entered into a relationship of 
promise with.  It is even more puzzling that these incidents are overlooked when one 
considers his warm approval of R. Kendall Soulen's The Divine Name(s) and the Holy 
Trinity: Distinguishing the Voices, a book which focuses on a theme dear to his heart, the 
proper naming of God, and which gives high profile to these disclosure events.  These two 
incidents of course, if included in his Systematic Theology, could have awkwardly raised the 
issue of the being of God, and were omitted perhaps for that reason. 
 
For that matter it is odd that the Baptism of Jesus in the Jordan, his Transfiguration on 
Mount Tabor, and the inner Trinitarian discourse in the High Priestly prayer in John 17 
aren't front and centre in his prioritising of Scriptural events from which we can read off 
the identity of God.  Furthermore Jenson states that he agrees with the Orthodox that 
Pentecost is a peer event with the resurrection, and not just a roll out consequence of it as 
much of western theology would have it.8  Again, this is another event that receives a lot 
of attention from Kendall Soulen in his discussion of the proper names of God.9  So one is 
left wondering why he didn't include the Baptism in the Jordan, the Transfiguration and 
Pentecost in the line-up of decisive events that happened to the world, and that are on a 
par, some would think, with the escape across the sea of reeds and the resurrection? 
 
To state that God is a person could be encouraging to those who are of a Neo-
Chalcedonian frame of mind in their doctrine of God, but Jenson has something else in 
mind in using this descriptor.  To the question “how can an event be a person,” he replies 
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9 R. Kendall Soulen, The Divine Name(s) and the Holy Trinity: Distinguishing the Voices, Volume 1 (Louisville: 
Westminster John Knox Press, 2011), 185-189, 251-255. 
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that this means that there is a continuity in the stream of events that is God, they have “a 
mutual dramatic coherence,” they hang together in such a way as to indicate that there is a 
personality that links them up. 10    This is particularly the case in the dialogical rhythm, 
the back and forward exchange between God and humankind in the events of Scripture.  
God is faithful to himself in the way he acts.   
 
To say that God is a decision flows on from the other two descriptors – the events and 
their continuity character reveal a set of decisions.  To declare him a conversation is to 
point to his communicating character as Word and Logos who maintains a conversation 
with those he engages within the stream of history.  Address and response are essential 
both between the Triune persons, and with those whose future is unfolding, and who 
might become different from what they presently are on the basis of this address and 
response exchange.  If the end is to be a surprise then this will be in part because of where 
these unfolding conversations may take it to. 
 
Is Gregory of Nyssa a theological ally? 
 
Robert Jenson claims a warrant for this rather original and remarkable take on God’s being 
from Gregory of Nyssa.  He thinks that Gregory described God as a predicate – a doing, 
acting, making it happen kind of Divine being, rather than being a God of attributes.  In 
this way he would be quite distinct from the majority of his Patristic contemporaries for 
whom God’s attributes of timelessness, impassibility, and so forth, secure God from the 
possibilities of becoming vulnerable to the attrition of time.  They, as it were, put God in 
the refrigerator of a frozen, static, immobility that is the inevitable concomitant of allowing 
Greek metaphysics into one’s doctrine of God.  But Gregory’s doctrine of God was 
different and unique because his view of infinity was different.   
 
Here we can call to mind his doctrine of epectasis, the development of an idea originally 
drawn from Origen that the soul continually advances in knowledge of God in a never 
ending journey into the inexhaustibility of bliss.  Origen had seen heaven as being like 
membership of an advanced research institute in which the mysteries of the universe and 
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all the conundrums of the search for human understanding would be explored and 
resolved, and then further developed.  Gregory took this notion further, and brings it to 
bear on his doctrine of God. Rowan Williams gets to the heart of the matter when he 
writes: 
 
If the Christian life is a journey into God, it is a journey into infinity – not an 
abstract ‘absoluteness’ but an infinity of what Gregory simply calls ‘goodness,’ an 
infinite resource of mercy, help and delight.  And because of its limitless nature, 
this journey is always marked by desire, by hope and longing, never coming to 
possess or control its object.  This is perhaps Gregory’s most vivid way of 
expressing the Christian conviction of God’s transcendent freedom and objectivity: 
faith is always, not only in this life, a longing and trust directed away from itself 
towards an object to which it will never be adequate, which it will never 
comprehend.  God is what we have not yet understood, the sign of a strange and 
unpredictable future.11 
 
Jenson claims support for his notion of God as “a going on” from Gregory of Nyssa on the 
basis of one book.12  This writer cannot read theological German, and is not aware of an 
English translation of this book, but in a sense this does not matter because what is 
important here is that Jenson thinks Gregory supports what he wants to write about God.  
But before moving on from our consideration of Gregory of Nyssa there is one topic that 
deserves investigation – is he as free from Greek metaphysical thinking about God as 
Jenson thinks he is? 
 
John Behr describes Gregory’s intellectual formation thus.  “Gregory did not have the 
advantage of an education at a prestigious university, or even of foreign travel, but was 
educated largely by his two eldest siblings (Peter, later Bishop of Sebaste, Basil the Great).  
Gregory probably studied under Basil between 335 and 357-58 when he taught rhetoric at 
Caesarea.”13   This writer finds it hard to believe that he would not have been thoroughly 
inculcated with Greek philosophical thinking, and given a deep immersion in Greek 
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 (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1990), 57-58. 
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metaphysics.  It would therefore have been hard for them to think about the world and 
what lay behind it in any other terms. 
 
Of course, for the Cappadocian Fathers Scripture is the primary datum they would have 
worked from in developing their Trinitarian doctrine of God.  But Lewis Ayres has written 
persuasively on the way pro-Nicene theologians made magpie like borrowings from their 
intellectual milieu to engage with Scripture: 
 
Engagement here is a complex and piecemeal affair between Christian, inherited 
Jewish, and Greek and Roman philosophical traditions.  By “piecemeal” I mean 
that particular philosophical doctrines, separated from others taken to be 
intrinsically related to them in their original contexts are used to elucidate 
particular themes or terminologies or passages from Scripture.  For example both 
Gregory of Nyssa and Augustine adapt themes from Plotinus: neither, however, 
makes any extensive use of the complex discussions concerning the complex 
interrelationships between the three primary hypostases that so fascinated the 
latter.  Rather, discussions that Plotinus would have assumed to be pertinent to 
only the One or Nous are drawn on and melded together to discuss the Christian 
Trinity.  Both similarly draw on aspects of Stoic terminology…: both feel free to 
condemn other aspects of Stoic tradition that are antithetical to their 
purpose…This piecemeal engagement is deeply shaped by a complex notion of the 
scriptural text as the primary resource for the Christian imagination, as a text that 
may be explicated through the use of whatever lies to hand and that may be 
persuasively adapted.14 
 
Recent scholarship about Gregory posits that his primary focus as a theologian is to 
establish an epistemology by which we can know God.  This epistemology is very much 
grounded in his neo-Platonic intellectual background, and it assumes that ontology is the 
appropriate way to think about God. To quote two sources: 
 
Since God is infinite, the cognitive journey opened up by faith is also without 
limit; it is epistemology rooted in ontology.15 
 
…through his deployment of power terminology, Gregory also offers an 
ontological and epistemological foundation for human knowledge of God that he 
                                                          
14Lewis Ayres, Nicea and its Legacy: An Approach to Fourth-Century Trinitarian Theology (Oxford: Oxford 
 University Press, 2006), 391-392. 
15Martin Laird, Gregory of Nyssa and the Grasp of Faith: Union, Knowledge and Divine Presence (Oxford: Oxford 
 University Press, 2004), 25. 
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thinks fundamental to pro-Nicene theology and which sets the stage for any 
analogical description of the Godhead.16 
 
And as Gregory proceeds he shows his Greek philosophical bias more and more: 
 
The language of invisibility also implies elevation beyond the intelligible, for in 
becoming invisible himself, Moses is becoming like God.  This motif, namely, that 
only like knows like reaches far back into Greek philosophical tradition.  If Moses 
is to know God, Moses must become like God.17 
 
What Gregory is doing is laying the foundations of the classic Christian mystical tradition, 
with its three stages of the purgative, the illuminative and the unitive.  First the mind is 
purged of unhelpful and misleading notions of God, then light is shed on the mysteries of 
God, the deep truths of the gospel, and then the lights are turned out, discursive reasoning 
fails, as the soul journeys on proceeding by naked faith alone into union with God, the 
goal of the Christian life.  It almost goes without saying that this is a tale of neo-Platonic 
ascent.  Indeed, Scripture is read typologically along these lines.  The burning bush is a 
type of the mind being purged of false notions of God, the long and winding road that 
Abraham pursues is a journey of pure faith without knowledge, the ascent of Moses to the 
top of Mt Sinai is a type of the soul’s eventual union with God.  The road map towards 
eventual union with God is one of continuity, then of abrupt discontinuity, as the insights 
and rational understanding of God granted in the illuminative phase fade out and are of 
no further use as the soul proceeds over the precipice into darkness, where only faith as 
naked trust counts and is useful, and indeed is its own kind of antennae and sensibility.  
Knowledge is overcome in faith. 
 
The Christian mystical tradition depends upon certain Scriptural texts such as the Song of 
Songs, but it is also saturated with neo-Platonic assumptions.  Gregory as one of the 
influential founders of this tradition is not uniquely different from his Patristic 
contemporariness in being immune from this powerful and ubiquitous intellectual current 
of his time.  His is not the lazy God whom Robert Jenson fears, but is a dynamic God who 
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 Publishing, 2003), 16. 
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can do and be all that Scripture says of him, while being assembled in part from 
metaphysical sources. 
 
Before leaving this topic let us briefly rehearse certain points that have been put to Jenson 
on this score.  One cannot posit a pure Bible and a corrupt Greek metaphysics.  From the 
intertestamental period on, substantial importation of Greek thought forms takes place 
into biblical literature, and into the New Testament itself.  If they were culled out then 
Johanine literature, the Pauline, and some of the post-Pauline epistles, would be different, 
and somewhat impoverished.  Greek metaphysical thought is not a monolithic reality, and 
Hellenic thought on say, the topic of impassibility, is a diverse and multi-faceted reality.  
And Jenson’s Systematics is not without its own philosophical assumptions, especially his 
enthusiasm for Hegel, a topic that will be considered in a later chapter. 
 
Martin Laird also raises an interesting point about the book Jenson puts so much weight 
on in his enthusiasm for Gregory of Nyssa.  Muhlenberg asserts that Gregory thought that 
the soul cannot achieve union with God, because this would be to suppose that God can 
be contained within the grasp of human comprehension.  But this misses the point that 
Gregory believes that the last lap of the journey into union with God is achieved through 
faith, in which attempts to grasp God cognitively and conceptually have been renounced, 
and thus the incomprehensibility of God is preserved in what amounts to a union beyond 
knowledge.18  Ironically Robert Jenson has become enthusiastic about the doctrine of 
theosis in recent times,19 a doctrine of union with God that originates in the Patristic era, 
and which again is heavily impregnated with neo-Platonic background assumptions.  But 
this of course raises the issue of exactly what or who the believer achieves union with.  
Here is Gregory’s take on who one is united to: 
 
none of those things which are apprehended by sense perception and 
contemplated by the understanding subsist, but that the transcendent essence and 
cause of the universe, on which everything depends, alone subsists.20 
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In other words God is a transcendent essence – here we have the language of substance 
relating to the doctrine of God that Jenson is so keen to renounce, since God is what 
happens to the world through Jesus Christ.  And one is left wondering if God has any 
substantiality to unite oneself to since he is apparently only eventfulness. 
 
In a recent lecture entitled Karl Barth on the Being of God Robert Jenson admits to being 
embarrassed to find that in CD II/1 Barth discusses the being of God under the categories 
of essence, using the language of standard substance metaphysics.  How could this be 
when he then goes on to characterize God as “event, first-person person and decision,”21 a 
way of thinking about the being of God that encouraged Jenson into his particular take on 
this theme? The rest of the lecture is something of a torturous struggle to accept that Barth 
can allow both ontological and action/eventfulness categories of God to exist side by side 
without difficulty or embarrassment.  About as much as he can concede is that substance 
language in this instance is about God being “our object, an other which is simply and 
unavoidably there for us and which therefore we can actually know.”  This combination of 
ontological language about God’s being, together with a dynamic understanding of his 
mode of being, is typical also of Gregory of Nyssa, but it is a combination which Jenson 
cannot permit for his doctrine of God.  Which leaves us wondering whether his will o’ the 
wisp God has any substance by which the believer can connect with him? 
 
Why the Immanent Trinity matters 
 
We have noted that Jenson is opposed to substance language about God's being because 
this proposes a picture of God as a timeless, changeless substance who exists in an eternal 
present without the dynamic existence in time that he thinks is true to the biblical God.  
He only allows use of the term ousia to refer to the divine action of being – it acquires valid 
theological content only if used after identifying the three Triune identities.  To use such a 
term before listing the descriptions of their dynamic particularity would be to empty the 
term of any theological content.22 
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What then does he think goes on at the heart of the Triune being?  The issue comes down 
to a matter of internal relationships:  “...the one and eternal Godhead, which each of the 
persons 'has,' is itself constituted by the relations between these persons, so that Father, 
Son, and Spirit play different roles in their joint realization of deity, and just so each 
possess the one and self-same deity.”23  In other words there is a kind of phantom junction 
box that co-ordinates the three Triune identities as they deploy in their respective poles of 
time, and as they relate to one another.  But this is as far as he is prepared to go in saying 
what the stuff of God consists of. 
 
We have commented already on Jenson's objection to the intrusion of Greek metaphysics 
into the doctrine of God as a re-paganising of the gospel. But his real point of concern does 
not lie only, or even primarily, with what happened in the Patristic and/or Medieval era.  
It is easy to forget that Jenson sees his primary vocation as being that of a theologian of 
culture, who is desperately concerned at the plight of the Church in the west, which he 
perceives to be seduced and subverted by its surrounding culture.  As we shall see in the 
next chapter this is in large measure why he proposes such an industrial strength doctrine 
of the Church.  It requires a dense theological texture at its centre and robust ecclesial 
boundaries so that it can see off the encroachments of the surrounding toxic culture.  It is 
the present state of emergency for the Church in the west that is the urgent driver of his 
rejection of what he perceives to be the infiltration of pagan philosophy in former and 
formative times.  Christopher Wells sums up Jenson's motivation in this regard very well 
when he writes: 
 
What readers of Jenson ought to see is perhaps quite obvious: he has always 
understood himself as a theologian of culture – indeed Jeremiah-like, often against 
culture – driven above all to confront the nihilism of the present with the radicality 
of the gospel of Jesus Christ.  Understanding this prevents us from viewing 
Jenson's revisionist metaphysics as, say, a self-aggrandizing “new” theological 
agenda, conceived and only recognizable in the world of academia.  Rather, like 
Barth, Jenson's program is theological intervention, intended above all to call 
cultural Christianity to account, to bring accomodationist versions of the Christian 
religion to their knees, and so preach the good news.  If the “cash value” of Jesus' 
resurrection is new life in baptism, argues Jenson, then the church needs in her 
proclamation and in her being to wrest as many as she can from the clutches of sin 
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and death, which in modernity is synonymous with the emptiness of neopagan 
transgression and antinomianism...Read in this context of late-twentieth century 
Protestant theology, Jenson's analysis against “Aquinas” is understandable.  It is 
intended to be a highly charged polemic against cultural religion on the one hand 
and haute intellectual versions of mainstream Christianity on the other.   That is, 
Jenson rejects what he perceives to be the intrusion of pagan culture and 
philosophy into the theology of the Church.24 
 
At this point we must consider the possibility that Jenson has Sabellian tendencies in his 
Trinitarian doctrine.  When those with a smattering of theological understanding first have 
Jenson's so called Cappadocian take on the Trinity as the Father being the past of our 
salvation, the Son as being its present, and the Holy Spirit as being its future they often 
respond with a query as to whether this is modalism, at least that is the response this 
writer has usually encountered in such circumstances.  But in fact Jenson must be 
acquitted of this charge, because by allocating each of the Triune persons to a particular 
pole of time he has certainly given each of them their unique proprium.  They are not 
merely masks of the one God deployed in functional form as required in the drama of 
salvation.  They are uniquely and fully themselves, as you would expect from a theologian 
who is keen to stress that they are not located within one ousia.    
 
Nor are they so separated in their Triune identities (his term of choice for them) as to be a 
trithiest God.  We can recall that Jenson attributes a dramatic coherence of events that 
links up and pulls together the teleological stream of events and decisions that is God into 
an integrated Divine personality.  There is a continuity and stability here that are the 
hallmarks of the one God in three identities at the centre of the Christian religion. 
 
We can note though that the Christ spoken of in this way may have Arian tendencies.  If 
he is not the logos asarkos, if his pre-existence can only be considered in the most tentative 
and attenuated way, if he only exists in four modalities – in a subtle underlying presence 
in the history and Scriptures of his people, in biological form in New Testament times, in 
ecclesial form in present times, and as totus Christus in the fulfilled future - then he may be 
less than the Christ defined by Nicea and Chalcedon. 
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Who is the God who comes among us? 
 
This indifference to the past of God's being, this denial of his prior actuality, creates 
difficulties about the kind of God the believer hopes to encounter in the end process of 
salvation.  Like Philipp Melanchthon, a founder of Jenson's theological tradition, he tends 
to focus on the beneficia of God's works on behalf of the believer, rather than on 
speculation about the God who causes them to happen, and who stands behind them.  
There is a fascinating parallel here with the Anglican priest poet George Herbert, who 
tends to use words drawn for the world of human affectivity as synonyms for God in his 
poems.  Consider his poem The Call: 
 
Come, my Way, my Truth, my Life: 
Such a Way, as gives us breath: 
Such a Truth, as ends all strife: 
And such a Life, as killeth death. 
 
Come, my Light, my Feast, my Strength: 
Such a Light, as shows a feast: 
Such a Feast, as mends in length: 
Such a Strength, as makes his guest. 
 
Come, my Joy, my Love, my Heart: 
Such a Joy, as none can move: 
Such a Love, as none can part: 
Such a Heart, as joyes in love. 
 
It is what God does to people, the effects he creates, the affective states he generates in 
people that is of interest here, rather than the God who produced them.  The notion of 
loving God for his own sake, or that the source of true human happiness, pleasure, 
fulfilment, contentment comes from creaturely participation in his being is not considered.  
Yet the issue of God's quiddity, his most essential mode of existence, is unavoidable here.  
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The question of what God is, and how God is are inescapably connected to his salvific 
effects. 
 
Divine revelation, or the story of God revealed in the Scriptures, leaves us asking, who is 
the God who comes among us as he is?  And that in turn means we have to ask where 
does this God come from?  To read the Bible as the book of the acts of God is to be left 
asking the question – Who is the one who acts thus?  So the past of God is an unavoidable 
issue.  Indeed, the gospels themselves are mightily interested in the question of where this 
life that has appeared among us comes from, hence the way in which the themes of 
gynaecology and genealogy are deployed right from the start.   
 
The conclusion that the orthodox theologically reflecting community has come to as it has 
pondered the data of Divine origins as revealed in the incarnation is that the God on 
display among us is a God who is wholly achieved and self-sufficient, that the Triune 
persons have a substantial presence, and that an essential part of the missions of the Son 
and the Spirit is to reveal their origins.  In this way they present their credentials as 
trustworthy bringers of salvation so that its recipients can know who they are dealing 
with, and can come to know that they are in relationship with a reliable God.   In a way it 
is odd that Philipp Melanchthon, and the theological tradition flowing on from him to 
include Robert Jenson, are so disinclined to encourage theological interest in and 
speculation about the inner life of God, since this addresses a fundamental anxiety in 
Protestant Reformation theology – the possibility of a God behind God, a dark God who 
does not wish the human race well, despite his apparently benign acts in salvation history.  
Such a nightmare God came into clear focus in the writings of the 20th century son of a 
Swiss Reformed Pastor, Carl Jung, with his God who is beyond morality, the maker of 
weal and woe as he pleases, who acts without reference to the best interests of the human 
race.  Such a God has even been deployed in the service of Christian theodicy to try and 
explain some of the more troubling incidents of 20th century history.25   
 
This is why a God who is all story and eventfulness, who has no apparent substance 
behind his will o' the wisp occurrence in human affairs, will not do.  God's past matters, 
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his prior actuality is a significant factor in the quality mark of his trustworthiness and 
reliability in his dealings with the world of human creatures.  And it is why Trinitarian 
theology that is deeply interested in the inner life of God is not a luxury or an optional 
extra.  The more one comes to know something of the inner life of the Triune persons, the 
style and the content of their life together, the less one has cause to fear the possibility of a 
rogue God.  The search for a gracious God has its fruitful conclusion in a theology firmly 
focused on the immanent Trinity. 
 
A God in flux? 
 
There is a further troubling issue to do with a God who is all future and no past.  It comes 
into clear relief in some quotes from an article entitled Challenging the Modalism of the West: 
Jenson on the Trinity by Timo Tavast, a theological offering which Jenson has warmly 
endorsed as showing a deep understanding of his theology: 
 
Using the perspective of the entire biblical narrative, Jenson expresses this same 
idea, arguing that the central events of the Old and New Testament, especially the 
Exodus and the Resurrection, did not happen only for human beings but for the 
Triune God Godself26...The Spirit is able to bring new aspects to God's reality, and 
these new, contingent historical matters are now inseparable parts of the Triune 
God's deepest nature27...In the theological model advanced by Jenson, true 
freedom is neither freedom from being influenced nor the timeless permanence of 
the status of origin.  Instead, the freedom of God – which also distinguishes the 
Trinity from creatures – is God's true openness to the future and to new 
possibilities realised by the Holy Spirit through the resurrection of the living Jesus, 
who died for us as an obedient servant of the Father...In this freedom, the Trinity 
is free to be what God would not necessarily have been.28 
 
Here in clear relief is the issue with which the conclusion of this thesis must wrestle.  Few 
would quarrel with the notion that the end of the human story will be a surprise for those 
to whom it will happen.  Those present at the eschaton, and the far greater number who 
will then experience the last judgement, possibly a sojourn in purgatory, and then the 
apportioning of each to their eschatological due, will no doubt experience many a 
surprise.  But Jenson proposes rather more than this – that the freedom that attends the 
                                                          




Holy Spirit's style of operations, and indeed that informs its very nature itself, is so radical 
that it will affect and alter God himself.  The future is wide open in its possibilities, and 
that applies also to God.  He is not conditioned and controlled by the past, but rather the 
developing interactions between God and humankind set the agenda for the eventual final 
form of God himself.  This is not quite what the Christian world has expected up until 
now: 
 
My dear people, we are already the children of God but what we are to be in the 
future has not yet been revealed; all we know is, that when it is revealed we shall 
be like him because we shall see him as he really is.29   
 
The redeemed have expected to be in for changes at the hand of God, but have assumed 
that they will be conformed to the image of a solid state God, one with continuity, 
constancy and stability as his hall marks of nature and identity.  That he may be a God in 
flux is the possibility that must be investigated in full as this thesis proceeds. 
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Chapter 2 
Ecclesiology and Christology 
 
We have noted before the robust ecclesiology in Jenson's Systematics.  In part it is a 
response to what he perceives to be the emergency situation that the Church faces in 
western culture.  He wants a Church with clear boundaries and a thick theological 
description so that it can see off the seductive allure of a surrounding culture that seeks to 
reshape the Church according to its nihilist and self-indulgent agendas.  However, as we 
shall map out in this chapter, it is Jenson's doctrine of God that is the primary driver of an 
ecclesiology that leaves even Catholics wondering at its dense texture. 
 
The Three Key Issues 
 
In this chapter we will resist the temptation to be drawn into an extended discussion of 
Jenson's ecclesiology.  Instead we will focus on three issues.  Does Jenson believe in the 
heavenly session – that Christ ascended into heaven to take his place at the right hand of 
the Father, from where he reigns as Lord of the Church?  This will involve a consideration 
of Jenson's theology of the Ascension.   
 
To what extent does Jenson’s belief that Christ's bodily location in the Church act as a 
preliminary formation point of the totus Christus?  Jenson believes that Christ exists in four 
successive modalities of being, an underlying literary pattern of pre-incarnate existence in 
the pages of the Old Testament, his biological existence as Jesus of Nazareth, his present 
existence as closely identified with the Body of Christ the Church, and his ultimate and 
fully deployed existence as the totality of all redeemed believers of which he will be the 
head.  To what extent is Christ as second identity of the Trinity distinct and apart from the 
church, both in its present existence, and in its eschatological fulfilment?  This issue is 
important because the totus Christus represents a substantial portion of what Jenson 
perceives to be the content of the end.  To what extent then does the Church in via 
constitute a major ingredient of the surprise ending to the story of salvation? 
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Thirdly, there will be a consideration of Jenson's use of the communicatio idiomatum within 
his ecclesiology and Christology.  This in turn will lead on to an investigation of his 
enthusiasm for Cyrillian single subject Christology, and how he has modified it to 
incorporate his rejection of Divine impassibility.  We will focus on an incident in the 
earthly life of Jesus, the temptation in the Garden of Gethsemane, and the possibility that 
Jesus might have given way under this extreme existential pressure.  This raises the issue 
of a God who might change, who may be developing in dialogue with the human story, 
and who might be a different God as the surprising ending comes about. 
 
Roman Catholic Reservations 
 
However, before leaving Jenson's ecclesiology to one side as a major topic we can usefully 
note some Roman Catholic observations and reservations about it.  Susan K. Wood thinks 
that Jenson so completely identifies the risen body Jesus with the Church that he comes 
close to arguing that the Church is an extension of the Incarnation.1  She goes on to note 
that at Vatican 2 Lumen Gentium prudentially put some space between the risen Christ and 
the church by describing the church as the sacrament of salvation, a modality of Christ's 
presence which both reveals and conceals him.  While the church is like the incarnate 
word it is not synonymous with him, and that is important because too close an 
identification between them ignores the reality that the church is in a state of becoming as 
it moves by grace towards the eschaton which has yet to arrive.2 
 
She notes also the way in which Jenson anchors the origins of the Church as one of God's 
gifts in creation.  It comes first before the gospel, for it was always God's intention to 
locate his being within the community.3  Francis Watson explains what Jenson is about 
here with great clarity.  “The church's origin lies in the Father's act of electing Jesus and his 
community, the totus Christus.  (In the earlier unfolding of the doctrine of the trinity, Jesus 
was presented in relative abstraction from the community; but, as we shall now see, the 
relationship between Jesus and the community is so close that the doctrine of the church 
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might itself have been developed within the doctrine of God.  If God is not God without 
Jesus, it is for that very reason that God is not God without the church.”4  Wood thinks 
that this is more than even the Roman Catholic Church claims for itself. 
 
Wood mentions too the way in which Jenson comes close to positioning the Church within 
the other three persons of the Trinity as a kind of fourth primary point within the biblical 
narrative.5  Though she does not mention it, this of course flows from Jenson's enthusiasm 
for Jonathan Edwards.  Since we will have to come back to this remarkable claim in our 
discussion of the totus Christus it is worth quoting Edwards on this point: “There was, (as) 
it were, an eternal society or family in the Godhead, in the Trinity of persons.  It seems to 
be God's design to admit the church into the divine family as his son's wife.  Heaven and 
earth were created that the Son of God might be complete in a spouse.”6  Here we see the 
way in which Christology and ecclesiology come together in a potent mix in the 
developing relationship of the Triune persons as the End discloses itself.  We are also left 
pondering as a dilemma for later exploration the extent to which the second person of the 
Trinity and the fully deployed totus Christus can be and will be distinguished from one 
another. 
 
Jenson on the Ascension 
 
So to proceed to the first question, to what extent does Robert Jenson believe that Jesus 
ascended into heaven to sit at the right hand of the Father?  At several points in his 
Systematic Theology he says that he does7, but we can note how nuanced he is in this 
declaration.  The Ascension functions for him as the terminating point in the plot lines of 
events that the gospels report about the life, death and resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth.8  
To ask where Jesus came from in his resurrection appearances is to receive the answer that 
he came from the fulfilled future of the kingdom, from heaven if you like.  Is heaven then 
the place and space where God dwells, waiting for the Church to come to him across the 
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horizon of its eschatological destiny, from where he is drawing and attracting it to its 
fulfilment within the Triune economy?  Yes and no appears to be the answer, and the 
more a curious reader digs into his Systematics the more complex and interesting the 
question becomes. 
 
God is described as the Eschatos9 , an apt title for the one who we are told comes from the 
future.  Yet we are told very little about the life of the God of the future as he lives his life 
of fulfilled bliss in his preferred time zone.  In this Jenson is consistent, for he has ruled out 
speculation about the inner life of God as an unproductive and inappropriate exercise.  
The kind of speculation he is against is about that of processions within the immanent life 
of the Trinity, such as Augustine and Aquinas typically engage in.  Jenson is a theologian 
of the economy and of the missions of the Trinity.  He is thoroughly Lutheran in believing 
that human beings have no business trying to pry into God's private life.  Furthermore, the 
relentlessly forward momentum of the teleological stream of events that Jenson calls God 
is too fast a moving target, is too much a fleeting phantom, to be able to get a fix on.  The 
image of sitting at the right hand of God suggests rest and repose in calm magisterial 
gravitas.  Jenson must pay lip service to this received image from Scripture and Tradition, 
but it implies the kind of static, immobilised God that he has been at pains to remove from 
his doctrine of God.  About as far as he is prepared to go, in another publication, in which 
he is discussing the communion of attributes, is to concede that, “‘Jesus sits at the right 
hand’ of God predicates universal rule.”10 
 
Jenson is prepared to concede that Jesus exists in several different styles.  Yet these other 
styles are in a way beside the point because of Jenson's famous declaration that Jesus has 
risen into the Church, that embodiment equals availability, that Jesus has embodied 
himself and made himself available in the Church and its sacraments, and that heaven is 
where God is.  Jesus “needs no other body to be a risen man, body and soul.  There is and 
needs to be no other place than the church for him to be embodied, nor in that other place 
any other entity to be the ‘real’ body of Christ.  Heaven is where God takes space in his 
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creation to be present to the whole of it; he does that in the Church.”11  Thus heaven is 
collapsed into the life of the Church. 
 
We can notice immediately a follow on consequence in terms of a theology of the 
Ascension.  Traditionally Jesus as Lord of the Church has been assumed to be carrying out 
his leadership role from the right hand of the Father in heaven.  Yet in Jenson's assessment 
of this role Jesus leads the Church from within it where he is “ruling in the hearts of his 
believers from the church's table, font and pulpit.”12  Here one is left wondering whether 
Jenson means this in a provisional or complete sense.  He goes on to say that Jesus “can 
find his Ego in a community of earthly creatures and have that community as his body.  
Nor is the one human personality Jesus thereby separated or divided,”13 so the head is 
well and truly connected to the body, and the Ascended Christ appears to have descended 
into his community, which has thereby acquired a dense ecclesial texture as the place of 
Divine indwelling.   This raises questions as to the extent that he takes the Church's 
sinfulness seriously. 
 
There is an irony and ambiguity here.  On the one hand the church has been valorised, 
both by locating Christ's availability within it as his risen body, and by privileging the 
ecclesiological biblical model of body of Christ above all others, despite the fact that it is 
only mentioned four times in the New Testament.14  Yet on the other hand his account of 
the founding of the church is resolutely eschatological in such a way as to point to its 
provisional nature.  “God institutes the church by not letting Jesus' Resurrection be itself 
the End, by appointing ‘the delay of the Parousia.’”15  Similarly “The church is nothing 
other than an appropriate if beforehand unpredictable side step in the fulfilment of the 
Lord's promise to Israel.  The church is, just as Loisy insinuated, an eschatological detour 
of Christ's coming; ...Thus the church is neither a realization of the new age nor an item of 
the old age.  She is precisely an event within the event of the new age's advent.”16  As an 
interim community, which is deficient in not having the broad mass of Jewish 
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membership that were the primary mission target of Jesus of Nazareth, that is living 
between the ages, one is left wondering whether it deserves the valorisation that Jenson 
has bestowed upon it? 
 
There are also pneumatological and eschatological complications here.  Apparently, 
seizing the eschatological arrestor hook to stop the post resurrection end to human history 
was the work of the Spirit.  Doing this, and founding the church are two sides of the same 
coin.  “Pentecost is the Spirit's particular personal initiative to delay the Parousia: when 
the Spirit descends eschatologically yet without raising all the dead and ending the age, 
the time of the church is opened.”17  Yet what the Spirit has created is a community so 
deeply imbued with the bodily presence of the second person of the Trinity that it raises 
questions  as to whether He is indeed dwelling with the Father in the heavenly realms, 
and crucially whether He can therefore come again at his second coming to his followers 
and the creation.  Can the one who is so firmly located below in the here and now of the 
developing life of the totus Christus be also the one who will return in glory?  That role 
indeed appears to have been usurped by the Spirit, as “The Spirit is God coming to us 
from the last future; he is God coming from and as the Kingdom.”18   Jenson spells this out 
in more detail in another place in this way: 
 
It is in that the Spirit is God as the power of God's own and our future and, that is 
to say, the Power of a future that also for God is not bound by the predictabilities, 
that the Spirit is a distinct identity of and in God.  The Spirit is God as his and our 
future rushing upon him and us; he is the eschatological reality of God, the Power 
as which God is the active Goal of all things, as which God is for himself and for 
us those 'things not seen' that with us call for faith and with him are his infinity.19 
 
Later in this work it will be necessary to unpack this convoluted quotation, which is at the 
heart of this particular thesis topic, but for now we can note that apparently the one who 
will usher in the last days is the third Triune identity, who appears to have exclusive 
rights on the last act of salvation history.  While it is true that Jenson assumes that the 
Spirit will find himself in the fully realised totus Christus, it is the Spirit nonetheless who 
initiates the End as the completer and perfector of salvation.  The totus Christus would 
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seem to be in somewhat passive mode as the consummation occurs.  Some may feel at this 
point that key aspects of the doctrine of the Spirit have been short changed, that certain 
dimensions of classical pneumatology have been neglected, that what we have here is a 
theologian of the identity of God, and not the nature of God. 
 
Key to understanding Robert Jenson's theology of the Ascension is what he understands 
heaven to be, and its implications for the future.  On the one hand, “Heaven, we saw, is 
the place of the future as this is anticipated by God.  To our present concern, what is in 
heaven is therefore Jesus as the head of that communal body that itself will only be whole 
at the End.”20  It is “finally defined within apocalyptic metaphysics, where it is the created 
future's presence – as future! - with God.”21 On the other hand, “heaven is the origin of the 
call of God's coming Kingdom, insofar as that call is a created force beckoning within the 
creation.  The creation is liberated to its End and Fulfilment by God the Spirit; heaven is 
the telos of this dynamism insofar as it is a teleology within creation itself. “22 
 
What this appears to mean is that heaven is the presence of the future from which God's 
generative salvation initiatives come, such as the implanting of Jesus in the womb of the 
Virgin Mary, and the descent of the Spirit on the day of Pentecost to halt the imminent 
Parousia and thereby create the Church as a pre-eschatological communal structure.  
Heaven is also the anticipated future which God possesses by anticipation.  However, this 
is not a fixed future fully determined in all its details because, as we shall be discovering 
later on in this work, the future is open in its possibilities, both for the creation and for 
God.  One could say it is a future of anticipated possibilities and scenarios.   
 
Heaven is where Jesus sits at the right hand of God in a putative and nominal sense.  Lip 
service is paid to the location of the head of the Church in the ascended heavenly realm.  
The fact of the matter, however, is that Christ is where he decides to be, and he has chosen 
to be in the Church so as to be available in the present dimension of humankind's 
salvation prospects.  This is where he must be since any post-Ptolemaic understanding of 
the universe could not conclude that heaven is a spatial location, in which God dwells 
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separate from the creation.  The metaphor of Ascension enthronement will be fulfilled at 
the End when “The space between the Father and Christ at his right hand accompanies the 
embodiment of the totus Christus.”23  The Ascension in the fuller and traditional 
understanding will only occur when all things are fulfilled and complete.  It too is a future 
event. 
 
Yet the here and now dimension is inescapably there in any consideration of heaven 
because, as we noted three paragraphs before, it is “the call of God's coming Kingdom,” it 
“is a created force beckoning within the creation,” it “is the telos of this dynamism in so 
far as it is a teleology within creation itself.”  In this sense it is the force that drives the 
future from within the present, rather than a fully realised atemporal supernatural reality 
drawing creation on to an inevitable conclusion, which is the conclusion that Jenson wants 
to avoid.  It is the galvanising internal accelerator of the flow of events that occur within 
time, rather than the haven of rest and peace of resolved personal histories.  It is the 
motivator and animator of the forward momentum towards the future, the time 
dimension that really counts, and the only place where God can truly be said to be, apart 
from his robust presence in the Church. 
 
In the opinion of this appreciative reader of Jenson the ambiguity and ambivalence of his 
attitude to Christ's heavenly session is finally resolved in one decisive quote that says it 
all.  “Any picture of God ruling the hearts of his believers from the Church's table, font 
and pulpit, and ruling the rest of creation from some place else called heaven, it is here 
claimed, radically inappropriate.”24  Thus we may now turn to the place of the earthly 
totus Christus as a major ingredient of the surprising ending to the story of salvation. 
 
Separating the Second Triune Identity and the totus Christus 
 
A problem with the two volume Systematics is that Jenson is often trying to say so much in 
so compressed a space that his taut aphorisms and highly condensed paragraphs can be 
difficult to unpack, offering as they do an ambiguity of interpretation.  In the matter of the 
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totus Christus Jenson is much clearer when in more relaxed mode in his article Christ as 
Culture 1: Christ as Polity.  Here he both states what he means by the term, and outlines a 
tension that must now be explored: 
 
Christ is eschatologically and so ecclesially what Augustine called the totus 
Christus: he is himself simply as himself and he is himself as one with his disciples, 
with the members of his body; and only as he is both is he indeed himself.  His 
person, in so far like ours, is constituted by his vocation and its carrying-out; but 
his mission was precisely to give himself wholly to others – consider only, 'This is 
my body given for you.'...the structure we have just described is the structure of 
Christ's personal life only, of the life that could and did empty itself by death into 
a community of disciples without thereby vanishing into the community.  Christ is 
and remains the second identity of the community as one only; yet he and the 
community he brings with him into the life of the Trinity are again one and the 
same 'whole Christ.'  Christ has a body that is itself a community of bodies; while I 
have only one thing that sits at the computer as I write.  Nevertheless, the relation 
between Christ and the church is the prototype of my relation to my body, so that 
analogies can be drawn: just as I am my body yet can stand over against my body 
to discipline it or harm it or suffer it or enjoy it, so Christ is the church yet stands 
over against the church to discipline and shape and suffer and enjoy it.25 
 
The distinction between Christ as second identity of the Trinity and Christ as totus Christus 
is well put, but has he put sufficient space between the two to prevent Christ in his second 
modality simply dissolving into the community?  The question is important for this work 
because it determines whether Christ will simply be a collective entity in the life of the 
world to come, or whether he will be sufficiently separate to welcome the church as bride 
into the Triune economy. 
 
Jenson inserts three ontological buffers to maintain the degree of separation.  Christ's 
robust risen presence in the Church is through the medium of the sacraments, especially 
the Eucharist.  Thus he is in its midst, sustaining it, inspiring it and feeding it with his 
risen life, while at the same time not being completely identified with it in every detail.  So 
it is that he can assert, and agree with, the doctrine of Eucharistic sacrifice.  “The risen 
Christ now offers himself and his church, the totus Christus, to the Father.  This offering 
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anticipates his eschatological self-offering, when he will bring the church and all creation 
to the Father that God may be “all in all.”26 
 
He also distinguishes between the two by making use of the Scriptural metaphor of bride 
for the Church.  “In the New Testament, the church and risen Christ are one but can also 
be distinguished from each other; thus, for example, the church is the risen Christ's bride 
(Ephesians 5: 31-31) so that Christ and the church are joined as a couple.  We may not so 
identify the risen Christ with the church as to be unable to refer distinctly to the one and 
then the other.”27  It is prudential for Jenson to have worked the bride ecclesial image into 
his script since those theologians who prefer a thick theological description for the Church 
often use “body” and “bride” in tandem as their preferred descriptors, while Jenson has 
let “body” do pretty much all the heavy lifting in his ecclesiology. 
 
The third buffer is an eschatological one, referring in particular to the internal life of the 
totus Christus in the fulfilled future, and its asymmetric relationship to the Triune persons.   
“The diachronically constituted community cannot be raised without its past members.  
Nor are we to become identical with one another, or melt into one monadic superperson, 
even one named totus Christus.  The redeemed life will be congruent with and moved by 
the divine life, and this is the mutual life of irreducible personal identities.”28  So the 
redeemed are to be sharply distinguished one from another, and Christ from them.  
Furthermore, “God can indeed, if he chooses, accommodate other persons in his life 
without distorting that life.  God, to state it as boldly as possible, is roomy.  Indeed, if we 
were to list divine attributes, roominess would have to come next after jealousy.  He can, if 
he chooses, distinguish himself from others not by excluding them but by including 
them.”29   Here we can recall Jenson's enthusiastic quoting of Jonathan Edwards earlier in 
this chapter in which he wrote of Jesus bringing his bride with him to share in the life of 
the Trinity, thus bringing Jenson's second and third ontological buffer into play 
simultaneously.  We can also recall Susan Wood's distinct unease at this move with its 
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implications that the church as totus Christus has thereby achieved almost fourth person 
status within the Trinity. 
 
Ian McFarland is also not convinced that Jenson has provided a sufficient degree of 
separation between the risen Christ and the church.  He thinks that Jenson has pressed the 
body of Christ imagery so hard as “to suggest that the church exhausts Christ's 
objectivity,” that he has thereby risked compromising “Christ's freedom over against the 
community,” and that despite Jenson's enthusiasm for communio ecclesiology he has missed 
the point that, “However intimate their union is conceived, the head and members of the 
ecclesial body are not parts of a single organism, but a communion of persons whose 
enduring, bodily distinctiveness is a defining feature of Christian belief.”30  For McFarland 
the balance between the dimensions of union and distinction can be found by going back 
to Scripture, and by taking a long, hard look at a key passage from Ephesians: 
 
speaking the truth in love, we must grow up in every way into him who is the 
head, into Christ, from whom the whole body, joined and knitted together by 
every ligament with which it is equipped, as each part is working properly, 
promotes the body's growth in building itself up in love. (Eph. 4: 14-16; cf. Col. 2: 
19)31 
 
By making a clear distinction between Christ as the head of the body the church, and 
Christians as members of that body, Ephesians makes it clear that Christ is the source and 
goal of the Church's growth as the members grow into him.  It gives him a degree of 
objectivity over against the church, and makes clear that as head he enjoys absolute 
priority over it, while at the same time preventing any notion of the body existing in 
ontological separation from the head:   
 
The identity of the ecclesial body is not simply an amalgam of the various 
individual identities of its members, but is rather determined by the head as the 
source and goal of the body’s’ growth.  There is thus no possibility that the 
engrafting of new members will change this body's identity; it is rather the 
members whose identities are transformed in the process of growing into the head 
(Romans 8: 29; 2 Corinthians 3: 18).  At the same time, however, the fact that this 
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body does grow means that Jesus, though the source of the body's identity, does 
not exhaust it.32   
 
These are telling points that leave this reader concluding that it would have been helpful if 
Jenson had done more in the Systematics to create a clear distinction between head and 





I turn now to a consideration of Jenson's use of the communicatio idiomatum, of Cyrillian 
single subject Christology, and their follow on consequences for the notion of Divine 
impassibility, and the possibility that Jenson believes in a God who changes as he interacts 
with the developing twists and turns of salvation history. 
 
The communicatio idiomatum was a theological resource developed by Patristic theologians 
to explain how Christ could simultaneously exist in his incarnate status on earth while at 
the same time governing the universe.  Cyril of Alexandria developed it further to explain 
how Christ had a highly unified identity as a single subject within his divine and human 
natures.33  To put it simply, for Cyril the Logos is a divine nature clothed with a human 
nature, rather than being a dual identity existing within separate compartments of divinity 
and humanity, the error which he supposed Nestorius to have committed.  Jenson sums 
up the Cyrillian take on the communicatio idiomatum with admirable clarity: 
 
each nature of Christ is active in communication with the other, each contributing 
what is proper to it and in its own way what is proper to the other...the one Christ 
lives his life as God and as a man, divinely and humanly, and his doings and 
sufferings cannot be sorted out into two differing sets of doings and sufferings.34 
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This theological resource was deployed for a different purpose within the context of 
reformation debates between Lutherans and Calvinists about Eucharistic presence.  
Calvinists assumed that the Ascended Christ could only be in one place, in heaven at the 
right hand of God the Father, and so could not be present on many altars.  The extra 
Calvinisticum was used to think through the way in which worshippers participated in 
Christ in the Eucharist.  Instead of Christ coming to them in the consecrated bread and 
wine the Holy Spirit lifts them up to the heavenly places to the heavenly banquet whereby 
they partake of a mystical union with Christ.  Lutherans, by contrast, had and have a 
robust doctrine of the real presence, and believe Christ can be simultaneously present on 
many altars because the communicatio idiomatum makes this possible.   
 
Robert Jenson has developed this resource further by way of the theology of Johannes 
Brenz and his 16th century Swabian contemporaries to explain how Christ can be present 
in different styles, in different ways and in different places at the same time:   
 
Since the creation is for God but one place immediately over against the place that 
he is, his simultaneous presence to the whole creation is unproblematic.  And his 
exercise of the presence will not be modulated by location within the creation, 
since for God there are no plural locations, but only by ontological context: he is in 
one way present in his Word, he is otherwise present at all points in created space, 
he is otherwise present in the hearts of believers, and so on.35 
 
Of course Jenson could have used this resource to explain how Christ can be 
simultaneously reigning over the church from heaven at the right hand of God while at 
the same time being powerfully present within it, but for the reasons just explained above 
he does not require this assistance.  Instead the Swabian take on the communicatio 
idiomatum is used to explain how Christ is present simultaneously in his risen bodily 
availability throughout the church throughout the world in a variety of modes, but most 
particularly in the Eucharist and in the sacramental life of the church. 
 
Both Jenson and the Swabians claim to have radical Cyrillian Christology on their side.  
What then does Cyril of Alexandria's Christology consist of?  Kenosis is a major focus of 
Cyril’s Christology.  The Son enters the human condition fully at its lowest point of 
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abasement.  To heal the human condition he must assume its most hurting aspects.  
Philippians 2: 5-10 maps out the contours of Christ’s descent into human lostness.  But this 
is kenosis in the patristic sense as Krypsis, concealment of the Divine attributes rather than 
the divesting of them.  The close ontological union of divine and human in this unique 
being gives him the capacity to experience human distress without surrendering his divine 
invulnerability to it.  He experiences this in his human nature, registers it in his divine 
nature, which in turn contains and lessens the vitiating attrition of pain and suffering. 
 
Nor is sin able to enter him at any point.  In fulfilment of Romans 8: 3 the Son is sent “in a 
form like that of our own sinful nature,” in such a way that “he has passed judgement 
against sin within that very human nature.” (NEB)  He does this by means of the 
communicatio idiomatum, another central concern of Cyril’s. 
 
For Cyril one of the major reasons for his commitment to a highly unified view of Christ’s 
incarnate medium of existence is because this enables human beings to be drawn into 
union with God – that Christ’s henosis leads to human theosis.  The purpose of the 
incarnation is the ontological restoration and rescue of the human race. 36  Cyril puts it this 
way, “For Christ is, as it were, a kind of common frontier of the supreme divinity and 
humanity (being both in the same one, and as it were holding together in himself things so 
greatly separated), and as God by nature he is joined to God the Father, and again, as truly 
a man, is joined to men.”37  Because Christ draws together in himself divinity and 
humanity he is able to be the unique generation and locus point for human participation in 
the divine life. 
 
We can note also that this is the enabling motif of his high doctrine of Eucharistic presence.  
As the baptised receive the body and blood of Christ the seeds of immortality are planted 
within them – they are reconnected to that vivifying source of Divine life that the human 
race lost contact with at the Fall.  So although the redeemed will still experience biological 
death their divinization is both a work in progress and their ultimate destination. 
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In a compare and contrast exercise between Cyril and Jenson we can note that Cyril’s 
doctrine of Eucharistic presence was virile, of “the medicine of immortality” variety,38  but 
was not associated with such a close-knit sense of identification with Christ’s post 
Ascension presence in the Church.  As Keating points out, the consequences of the 
Ascension have a different trajectory for Cyril: “The ascension and enthronement for Cyril, 
then: (1) brings the divine plan of salvation to its completion in Christ the first fruits; (2) 
reveals the end intended for the whole human race; and (3) inaugurates a renewed human 
life on earth through the gift of the Spirit.”39 
 
Cyril’s focus was on the more here and now issues to do with the way in which Christ was 
ontologically assembled and present in the days of his life on earth.  Four issues were at 
the forefront of his Christology: the need to settle on an agreed and adequate terminology 
with which to discuss and define the issues in dispute; the “what” of the Incarnation, that 
the eternal word of God is the one single subject in all the psychic and intellectual life of 
the incarnate Lord; the “why” of the Incarnation as a dynamic transaction stimulated by 
God’s redemptive mercy to become the source of the universalised divinization of the 
believer by grace; and the “how” of the Christological union, the manner of the 
relationship between the divine and the human in Christ.40  In a sense Jenson can take all 
this for granted, and build on these foundations for his own startling purposes. 
 
Robert Jenson’s Christology rests on Cyrillian foundations; he appropriates many of 
Cyril’s hard won gains in the Nestorian controversy.  It is a single subject Christology. But 
there are certain areas of its follow on conclusions that would cause Cyril concern, 
particularly as they relate to the issue of Divine impassibility.  Although Nestorius 
accused Cyril of being theopaschite in his Christology because of his highly paradoxical 
language about the way in which Christ suffered, he was in fact what we would call a soft 
impassibilist.  He believed that the Divine logos suffered in the manner of the flesh, in his 
human nature. “For Cyril, both qualified divine impassibility and qualified divine 
passibility were necessary for a sound theology of incarnation.  The affirmation of 
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impassibility was a way of protecting the truth that the one who became incarnate was 
truly God.  Admitting a qualified passibility secured the point that God truly submitted 
himself to the conditions of the incarnation.”41  For Cyril this is at the very centre of his 
Christological concerns because it provides a way of making sense of Philippians 2: 5-11, 
with his concomitant conviction that kenosis is the most important topic in Christology. 
 
Robert Jenson has a nuanced definition of divine impassibility.  Jenson proposes that the 
patristic writers used the term apatheia to make clear the Bible’s central notion of God’s 
unwavering faithfulness.  While God is affected by changes in knowledge, will and 
emotions, he remains constant in his personal identity, character and nature.  However, 
God’s identity is shaped by temporal events.  Human beings can interact with God in such 
a way as to generate emotional responses within him, and there is a considerable element 
of surprise in the way salvation history will play itself out, even to God. 
 
Jenson thinks that western Christianity has imported unhelpful elements of Hellenistic 
philosophy into its doctrine of God in such a way that God has been thought to be 
stoically free from emotional disturbances as a result of his interactions with the world of 
human creatures.  So seriously does Jenson take the biblical narratives of struggle, and the 
strength of divine emotions in response to the events of salvation history, that he takes 
literally the despair of Jesus in the Garden of Gethsemane – at this crucial point God feels 
despair because it is a possibility that he may experience defeat.  It is worth quoting Jenson 
on this point: 
 
What if Jesus had capitulated in the desert or in the garden?  We want to say this 
could not have happened, since by the dogma of Nicea Jesus is of one being with 
the Father, and God cannot despair.  But that again is to violate these stories of 
struggle and overcoming.  The church must indeed read the stories of the 
temptation and the garden by the dogma, but if their narrative character is 
honoured what they then tell is that deity might at those moments have broken-
whatever metaphysical sense we are to make of this.  The heart of the matter is 
that Jesus’ Resurrection appears in the New Testament not as an obvious 
consequence of his deity but as the Father’s amazing triumph.42 
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Cyril by contrast bookends the garden scene in such a way as to highlight the 
invulnerability and robust self-assurance of the Nicene God-man.  In his Commentary on 
Luke he portrays Jesus deliberately leaving the house where he had been instructing the 
disciples and going to the garden, where Judas would have known he was staying, in 
order to make himself easy to locate and arrest.43 And then in his Commentary on John he 
has Jesus deliberately identify himself and make himself known to the temple police to 
make it easy for them to arrest him because they could not recognise him through their 
own natural powers.44 
 
But Jenson has no patience with this approach: 
 
Here is a place at which the main theological tradition has simply capitulated, 
betraying the stories because it has been unable to fit them into its inadequately 
evangelized metaphysics.  Thus even John of Damascus and the Neo-
Chalcedonian tradition he summarized could do no better with the prayer in the 
garden than to interpret it as – not to put too fine a point on it – pedagogical play 
acting.  To portray Christ in his last night on earth in terms of such Stoic self-
control and omniscient anticipation and control of events is to undermine any 
realistic account of Christ’s kenosis.45 
 
But is this fair to Cyril’s account of Christ’s interior psychological states?  Here he is 
commenting on John 12: 27, “Now is my soul troubled.”  Cyril writes “For the thought of 
death that has slipped in attempts to agitate Jesus, while the power of the divinity at once 
masters the emotion that has been aroused and immediately transforms that which has 
been conquered by fear into an incomparable courage.”46  So the Word has power to 
transmute vulnerable human emotion into something else.  And the point of experiencing 
human distress in this way is to bring this modality of human experience into the process 
of salvation. 
 
For Jenson God has such a rich affective life that his emotions can be blinding forces, the 
passions that Patristic theology was so keen to distance God from.  So God’s love discloses 
itself often in the modality of divine jealously, in an insistent demand for exclusive 
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fidelity. Yet despite all this such a God is self-determining, wholly reliable, and will 
ultimately reach his objectives without being frustrated by his passions.  In what he 
proposes here Jenson has gone far beyond Cyril’s paradoxical Christology.  For as John 
Byung-Tek Song states Cyril is in accordance with the patristic tradition in viewing “God’s 
emotions as acts of his free grace that served as pedagogical tools to recall a wayward 
humanity”. They are, “voluntary, foreknown, purposeful, and non-overwhelming.”47 
 
Cyril had recognised the crucial point that “the predication of suffering to the divine 
nature alone would render the assumption of humanity superfluous, whereas the opposite 
extreme, the attribution of suffering to the human nature alone would jeopardize divine 
involvement.  Nestorius as we know, embraced the second option, while many modern 
defenders of divine suffering tend to settle for the first one.”48   Jenson, it could be argued, 
has surrendered the transcendence of God by an over-literal reading of the despair of 
Jesus in the Garden of Gethsemane. 
 
The Healing of Human Affectivity 
 
Moreover, there is a further dimension to Cyril's Christology that makes Jenson's reading 
of the Gethsemane scene unnecessary, and that illustrates why, for this author at least, 
Divine impassibility is a crucial cornerstone of Neo-Chalcedonian orthodoxy.  For Cyril 
Christ's invulnerability to human passions is not just a defence against being reduced by 
human frailty to less than Divine status and potentiality.  Christ has entered the human 
condition and has taken on human affectivity so as to fully experience it, and thus to heal 
it from within.  Christ as it were experiences human emotions Divinely so as to open up 
the dimension of human affectivity to its full potential, so that it may enter into its proper 
and God intended functioning.   Human affectivity as we now know it is a disordered and 
etiolated reality.  One of the purposes of the incarnation is to re-order it, and to restore it to 
what it was supposed to be when God first invented the palate of emotional tones and 
responses that make up a key dimension of human experience.  Thus the acute existential 
distress that Christ experiences in the Garden of Gethsemane is not a crisis moment of 
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potentially falling away from his mission agenda at the 11th hour, but is rather the healing 
from within of extremes of negative and destructive human emotions.  Human 
disobedience is healed from within. 
 
This is why single subject Christology and the communicatio idiomatum matter at the 
deepest level in Cyril's theology.  As Andrew Mellas puts it:   
 
St Cyril of Alexandria held that it was Christ's appropriation of flesh that made it 
possible for the Logos to experience human emotions and transform 
them...Christ's temptations, suffering and emotions were not attributed simply to 
his human nature but ascribed to the one incarnate Logos; to do otherwise would 
render asunder the unified subjectivity of Christ into a human self and divine alter 
ego...In contemplating Christ's emotions, the healing of a fallen humanity through 
the communication  of idioms within the hypostatic union is what mattered, not 
whether an emotion was natural or unnatural.  Christ did not suppress his 
humanity and its passions but divinised them 49   
 
The purpose of all this is so that Christ's followers can henceforth be taught to feel things 
beyond their nature, so that a healed affectivity can become the norm in their emotional 
life. 
 
Thus Robert Jenson has missed the point about the Gethsemane scene, by not grasping the 
deeper dimension of Cyril's Christology.  There is no “pedagogical play acting” going on 
in Gethsemane, but rather an entering into the depths of human distress, while at the same 
time remaining immune from its internally destructive effects, in such a way as to heal 
and heighten human affective capacities.  Divine immutability is not abandoned, nor is it 
necessary for it to be jettisoned.  There could be no question or possibility of the divine 
mission being abandoned.  While divine aspiration and human response has entered into 
close combination in the gospel story they are not so symbiotically intertwined as to 
change the inner nature of God, or to alter his being as the developing story of salvation 
plays out in the post resurrection, post Pentecost era.  Whatever surprise awaits believers 
at the End it will not involve encountering a Triune God who has changed in himself as a 
result of encounters with the human situation. 
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What does await believers is a re-ordered affectivity, restored back to what it should have 
been from the beginning, and now elevated to the enhanced emotional capacity of the 
pioneer of salvation.  The new humanity will be neither overwhelmed by nor deceived by 
their feelings.  This outcome will be a sub set of the ending of the reign of sin, of the 
redeemed's ontological elevation and greater existential density. 
 
What is not clear, and awaits that ultimate resolution and discovery, is whether this will 
be a uniform style of rightly ordered emotions or whether the different cultural 
expectations and expressions of emotional registers known in this world's pluralist 
cultures will be mirrored in heaven.  The only clue to this puzzle is the way Dante 




In this chapter we drew the conclusion that while Jenson pays lip service to the tradition 
that Christ ascended into heaven to be Lord of the Church this is in fact such a nuanced 
and ambivalent affirmation as to be of little account.  For him Christ's risen body is firmly 
located within the Church.  The Ascension in its fullest and fulfilled sense is a future 
event. 
 
We noted that Jenson has made a major effort to clearly distinguish between the second 
identity of the Trinity and the completed totus Christus in heaven by inserting three 
ontological buffers between them.  We noted too the attempt to distinguish between Christ 
as groom and church as bride in the present existence of the church, and between Christ as 
source of sacramental grace and the church as nurtured and nourished body.  However, 
many of Jenson's critics are not satisfied on this score. 
 
In an extended discussion of Jenson's commitment to Cyrillian single subject Christology 
and the communicatio idiomatum we called into question Jenson's commitment to 
overturning Divine immutability, and raised concerns about the possibility of God 
changing and developing in dialogue with human salvation history.  We concluded that 
Jenson has failed to appreciate Cyril's significant contribution to the link between Christ's 
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self-possession in the face of disabling distress and human affectivity – that he thereby 
offers a pathway to healed human affectivity.  This is available for partial appropriation 
now, and for complete reception in the life of the world to come when sin and death will 
be banished. 
 
We turn now to a consideration of intra-Trinitarian relations and their implications for a 
doctrine of God that is shaped by the doctrine of eschatology.
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Chapter 3 
The Spirit of Freedom and Love 
 
In this chapter we consider how intra-Trinitarian relations have a bearing on the End in 
the Jensonian scheme of things.  Particular attention will be paid to the proprium of the 
Holy Spirit and that of the Son. 
 
New Zealand theologian Andrew Burgess is a trenchant critic of Jenson's Trinitarian 
thought.  He asserts that Jenson has collapsed the Spirit into being the spirit of Jesus in 
such a way that one cannot differentiate the Spirit from the Son.1  In fact almost the 
opposite is the case.  The Spirit's independent role (in terms of subsistent relations) is 
robust and remarkable.  Jenson's highly original pneumatology gives the Spirit pride of 
place within the workings of the Triune persons, and bestows upon him a pre-eminent 
and privileged significance.   
 
In what has now become a famous article about Barth's theology of the Holy Spirit entitled 
“You wonder where the Spirit went” Robert Jenson set out to address an issue noted by 
the North American Karl Barth society, that long stretches of Barth's thinking seemed 
binitarian rather than Trinitarian. 2   He contended that in Barth's theology the Spirit does 
not appear as a party in the triune actuality, that the Spirit was condemned by his 
treatment of the vinculum  doctrine to remain a modus only, and that the Spirit 
disappeared from Barth's pages whenever he would appear as someone rather then 
something.3   He concluded with two questions “How is the Spirit at once his own person 
and what 'all three' hypostases are together?  How is the Spirit at once who has power and 
that power itself?”4  Jenson has set out to remedy these pneumatological issues with 
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The Spirit and the totus Christus 
 
If one were to give the Spirit a particular title that expressed in catch all terms what he 
primarily does it would be that of relationship initiator, repairer and reconciler, in which 
the quality of these relationships is elevated.  This has an immediate significance for what 
shall be in the life of the totus Christus in the life of the world to come because the Spirit 
will be the giver and enhancer of individual potentiality and fully realised existence 
within the completed totus Christus.   We have noted before Jenson's conviction that the 
redeemed will not “become identical with one another, or melt into one monadic 
superperson, even one named totus Christus.”5   That is because the Spirit will confer a 
relationship of freedom within the totus Christus.  The redeemed are, “liberated for one 
another by the Spirit – as we may recall are the Father and the Son...this means that the 
totus Christus, as the one as whom I am available to myself, becomes the subject by whose 
liveliness I am what I am.  And that is to say, Christ himself becomes the subject by whose 
liveliness I am what I am.  In the Spirit, the Christ who is what I am is the Christ who is 
who I am.”6  To express that in a less convoluted form, the redeemed will be supremely 
who they are, in fact will be more themselves than they have ever been, because they will 
find themselves in Christ and in one another as the Spirit makes this possible as the spirit 
of freedom who takes away the threat of otherness posed by this ego re-location process.  
The Spirit will resolve the apparent antinomy of a highly communitarian style of existence 
that at the same time permits a highly individualised mode of existence. 
 
Furthermore this differentiation and elevation of the identity of the redeemed in the 
completed totus Christus is not just a process that the Spirit bestows upon the redeemed, 
for it also carries out a vital function in the identity formation of the Spirit.  “The Spirit 
finds his “I” in the Son just insofar as the Son is the totus Christus, insofar as the Son 
includes and is included in his community.  And the Spirit himself is nothing other than 
the Freedom that occurs in these relations.  Thus the Spirit himself is located at the Goal of 
God's ways.”7  Although he does not refer to a particular Russian Orthodox source, and is 
perhaps unaware of it, this has fascinating parallels with Vladimir Lossky's pneumatology 
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and eschatology where he writes, “For the Holy Spirit is the sovereign unction resting 
upon the Christ and upon all the Christians called to reign with Him in the age to come.  It 
is then that this divine Person, now unknown, not having His image in another 
Hypostasis, will manifest Himself in deified persons: for the multitude of the saints will be 
His image.”8  So just as the Father finds his ego in the Son, so the Spirit will eventually 
locate his ego in the deified ones who make up the communal Christ.  Here we see another 
Jenson theme repeated – that the events of human salvation history and the economy of 
the Trinity are so intertwined that human creatures can have a vital influence on the 
internal life of God.  What they do has the potential to affect the final shape of the Triune 
identities. 
 
Before leaving this important eschatological differentiation point we can note also that it 
addresses in part a concern raised in the last chapter – that of Christ as second person of 
the Trinity being differentiated from the completed and perfected totus Christus in the life 
of heaven.  Accordingly the Spirit will provide a further ontological buffer between the 
communal body of Christ and the individual second identity of the Trinity.   
 
To be clearer about this, Robert Jenson believes that the Father generates the Son, and 
breathes the Spirit upon the Son.  Thus the Spirit is closely associated with the Son, and so 
the Son can bestow the Spirit upon the Church.  It is the Spirit that agitates the Church into 
life with his liveliness, hence the outbreak of prophecy at its birth.  The Spirit gives the 
church its group spirit, its communal spirit, just as a successful sports team has a good 
team spirit.9  That spirit is one of congruence and faithful identity with the risen Christ.  
The church is kept on track as the body of Christ as the Spirit links the Head to the body, 
and moves this present availability of Christ to the world through time.  Scott Swain 
expresses this memorably in a telling phrase, drawn in part from another source - “The 
Spirit thus 'blazes a trail through time on the way to the kingdom':10 birthing, nourishing 
and perfecting the totus Christus, head and body.”11 
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The Spirit and the Church 
 
Robert Jenson describes the resurrection of Jesus as an unanticipated surprise.  
Furthermore the resurrection of Jesus is not a once and for all event – it is a process that is 
still working its way through in the unfolding life of the church as the body of Christ.  In 
that sense Christ is said to possess the fullness of his risen body only in anticipation, and 
will not reach that place of fullness until the totus Christus is completed and perfected at 
the End.  This following through of the process of resurrection from beginning to end in 
the life of the communal Christ is the work of the Spirit as it frees up the life of the 
members of the body to be truly the body of Christ.  Thus the church acquires greater 
ecclesial density, an enhanced hinterland of koinonia and theological content, through the 
operation of the Spirit.  Unusually for Jenson he uses sociological terms to describe this 
leavening process, the sociological distinction between Gesellschaft (“society” or 
“association”) and Gemeinschaft (“community”).  The transition from society to community 
can only happen when the Spirit enlivens the church to be more than the spirits of its 
members.12  The church in via is moving from the one to the other, a useful distinction for 
it both explains the disappointing and etiolated koinonia of the western church, offers hope 
for its anticipated future eschatological development, while at the same time enabling a 
distinction to be made between Christ as head of his church and Christ as husband of his 
church: 
 
The object that is the church-assembly is the body of Christ, that is, Christ 
available to the world and to her members, just in that the church gathers around 
objects distinct from herself, the bread and the cup, which are the availability to her 
of the same Christ.  Within the gathering we can intend Christ as the community 
we are, without self-deification, because we jointly intend the identical Christ as 
the sacramental elements in our midst, which are other than us.13 
 
Jenson is even clearer about the roll out consequences of Christ's resurrection in the 
developing life of the church in this place: 
 
There is even a sense in which Christ, insofar as his body the church is still an 
association also and not purely a community, possesses his risen body only in 
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anticipation; thus the Lord's own resurrection awaits a future also.  Removal of the 
interim separation between the members of Christ and their Head, which appears 
in the sacramental character of his presence with them, is the heart of the 
resurrection.14 
 
Before leaving this consideration of the intertwined fortunes and destiny of the Triune 
persons and the church I offer two points to ponder.  Robert Jenson has made it clear that 
despite the fact of heavy Christological and pneumatological investment in the textures 
and structures of the body of Christ on earth it is quite conceivable that a church may so 
depart from faithfulness to God's ways that he may withdraw from its life.  Indeed he 
considers that some ecclesial communities in the western/American church may be 
rapidly approaching the point of apostasy, and in consequence the withdrawal of the 
Shekinah presence from their collective life.  This of course provides a helpful let out 
clause from his high ecclesiology.  The Triune persons are not so symbiotically connected 
to the church that their integrity can be undermined by human sin, folly and 
unfaithfulness.  God is free to withdraw his presence from churches that have gone wrong.   
 
However, should such a separation take place where does this leave God?  A God of 
protological origins can cope, existing in sovereign freedom from humankind and all its 
machinations, his shimmering plenitude of being not requiring human praise and 
adoration, even though he loves to have it if it is offered.  What though of the God who 
only exists in the future, and in the here and now?  The possible shape(s) of the future, its 
contours and outcomes, are developing in dialogue between the God who is event and 
conversation with his dialogical partner, the wayward western church.  Such a God and 
such a future(s) might well be vulnerable to human rejection, indifference and mendacity. 
 
The second point to ponder is closely related.  Missiologists and church historians often 
point with growing concern to the speed with which the church and the Christian faith are 
evaporating in western culture and societies.  The possibility of the church reaching 
vanishing point within a generation is now a potential and credible scenario.  A possible 
response is that God may pack his bags and go to Africa, where the faith has been 
spreading like wildfire since the continent's nineteenth century evangelisation.  However, 
as Missiologists often point out, the Christian faith in Africa is 'a mile wide and an inch 
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deep,' hence its lack of impact on endemic problems in African society such as corruption 
and civil conflict.  Again, the God of the future, whose fortunes and destiny are so closely 
intertwined with his body on earth, and whose Son lives in his church, may find himself 
homeless, ignored and unloved in the west, and reduced to a thin overlay existence in 
Africa.  The inner life of the Trinity could be thinned out in tandem with his reduced and 
etiolated life in the church, and the eschatological destiny of his totus Christus derailed.  
Earlier we noted that Jenson considers that Christ might have turned away from his 
cruciform destiny in the Garden of Gethsemane, might have failed to follow through in his 
mission at the eleventh hour, since this is the way things could be given the dynamic 
stream of unfolding teleological events that he calls God.  Thus also the church as totus 
Christus could unravel, and with it Christ's embodied presence in the world disappear, 
with unpredictable consequences for the inner life of God.  The God who existed before 
time began, before he created the people of God, could exist in sovereign freedom and 
undiminished radiance of being, despite their rejection of him and his winnowing 
judgement of them.  The God of only future location, and present inhabitation of his 
communal earthly existence, is in a more vulnerable position. 
 
There is a possible Jensonian counter argument to this, one he engages with in his 
commentary on Ezekiel, particularly in the section on the departure of the cherubim 
throne and the Shekinah from the Temple in Jerusalem15.  Despite the diminution of the 
Covenant community to a small exiled remnant God's presence was still with them as he 
worked among them to make them more than they were.  God's rejection of Israel and 
Judah as a faithless people, the destruction of the Temple and those nation states, and the 
seventy years of exile did not diminish the being of God?  Perhaps only a small number of 
faithful followers are required to keep the dynamic stream of events that Robert Jenson 
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The Pre-existence of Christ 
 
Since we are about to embark upon a careful consideration of the proprium of the Son, and 
are at present in Old Testament territory, it is time to consider the issue of Christ's pre-
existence.  This concerns the subject matter of this thesis because Jenson's difficulties with 
beginnings have a follow on effect in his consideration of the End.  The way he thinks 
about the origins of Christ, and his relationship to the Father, have a bearing on Christ’s 
stature over against the totus Christus and his location within it. 
 
As with his theology of the Ascension Jenson wants to assert that he believes in the pre-
existence of Christ, but in like manner wants to do so in his own particular and unusual 
way. Prior to his conception in the womb of the Virgin Mary Christ did not exist as an 
independent and unique metaphysical entity, the logos asarkos, who then added a human 
nature to himself to become incarnate.  To ask where and how he was before that is to 
receive the answer that “the most obvious pre-existence of Christ attested by Scripture is 
his active presence in old Israel: as the Glory of the Lord, the Angel of the Lord, and the 
Word of the Lord.”16   
 
To assert that Jenson is a crypto-Arian is to forget his rejection of what he calls the notion 
of unbaptized time, the conception of time as put forward by Plato and Aristotle.  He does 
not say that there was a time when Christ was not because Jenson's “God is his own past, 
present and future, and thus transcends time.  Hence, eternity is not the absence of time 
but rather God's co-opting of all time into his service: the victory of God's love within 
time, bringing everything into the service of the future which God himself is.”17  This is 
why the three Triune persons occupy the three poles of time, the Father the past, the Son 
the present, and the Spirit the future.   
 
Christ is the Son of God not by way of divine origin but rather from the future by being 
declared so at the resurrection, “the supreme act of the Spirit who is “giver of Life.”18  
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 131. I draw from the arguments in this article because they answer criticisms made of Jenson's original 
 pre-existence proposals in Systematic Theology 1. 
17Burgess, “A Community of Love?” 291. 
18Ibid., 132. 
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Indeed the Spirit is as important in determining the Son because his telos matters as much 
as the Father's arche, given the Bible's pervasive eschatological-pneumatological 
orientation.  The key text in this matter is Romans 1: 3-4:  “It is about his Son: on the 
human level he was born of David's stock, but on the level of the spirit- the Holy Spirit – 
he was declared Son of God by a mighty act in that he rose from the dead: It is about Jesus 
Christ our Lord.” (NEB) 
 
Jenson defends himself against charges that he has ignored Scriptural warrants and proofs 
for the pre-existence of Christ by stating that the prologue in John's gospel is a gloss on 
Genesis 1.19  This ignores the thorough marshalling of New Testament evidence by Simon 
Gathercole in which he insightfully considers texts such as Hebrews 1: 2, 1 Corinthians 8: 
6, 1 Corinthians 10: 1-10, Colossians 1: 16-17, John 12: 41, Philippians 2: 6-11, and in the 
coming and sending language of Galatians 4: 4-5 and Romans 8: 3.20  However, it is not the 
business of this thesis to become drawn into an exercise in New Testament exegesis, but 
rather to address the issues involved in Robert Jenson's proposals on their own terms. 
 
If one assumes Jenson's background assumptions that God is not a metaphysical entity out 
there behind and beyond the universe, and that God lives in time and not outside time, 
then it becomes possible to acquit Jenson of the charge of crypto-Arianism.  Christ has 
always been present to some extent in the world as described by the Scriptures.  The 
problem comes in his somewhat shadowy phantom like existence as a literary underlying 
pattern in the pages of the Old Testament.  We might like to consider also that the canon of 
First Testament Scripture only came into existence late in the history of the children of 
Israel.  It is this lack of substantial reality in the second person of the Trinity that causes 
problems in the Jenson project at several levels.  He is clearly delineated in the flow of 
events from the womb of Mary to the Ascension, but is an incognito subtle background 
influence in the prior history and Scriptures of his people.  This in turn raises the 
credibility of his independent existence over against the totus Christus, an issue we have 
considered at some length earlier.  Fade in, fade out, come into clear focus, recede into 
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background ambience – it is hard at times to see Christ at the centre in this way of doing 
theology. 
 
Gathercole has pointed to other difficulties around this issue.  New Testament language 
posits that Christ came in to this world as an act of choice, that he freely chose to do so in 
glad co-ordination and co-operation with the will of his Father.  However, “if Jesus simply 
exists in his incarnation with no pre-history, with no real prius, then his situation is one – 
like every other human being – of ‘thrownness’, whereby he finds himself in the world 
unconsulted, independently of any other will on his part.  In this respect, there is a serious 
distortion of the idea of the Son's freedom, which is regarded by the New Testament 
authors as such a key component of Christology.”21   
 
There is also the issue of incoherence in terms of the concept of baptised time that Jenson 
is so keen on.  There needs to be a “before and after” dimension of Christ's coming into the 
world for this to be a genuinely free choice in which Jenson's dynamic sense of time is 
closely associated with the style of personal existence which the second Triune identity 
enjoys.  “Without this 'before and after', the pre-existence of Christ has actually – 
paradoxically for Jenson- become atemporal.  It therefore means that this aspect of the Son's 
identity fails really to function as a part of the drama-concept to which Jenson is so 
attached.”22 
 
“In my end is my beginning,” wrote T S Eliot in the Four Quartets, and this is where the 
pinch comes in the Jensonian assessment of Christ's pre-existence.  Here we have  a 
Christology in which Christ acquires a growing density of ontological existence as he 
proceeds through time, and successive stages of existence, only to be trumped at the last 
by the Spirit who will deploy his ego in the totus Christus, just as the Father found and 
deployed his ego in the Son.  Christ in a sense will never be more powerfully influential 
and available than he is now at the heart of the church's life – these are his glory days.  He 
was a subtle, background influence in Old Testament times, he was a vivid Galilean 




personality and inspiring spiritual leader in the incarnation, he will be a flagship presence 
in the life of the world to come, but his big time is now. 
 
The Son as Co-creator of the World 
 
Before leaving this topic it will be useful to consider the Son's role as co-creator in the 
foundation of the world(s).  At first Jenson appears to be going along with the tradition.  
“The second triune identity is Logos and Son.  The Logos that God speaks to command 
heaven and earth into being is no other Word than the word of the cross.”23  However, 
once again what starts out to be a traditional understanding of a key doctrine has travelled 
to a different place.  The world was created on behalf of the Son for the sake of bringing 
the church into being.  The church comes first before everything, it is the reason creation 
came into being, it is the crown of creation.  Here we see again that Jenson is above all an 
ecclesial theologian, one claiming more for it than just about anyone else on the Protestant 
end of the theological spectrum, and one moreover who has subordinated the doctrine of 
creation to the doctrine of the church.  Simon Gathercole has brought down vigorous 
counter-battery fire on Jenson's reading of Colossians 1: 15-20 and 1 Corinthians 8: 6 as 
proof texts for this point of view24, but again it is not our task to be drawn into a New 
Testament textual argument, but rather to note again how everything zeroes into the here 
and now situation of the church as primary location point for Christ's indwelling presence 
and availability to the world, and as final delivery vehicle for the eschatological end.   The 
doctrine of creation deserves more respect and more attention than it receives here, for 
apart from anything else it has major implications for the doctrine of God.  The limitations 
of defining God only at midpoint events in the drama of salvation are politely pointed out 
by J.A. DiNoia, who proposes an expanded alternative to the famous Jensonian definition 
of God.  God is “whoever rescued Israel from Egypt and raised Jesus from the dead, and 
who is also the cause of the world” (my italics).  He goes on to amplify this with Catholic 
philosopher Peter Geach’s question, “What kind of life does the cause of the world enjoy” 
and to answer it with “a life of sheer existence in which there is no potentiality to further 
perfection or determination.”25 
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Subject Object Relations within the Trinity 
 
We come now to the aspect of Jensonian intra-Trinitarian relations that has caused the 
most excited comment among his critics.  Scott Swain offers the most succinct summary of 
the proposals under discussion: 
 
the relationship between the Father and his Son Jesus, whatever might else have 
been, is one inherently threatened by opposition and struggle against bondage.  In 
dialogue with Hegel's  Phanomenologie des Geiste, Jenson argues that the two – in 
fact, any two – must always stand in tension with each other, must always live 
under the threat of mutual subjugation and alienation, always, that is, unless a 
third person comes to the rescue.  The Spirit's role on this scheme is to rescue the 
Father and the Son from a relationship of mutual subjugation and alienation for a 
relationship of mutual acceptance and love.26   
 
There is an aspect of this overcoming dimension of the Spirit's role in the relationship 
between the Father and the Son that this Jenson reader does not have difficulties with – the 
one relating to the abandonment by the Father of the Son on the cross summed up in the 
cry of dereliction (Mark 15: 34).  In this context the Spirit overcomes and prevents the 
possibility of a rupture within the first and second identities of the Triune identity, and 
thus a temporary disintegration of the inner Triune life. 
 
It is a commonplace assumption that Jesus goes to the cross in accord with the essential 
pattern of love and obedience to the Father that undergirds his mission and ministry.  Yet 
what many struggle to accept is that the Father drives and directs the Son to his death, 
both abandoning him, and even appearing to have surrendered him to his enemies.  This 
occurs not because the Father is a patriarchal child abuser but so that the mystery of 
human sin and rejection of God is drawn into the space opened up between the Father and 
the Son in the Son's saving death, to be contained, neutralised and transformed in the 
crucible of Triune love.  The Spirit's role in bridging this temporary gap of alienation and 
apparent estrangement is crucial.  He holds the ring, prevents a rupture in the inner life of 
the Trinity, and resolves the tension by raising Jesus from the dead. 
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Few have articulated this more lucidly and boldly than Hans Urs Von Balthasar whose 
descensus theology is at the heart of his theological project.  He is clear that the absolute, 
infinite distance that opens up between the Father and the Son in the events of the Paschal 
Tridium is at the same time united, bridged and held open by the Spirit.27  Far from being 
a diminishing of the inner Triune life it takes it to the next level: 
 
This participation and completion of the creation in Christ are possible because, 
paradoxically, the separation of the Son from the Father in death only intensifies 
their inner-trinitarian communion.  This paradoxical claim for the continuity-in-
discontinuity of the Father and the Son is rooted in the deeper 'logic' of the eternal 
relationship between the Trinitarian persons.  Because the Son's separation from 
the Father is undertaken in free self-abandonment, the Spirit is able to come forth 
from the Father and enter the Son through the bond of his perfect obedience, 
thereby reinfusing him with eternal life...According to this doctrine, the 
incarnation, death and resurrection of the Son opens a space between the 
trinitarian persons that humans can enter and 'dwell.'28 
 
Jenson's pneumatology of renovation and reconciliation in the events constellating around 
Golgotha is a gentler version of this, but it shares with Balthasar a willingness to address 
the crucial and indispensable issues of the Father's surrender of the Son, its implications 
for intra- Trinitarian life, and the reality that the full depth of human alienation from God 
was in some sense brought within the Divine nature to be neutralised there: 
 
The Father and the Spirit take the suffering of the creature who is the Son into the 
triune life and bring from it the final good of that creature, all other creatures, and 
of God.  So and not otherwise the true God transcends suffering...Father and Son 
are one God even as the Father abandons the Son, in that the Spirit who will raise 
Jesus had come in advance – as Spirit, anticipation is his being – and 'rested' on 
him from the moment of his dedication to his death, to be the bond of triune love 
also in abandonment.  Just so, this abandonment and its suffering become integral 
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to what the Spirit means for the Father and the Son, and so to the love that is 
God.29 
 
However Jenson departs from Balthasar and many other theologians deeply committed to 
the atonement in downgrading the significance of the crucifixion, and instead putting the 
major emphasis on the resurrection.  He argues that the cross was not 'an original element' 
in the church's faith,30 and he rejects the notion that 'Christ fully accomplishes our 
salvation at Golgotha,'31 though he does not deny that Christ died for our sins.32 Thus the 
overcoming of human sin on the cross, or the notion of Christ taking the place of sinful 
humanity on the cross, does not figure prominently in his estimation of the significance of 
Golgotha, for the defeating of sin is not a major priority here.  Reconciliation only has 
significance in an ecclesial and eschatological sense, for “Jesus' sacrifice accomplishes our 
reconciliation only when we are actually brought together with him and his Father in one 
community.”33  So once again we have a soteriology that starts out looking the same as 
others, but is in fact rather different.  Yet Jenson can take shelter in claiming the good 
company of Pannenberg, Kasper and Moltmann in this de-emphasising of the crucifixion. 
 
Inherent Binary Oppositional Relational Patterns 
 
Where Jenson's intra-Trinitarian relations theory runs into trouble is in his enthusiasm for 
the Hegelian master slave parable, with its follow on implications for subject/object 
relations, which he takes in tandem with his theory of bodilyness as availability.  Having a 
body makes me both available, locatable and vulnerable to others.  This is important 
because without this corporeal solidity I could and would dominate others as pure, 
invisible spirit.  This is in part why Christ must inhabit the church as body of Christ in the 
most complete theological sense, for it is in locating himself among his followers in their 
communal existence that he becomes available to the world and to the unredeemed in a 
way that is both accessible and vulnerable.  There is a sense too that as embodied one 
within the Triune persons Christ is in a mediating function.  In a way the traditional 
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Christian understanding of prayer as a Trinitarian exercise reflects this – Christians pray to 
the Father through the Son in the power of the Holy Spirit.  Yet it is just at this point that 
intra-Trinitarian difficulties arise.  Andrew Burgess lays out his criticisms in this way: 
 
If Jesus of Nazareth is the embodiment of God, then what can be said of his 
relationship with his Father?  As subject of his own body, Jesus cannot know the 
Father except as pure subject, disembodied spirit, which on Jenson's account 
would mean that the Father's relationship to the Son is one of totalitarian 
enslavement!  Either this, or the Father cannot be seen as having any significant 
otherness in relation to the Son...From this it follows that any sort of talk of 
relationships within the being of God must break down.  Jenson identifies God as 
an event of love, but within his own scheme love does not seem possible without 
otherness, without objectivity in relationship, and by definition there is only one 
object in God the man Jesus and his risen body the church.  The Father cannot give 
himself in love to the Son when he has no objectivity to give apart from the Son's 
own body!34 
 
Before addressing these concerns it is helpful to make it clear why this issue is central to 
the subject matter of this thesis.  What the redeemed participate in in the life of the world 
to come is the life of the Trinity, this is the content of salvation, and this is what 
Christianity is about.  Furthermore Robert Jenson has declared that the central concern of 
his theological project is to get away from contentless eschatology, to say what can be said 
about what comes next, so that while the End is a surprise the redeemed have a right to 
know roughly what they are in for.  Thus the quality and style of intra-Triune relations is a 
matter of no small importance, for the life that really is life will be lived out within the 
vectors and contours of their relationship patterns.  We can note at this point an irony in 
passing – a theologian who believes it is no business of theology to investigate, speculate 
about, or pronounce upon the inner life of God is doing just that here – as he indeed he 
must if he is to address these eschatological concerns. 
 
There is another reason why these complex Trinitarian arguments affect the future:   
 
First, we must remind ourselves what all these word games are about.  The 
'hypostases' are Jesus and the transcendent Will he called 'Father' and the Spirit of 
their future for us.  Just as vital to remember, the hypostases 'relations' are Jesus' 
historical obedience to and dependence on his 'Father' and the coming of their 
Spirit into the believing community...Whatever happens between Jesus and his 
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Father and our future happens in God – that is the point...It is just and only in that 
'the Father' gives,  Jesus obediently receives, and their Future is sent to us that the 
relation of Creator to creature is established in the evangelical events, that these 
three are, so to speak, on both sides of the God/creature line.  It is by the temporal 
dynamic between Jesus and his Father and our Destiny (my italics), that the three 
are God.35   
 
There are three obvious counter-moves that Jenson can make to the Burgess concerns.  
First, it is after all one God we are talking about in three persons, so therefore it isn't 
necessary to have three embodiments for the three identities.  Jenson has never been 
prepared to go as far as Pannenberg, and to speak of three centres of consciousness in the 
Trinity.   He sees intra Trinitarian relations as operating in a perichoretic way of close 
exchange.36  The unity of God is maintained by way of narrative coherence and 
perichoretic mutuality.   Therefore it is sufficient for Jesus to be the only one with 
embodied/object status within the Trinity.  Secondly, the Hegelian Master Slave parable is 
used to refer to human to human relationship, and also to the asymmetric relationship 
between God and creatures.  Jenson does not intend it to be used to refer to or explain 
intra-Trinitarian relationships.37  Then thirdly, for Jenson the intra-Trinitarian liberationist 
motif is right at the heart of the proprium of the Holy Spirit.  At this point Jenson uses an 
analogy from family life to describe the life of the Trinity, one drawn from the evolution of 
a marriage.  A newly married couple require a child to come out of their relationship to 
complete it, and to prevent their relationship with each other from turning in on itself.  
The Spirit is like that new arrival who enables the other two to be presented to each other 
in a new way that deepens and renovates their love for each other.  As Jenson puts it in his 
typically taut way, “the Spirit himself is nothing other than the Freedom that occurs in 
these relations…the Father begets the Son and freely breathes his Spirit; the Spirit liberates 
the Father for the Son and the Son from and for the Father; the Son is begotten and 
liberated, and so reconciles the Father with the future his Spirit is.”38  Thus Jenson's 
pneumatology gives the Spirit the capacity to overcome relational difficulties between the 
Father and the Son by re-presenting each to the other, and thus enabling them to be what 
they ought to be and wish to be each to the other. 
                                                          
35Jenson, The Triune Identity, 106, 107. 
36ST 2: 300. 
37ST 1: 121. 
38ST 1: 161. 
70 
 
However it is not the solution to this possible relational Father/Son stand-off that is the 
problem here.  It is the all-embracing claim that all binary relationships, either within the 
Triune life, or in human relationships, are inherently oppositional.  At first sight this 
appears to contradict the common sense observation that there are happily married 
couples, enduring friendships and loyal sibling relationships.  Yet step by step Jenson lays 
out a convincing rationale for his claim in one of his more recent books On Thinking the 
Human.  He contends that Nietzsche and his French epigones have persuaded many in 
western culture “that all human intercourse is violence...whenever we confront one 
another, each of us incorporates – under various levels of concealment – the 'will to 
power'...violence is the one inescapable fact, the infinite to which all good-faith tracings of 
finite beings' intercourse must lead.”39  Thus, those who think they love are deceiving 
themselves because the twentieth century masters of suspicion know better:   
 
Of course, we certainly do sometimes seem nevertheless to love each other, but 
'the hermeneutics of suspicion' are there to disillusion us.  I may think I love you 
and even act like I love you, but Freud or Nietzsche or Marx will be at hand to 
explain how this is a mere disguise for self-aggrandizement in one mode or 
another.  Indeed...what the famous and praised hermeneutics of suspicion are at 
bottom suspicious of, is always and only love.40 
 
Even without the baleful effects of these elite intellectual deceivers, recent developments 
in popular western culture have also betrayed fragile attempts at genuine human love: 
 
We should, anyway, be aware that much called 'love' in modernity's decadence is 
in fact flight from personhood, the search for absorption into the other and of the 
other into me.  The sixties stage of the sexual revolution, with its group sex under 
drugs and similar assisted suicides of personal identity, shows this blatantly.  That 
sort of 'love, love, love' is no longer quite so prevalent, but only, I think, because 
its motivations and attitudes have been taken into the wider culture.41 
 
Furthermore, inherent within human loving is a built in contradiction, for its dual nature: 
 
                                                          
39Robert Jenson, On Thinking the Human: Resolutions of Difficult Notions (Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. 




is to give and to desire...And to love is not merely to desire something of the 
beloved; it is to desire the beloved entire...This sinister shadow in fact shades our 
more exalted loves also: the love that eats up the beloved is too well known, and 
fear of being devoured is surely some part of late modernity's 'fear of 
commitment'...It may be already apparent where the hurt lies: the will to give and 
the will to possess make mischief at their intersection.42 
 
Attempts to separate out the components of love into agape and eros on theological lines so 
as to neutralise the binary opposition inherent in love do not convince Jenson, for even 
God is no stranger to desire: 
 
Whether in relation to God or to one another, gift and desire are; I think, not easily 
separable.  Indeed, I think it is theologically dubious even to say that God loves 
with a purely disinterested agape; he may not need us, but does he not want us?  
Moreover, if he loves us as sisters and brothers of the Son, do not, by the orthodox 
doctrine, the Father and the Son need each other?  Precisely to be Father and Son?  
So that if it is once established that we are inalienable sisters and brothers of the 
Son, must not the Father indeed need us too?  Is not God's love in fact eros also?43 
 
This goes some way to explaining why for Jenson God cannot be impassible.  It also helps 
to explain the inherent binary oppositional nature of Father/Son relationships, an issue we 
will return to shortly.  For now we can note the Spirit's indispensable and vital role in 
solving the human love problem – providing, that is, if human beings are within the life of 
the church, or are influenced by it: 
 
the Spirit who frees the Father and the Son to love each other, and who thereupon 
is their love, is the very Spirit who animates the church.  In the church, every 
human third party is animated by that very Spirit who does not fall into mutual 
bondage with those he frees to love one another.44 
 
We return now to the issue of why Jenson is at odds with the consensus view of 
Father/Son relationships within the Trinity as being one of mutuality, accord and of 
interdependent relatedness.  Jenson contends that there is an inherent oppositional 
dynamic in the religions of the world, that within polytheistic paganism, the starting point 
and template of much religion, there are always tales of Gods in competition with one 





another and slaying one another.  This same dynamic presents itself in a different form in 
emanation, the next step up in the evolution of religion.  As in Freud's version of the 
oedipal complex each successive emanantist stage finds it hard to let go of the next.  This 
dynamic intrudes itself also into Father/Son Trinitarian relations.45 
 
Enter on the scene then the Spirit of freedom and love: 
 
what rescues the real God the Father and the real God the Son from the Hegelian 
face-off, from Oedipal mutual bondage, is God the Spirit, whose biblical role is 
precisely that he is freedom and love.  The Spirit intends the Father and the Son, 
and the Spirit's intention for them is that they shall love one another.  The Spirit 
frees the Father to let the Son go, and so actually to love him.  The Spirit frees the 
Son from servility to the Father, and so actually to love him.46 
 
George Hunsinger has commented on the reductionist implications of this for the 
ontological status of the Father and the Son, for if the Spirit “liberates Father and the Son 
to love each other”47 then this implies that “they were somehow otherwise metaphysically 
incapable of a fully actual eternal love, as if they were somehow in bondage or prisoners 
of metaphysical roles in the scheme of panentheistic historicism, as if the Father and the 
Son represent 'past-imposed conditions' that only their common Spirit can overcome.”48  
Hunsinger goes on from this point to accuse Jenson of a reverse subordinationism in 
which the three persons of the trinity are unequal in power, dignity and substance because 
the Spirit has been ranked above the other two, since the Father can only initiate and not 
complete or fulfil, and the Son can only accept his role as the man born to die on the cross 
– he lacks freedom because of his dubious pre-existence status.  The Spirit trumps them 
both because the Spirit dwells in the time zone that really matters – the future.  As he puts 
it “The precedence of the future over past and present is the precedence of the infinite 
Spirit over the finitude of the Father and the Son.”49 
 
Hunsinger's is an angry essay lacking in scholarly objectivity, which is why Jenson barely 
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bothered answering his main points in his reply opportunity.50  While he raises thought 
provoking points at various points, here he has overstated the case.  If one accepts the 
Jensonian reckoning of all time as God's time, and assesses his schema on its own terms 
with the three Trinitarian persons occupying the three poles of time, then the Father and 
the Son do have sufficient cohesion and density of identity (with some reservations about 
the pre-existence of Christ).  Hunsinger declares his hand in the last paragraph of his essay 
where he concludes that Jenson's is the last and greatest effort in a forty year project of 
distinguished pedigree involving Pannenberg, Moltmann, Jungel and Rahner of 
subordinating the doctrine of God to the doctrine of eschatology.  It was an interesting 
project, but misguided, and it has failed, so there is not further need to pursue this 
option.51 
 
Third Article Rebalancing 
 
My conclusion is that while Jenson certainly privileges the future, and does give 
precedence to the Spirit, this is an exercise in third article rebalancing rather than over 
balancing.  It addresses, amongst other things, a major issue of considerable ecumenical 
concern – the filioque clause.  For those of us who long for the western church to be 
delivered from its Babylonian captivity to this regrettable late innovation Jenson has 
provided a pneumatology that is a possible way forward for those who find the Spirit's 
role in the Ambrosian/Augustinian Trinitarian scheme of things to be unsatisfactory. 
 
A succession of ecumenical dialogues and statements have put filioquists on the back foot, 
and Jenson as an ecumenical theologian builds on their work.  To mention but one of these 
influential conversations, perhaps the most important, the Klingenthal Memorandum of 
1979, organised by the Faith and Order Commission of the World Council of Churches – a 
multilateral commission of Orthodox, Protestants and Roman Catholics.  It questioned 
whether the filioque “involves the unbiblical subordination of the Spirit to the Son...(and 
perhaps is) inadequate as an articulation of a full and balanced doctrine of the Trinity.”  It 
concluded that the traditional Western formula should not be used, “for this would efface 
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the difference in the relationship to the Father and the Son.”  It offered several alternatives 
which, “well deserve to be given attention and consideration in future discussion.”  These 
were: 
The Spirit proceeds from the Father of the Son 
The Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son 
The Spirit proceeds from the Father and receives from the Son 
The Spirit proceeds from the Father and rests on the Son 
The Spirit proceeds from the Father and shines out through the Son 
 
It concluded that, “the original form of the third article of the creed, without the filioque, 
should everywhere be recognised as the normative one and restored.”52 
 
Within this context Jenson's re-vitalised pneumatology can be seen as something of a 
redressing of and catch up on a long overdue deficit in western third order theological 
thinking. 
 
There is however an odd caveat in Jenson's description of the relational freeing up work of 
the Spirit within Trinitarian relations that appears to work against his heightened role and 
elevated significance for the Spirit: 
 
The Spirit is both the one who intends the Father and the Son to love one 
another and in classical doctrine is himself the love between them: within God 
the Spirit exhausts himself in the gift he gives – here is the moment of truth in 
Eastern doctrines of self-emptying.  After all, spirit is always someone's spirit 
and nothing else; the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of the Father and the Son whom 
the Father lets love one another, and he is nothing else at all.53 
 
The Spirit of freedom and love is the architect of the future, the generator of the surprise 
ending to salvation history, who will find his ego in the faces of the redeemed in the 
completed and perfected totus Christus.  How then can he be also the self-emptying gift 
giver, who is 'nothing else at all?'  Here is a conundrum to be worked out in the conclusion 
to this thesis. 
 
 
                                                          
52See Lukas Vischer, ed., Spirit of God, Spirit of Christ, 9-10, 15, 18, cited in A. Edward Siecienski, The Filioque: 





The central concern of this thesis is about the way in which the Holy Spirit as the 'Lord of 
possibility' will bring about a deeply satisfying end to the human story that will surprise 
both the recipients of salvation, and the other two Triune persons. 
 
In this chapter we investigated the proprium of the Spirit under the title of the Spirit of 
freedom and love, and offered a summary of Jenson's conception of the Spirit as that of 
relationship initiator, repairer and reconciler.  We noted that the Spirit will find his ego 
within the faces of the redeemed in the fully realised totus Christus.  We then considered 
the Spirit's relationship with the church, particularly the way in which the church's 
transition from association to community depends upon its animation by the Spirit, who 
makes it much more than the individual spirits of its members.  We considered also the 
way in which Jenson's tight connection between the Trinity and the developing life of the 
church has the potential to thin out the life of God should the church's fortunes be 
radically diminished. 
 
Much of the chapter was taken up with the subject of intra-Trinitarian relations since 
insertion into the life of the Trinity is both the goal of salvation and the content of the End.  
Our attention was drawn to the issue of the pre-existence of Christ, who, in Robert 
Jenson's Christology, has a somewhat shadowy mode of existence in the pages of the Old 
Testament.  The Logos acquires a growing density of ontological existence as he 
transitions through successive modalities of existence until resurrection establishes him as 
indwelling Lord of the church, which in many ways seems to be his most powerful mode 
of existence.  While the completed and perfected totus Christus will arguably be his finest 
hour this is in fact the disclosure time of the Spirit, who will animate that body, while at 
the same time enhancing and elevating the ontological status  of the individual members 
of it, thereby disclosing himself within their collective existence. 
 
We noted again the relentlessly ecclesial focus of Jenson's theology as our attention turned 
to the Son as co-creator of the world.  He was involved in this beginning of the world 
process because the point of creation is to bring about the church.  We concluded that 
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Jenson gives insufficient attention to the doctrine of creation, an inherent weakness in a 
theological system that steers clear of accounts of protological origins. 
 
The chapter then engaged with the issue of subject object relations within the Trinity.  The 
Spirit's role in overcoming the temporary gap of alienation and apparent estrangement 
between the Father and the Son in the events of Good Friday and Holy Saturday was 
appreciatively explored. 
 
The chapter concluded with a consideration of Jenson's account of inherent binary 
oppositional patterns both within the Godhead and within human relationships.  The 
Spirit's vital role in overcoming these relational patterns of deadlocked estrangement was 
perceived as his prime function.  Andrew Burgess' criticisms of Jenson's use of the 
Hegelian master slave parable within the Triune relationships were discounted.  It was 
concluded that Jenson has offered a thoughtful and insightful analysis of binary 
oppositional patterns within contemporary western culture.  Finally, the chapter came to 
the conclusion that Robert Jenson's account of the proprium of the Spirit is a timely and 
useful exercise in third article rebalancing, while at the same time pointing to an apparent 
contradiction in Jenson's account of the Spirit's role and status at the End.  If the Spirit 
empties himself in reconciling the Father and the Son, and in completing and perfecting 
the totus Christus, how can the eschaton be at the same time his point of maximal 
disclosure?  This issue is to be wrestled to the ground in the conclusion of the thesis.
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Chapter 4 
 Evil and Eschatology 
Stating the Problem 
 
We have noted in a number of places how closely God as stream of events is intertwined 
with human history in the proposals of Robert Jenson.  The God who is only known as 
economic Trinity is located within the development of salvation history as these events 
continue to play out.  Furthermore we noted that since Jenson rejects the doctrine of 
Divine impassibility he believes that God is sensitive to, influenced by, and has the 
potentiality to be changed by his interactions with human beings.  This is saying more 
than the traditional Christian understanding that in intercessory prayer God allows 
human beings to consult with him about his plans, and to make requests about the 
unfolding pattern of Divine providence.  It goes beyond this role of lending human beings 
a sympathetic ear, and being prepared to entertain the possibility of changing his mind 
about what he intends to do.  It alleges that God sympathises with human beings to the 
point of suffering with them.  What they do and say can move him to extremes of emotion, 
can make things happen in him. 
 
There are a number of follow on theological difficulties with this point of view.  In this 
chapter we confine ourselves to the issue of whether Robert Jenson has opened up God to 
the possibility of radical evil flowing into his being as a result of an inappropriate 
proximity to the nastier aspects of human history.  David Bentley Hart gets to the heart of 
the matter when he writes: 
 
If God’s identity is constituted in his triumph over evil, then evil belongs eternally 
to his identity, and his goodness is not goodness as such but a reaction, an activity 
that requires the goad of evil to come into full being.  All of history is the horizon 
of this drama, and since no analogical interval is allowed to be introduced 
between God’s eternal being as Trinity and God’s act as trinity in time, all of 
history is this identity: every painful death of a child, every casual act of brutality, 
all war, famine, pestilence, disease, murder…all are moments in the identity of 
God, resonances within the event of his being, aspects of the occurrence of his 
essence: all of this is the crucible in which God comes into his own elected reality.1 
 
                                                          
1David Bentley Hart, The Beauty of the Infinite (Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans, 2003), 165 166. 
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Though he did not have Robert Jenson specifically in mind Paul McPartlan nevertheless 
spells out the follow on consequences for Jenson's doctrine of God in one biting sentence:  
“this implies that God needs the world…it compromises his freedom…it projects history 
into God…as with Moltmann’s crucified God, God comes to need his continual fix of 
suffering and history to be himself, the true God.”2 
 
Although Jenson is an admirer of Hegel it is important to be clear that he does not believe 
that God is to be identified with the world historical process.  What is at issue here is not a 
claim that God is completely identified with the deep patterns and totalising outcomes of 
world history.  Rather it is a particular difficulty that accompanies theologies that try to 
resolve theodicy issues by positing a suffering God.  In this particular case the key issue is 
the lack of analogical interval between God's being and occurrences of radical evil in 
human history that have the potential to provoke changes in the Divine being, and to 
invade the life of the world to come.  We noted earlier Robert Jenson's insistence that sin 
and evil will be excluded from the life of the world to come.  At first glance Jenson does 
not appear to have provided himself with the resources to protect God and the sunny 
uplands of eschatological outcomes from the vitiating effects of spiritual evil. 
 
Jenson on Evil 
 
What does Robert Jenson have to say about evil?  The Bible treats evil and sin as a major 
topic and references it many times.  The Jenson oeuvre does not give it this generous 
attention, but it is worthwhile briefly outlining what he has to say on the subject.  An 
illuminating paragraph concludes the chapter Thinking Wickedness in On Thinking the 
Human: 
 
In classical Augustinian doctrine, evil is pure absence, the darkness where the 
light of being runs out.  The devil is the personal reality of evil: thus there is 
nothing to him but his deficiencies.  The wicked person is the one whose 
encounter with nothingness in all connections of his or her permeability is such as 
to make emptiness his or her longed for-milieu, the devil his or her master.3 
                                                          
2Paul McPartlan, The Eucharist Makes the Church: Henri de Lubac and John Zizioulas in Dialogue (Edinburgh: T 
 & T Clark, 1993), 159. 
3 Robert Jenson. On Thinking the Human: Resolutions of Difficult Notions, (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans 
Publishing, 2003), 73. 
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To unpack this in a little more detail - for Jenson a key characteristic of human beings is 
their permeability.  They are nested within webs of varieties of communities, so the 
company they keep, and the influences they thereby expose themselves to define who and 
what they are.  To be nested within the Triune persons is to be a Christian, and to be on 
the path to righteousness, even if different and competing communities tug at their 
essential loyalty through the siren call of libido dominandi.  To locate oneself within 
contexts and communities where libido dominandi prevails and where evil waxes strong is 
to be on the road to becoming a wicked person.  The end result of becoming a wicked 
person is hatred of God because that is what loyalty to evil masters requires.4 
 
Jenson is acute and insightful on the predominant expressions of evil in western culture 
and in the western church.  He has a particular dislike of Nietzschean nihilism and its 
French epigones whose key conclusions are that there is no such thing as meta-narratives, 
and that “all human intercourse is violence in a metaphysical sense,” whatever its 
“various levels of concealment.”5  Herein is the love of nothingness, the belief that there is 
an endless futurity without conclusion or hope of a fulfilled future, that violence is the key 
theme of this nihilist eschatology in which the human story does not contain meaning or 
purpose.6  In the church this dark side of post-modernism takes the form of 
antinomianism, with its therapeutic analysis of human moral failure, its easy acceptance of 
different and irregular lifestyles, and its channelling of the struggle against oppression and 
evil into the paths of en courant identity politics.7 
 
Jenson concedes the existence of Satan, that evil has an ontological and personified status.  
As he puts it “as God values the creation, so there seems to be an active and somewhat 
powerful subjectivity that despises it, that hates all being.”8  The devil is a fallen angel, an 
evil spirit who wants to be like God, but cannot be since he is a creature.  Here Jenson 
fascinatingly harks back to the Hegelian insight about embodied status in subject/object 
                                                          
4 Ibid., 70-71. 
5 Ibid., 67. 
6 ST: 219-220, St 2: 147-8 
7 Jenson, On Thinking the Human, 65-6. It is worth taking a look also at ST 2: 133-152 Jenson’s chapter on sin in 
which he analyses sin under the headings of idolatry, lust, injustice and despair. 
8 ST 2: 130. 
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relationships, and how this promotes healthy and life giving relationships within the 
Trinity.  Here we may recall that a disembodied consciousness who had humankind in its 
continual gaze, and would not let humankind look back at it and locate it within creation 
would be a universal tyrant.  This is precisely what the devil tries to do because unlike the 
angels he refuses to inhabit creation, he wants to assume triune status, but fortunately for 
humankind he cannot achieve this because he is a creature.  In summary the devil “is what 
we would be could our sin finally and wholly triumph;” he is “pure and utterly 
compulsive hatred, and nothing else at all.”9  His ultimate fate is described thus: 
 
As the pseudopersonification of sin, the loveless liar, he will be cast “into the lake 
of fire and sulphur,” and that will be that.  What his mode of being thereafter will 
be need not concern us; the universe will be rid of him.10 
 
It has been worth dwelling on Satan’s status in the Jenson order of things because much of 
this chapter will discuss evil as privation and nothingness.  Yet the Christian assessment of 
evil includes the other side of the coin – its pernicious dynamism.  This Jenson seems to 
have taken account of, both in his analysis of what mars creation now, and of what will be 
done about evil in the final eschatological outcome.  The quote above that includes the 
biblical reference Revelation 20: 10, and thus provides Jenson with part of his answer as to 
how sin and evil will be excluded from the promised End, and the life of the totus Christus. 
 
Two Illuminating Possible Solutions 
 
Yet has Jenson given sufficient time or attention to the issue of how God places an 
analogical interval between himself and radical evil?  It is instructive at this point to 
consider how two heavyweights of twentieth century systematic theology have attempted 
to extricate themselves from similar difficulties.  Hans Urs Von Balthasar and Eberhard 
Jϋngel were both admirers of Karl Barth and were deeply influenced by him, in similar 
fashion to Robert Jenson.  The three of them have carried the Barthian inheritance to 
uniquely different places.  Balthasar and Jϋngel appear to have given more attention to the 
matter at hand here. 
                                                          
9 ST 2: 132. 
10 ST 2: 334. 
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The Balthasarian Solution 
 
Called “the Catholic Barth” Balthasar took seriously Barth's insistence on the eventfulness 
of God, while at the same time insisting on using ontological categories and traditional 
catholic language of substance and essence to talk about God’s being.  Such metaphysical 
descriptors of God did not, in his opinion, leave God in a static, immobilised state, but 
rather made him more lively, and opened up dynamic eschatological possibilities for the 
redeemed11  The eventfulness of God who shares his Divine plenitude of being with 
enraptured believers creates by participation a series of dynamic eschatological scenarios 
for them in the life of the world to come.12  
 
Balthasar sails close to the wind in almost denying the immutability and impassibility of 
God, while at the same time positing a God who becomes deeply involved with the 
human predicament in his overcoming of sin, suffering and death.  His controversial 
theology of Holy Saturday suggests that in the estrangement between Father and Son from 
Gethsemane to sealed tomb a potential rupture opens up within the Trinity.  As the Son 
descends into Sheol this creates the possibility also of human estrangement entering the 
Divine being.  Balthasar’s defence at this point is interesting.  
 
 In considering the life of the Trinity he draws the usual distinction between its inner life, 
what is called the immanent Trinity, and its external life that is orientated to the human 
race and the business of its reconciliation and restoration, what is called the economic 
Trinity.  Balthasar wants to maintain the freedom of God over against the creation.  
Although he is intent on saving the human race, God’s inner being is not entirely taken up 
with the drama of bringing this about – he does not need us to be himself.  This is in 
contrast to Karl Rahner, who insisted that the inner and the outer aspect of God’s triune 
being are integrally related. 
                                                          
11 Hans Urs Von Balthasar, Theo-Drama Theological Dramatic Theory Volume 5: The Last Act, (San Francisco: 
Ignatius Press, 1998), 57, 67. 
12 Balthasar, Theo-Drama 5, 396-7, 402, 404, 408, 511. 
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Balthasar then goes on to say that in the dramatic events of the Paschal Tridium the Father 
and the Son remained in intimate communion with one another within the inner life of the 
immanent Trinity while at the same time being estranged within the dimension of the 
economic Trinity as it was engaged with the consequences of Golgotha and beyond.  They 
could operate at these two levels of being because the immanent Trinity is not totally 
identified with the economic Trinity.13 
 
Far from collapsing the Trinity Balthasar sees this Trinitarian event of the cross as a divine 
redefining of what love is. David Luy uses a wonderful linguistic metaphor to say that the 
cross represents the translation of the inner Trinitarian life of God into the language of the 
world.14  As God speaks his language of Divine love in to the world it takes shape and 
form in the events of Christ’s death on the cross.  Given the way the world is, and given 
how God defines intimacy, these events of innocent suffering love are the expression of 
what true love is.   
 
Balthasar then takes this redefining of what intimacy is a step further.  He maintains that 
there is an unfinished part of creation that has been generated by humankind’s rejection of 
God.  Christ’s mission is to complete it, which he accomplishes by his descent into death 
and hell. As Christ encounters “this unfinished part of the creation” he completes it by 
drawing it into the newly available space of his empty self where it can be infused with 
the life-giving power of the Trinitarian circuit.  Thus the separation of the Son from the 
Father in death only intensifies their communion within the immanent Trinity. There is a 
pneumatological dimension to this because the Son’s allowing of a distance to open up 
between himself and the Father, makes it possible at the same time for the Spirit to come forth 
from the Father and enter the Son through this bond of love and obedience.  This gift of 
the Spirit is what fills the Son with eternal life.15 
                                                          
13 Hans Urs Von Balthasar, Theodrama Theological Dramatic Theory, Volume 4: The Action (San Francisco: 
Ignatius Press, 1994), 362. 
14 David Luy, “The Aesthetic Collision: Hans Urs Von Balthasar on the Trinity and the Cross,” International 
Journal of Systematic Theology 13:2 (2011): 167. 
15 Hans Urs Von Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord 7 Theology: The New Covenant, (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 
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This defence is of course not possible for Jenson because he has denied the possibility of an 
immanent Trinity as either a subject of theological investigation, or as a useful descriptor 
of the life of God.  He cannot and will not allow the possibility of a division between the 
inner and outer life of God.  The Trinity it would appear must take the consequences of its 
close identification with the world of human affairs and the apparently follow on exposure 
to human mendacity. 
 
However, as we consider the issue of whether God suffers Balthasar and Jenson move 
closer together.  Balthasar wants to maintain that he believes in the immutability of God.16 
He prefers such a traditional descriptor for his position so that he will not be 
misunderstood as waywardly speculative or off centre with orthodoxy in what he is about 
to put forward.  And he is clear that God is happy and at peace within his inner life, he is 
not needy in his relationship with the world.  However in his desire to do justice to the 
kind of God spoken of in the Bible, and in accordance with his view of the liveliness of 
God, his event–fullness, he will find it necessary to go beyond the rather static view of 
God that has often gone with the traditional doctrine of his immutability. 
 
This is after all a God who is open to being touched by dialogue with creatures, and who is 
available to human beings through what he calls, “the analogia adorationis in which God 
gives his children power over his will and heart.”17  The creation of free creatures capable 
of sin has opened up a vulnerability in God because from then on the divine love can be 
scoffed at by sin.18 God can be said to suffer when the reckless generosity of his love 
encounters a calculating self-interestedness and self-protectedness on the part of those to 
whom it is directed.   
 
                                                          
2008), 226, 234, 362-65, 389. 
16 Gerard F. O’Hanlon, The Immutability of God in the Theology of Hans Urs Von Balthasar (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990), 42-43, 176-177. 
17 Hans Urs Von Balthasar, The Theology of Karl Barth, (Austin: Rinehart and Winston, 1971), 149. 
18 O’Hanlon, Immutability, 32. 
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The way the drama of salvation unfolds continues this theme of Divine vulnerability.  The 
cross is the most dramatic example of an historical event that affects God, and is the end 
point of an incarnation that presupposes an event in God, which affects and changes 
God.19    As O’Hanlon puts it, “In this drama the divine Son and the Holy Spirit not only 
approve of and execute the plan of the Father; in fact they conceive of this plan in perfect 
unity with him.  The plan involves the suffering of the Son in order that this world might 
in the end be judged “very good.”20  This suffering is not the Son’s simple acquiescence in 
the Father’s proposal – it is the Son’s proposal too, and the Son offers himself to 
accomplish it.  And this proposal by the Son, humanly speaking, touches the heart of the 
Father more deeply than the sin of the world does.  In this way one may speak of a wound 
of love in God from before creation. 
 
Traditional views of the atonement have often limited the suffering of the Son by stating 
that Christ only suffered in his human nature, but Balthasar declines to stop short there, 
and firmly insists that the divine Logos is the subject who unites the two distinct natures 
in Christ.  So it is that the suffering of the world is drawn directly in to the heart of God.  
While this makes for a powerful antidote to the alienation and distress of humankind it 
appears to directly undermine the immutability of God.  How does Balthasar get himself 
out of this bind? 
 
He does so in a daring manner by using that part of his descensus theology that causes the 
most concern, namely the absolute, infinite distance that opens up between the Father and 
the Son and which is the same time united, bridged and held open by the Spirit.  In the 
same way the distance that opens up between the Divine persons is the space in which all 
other inner-worldly distances are contained, embraced and overcome, including the 
reality and consequences of sin.  So Balthasar posits a Trinitarian God who is so lively and 
dynamically acting that he can allow sin to affect him, “without in any sense forcing or 
dominating him.”21  Thus the distance that opens up between the Father and the Son in the 
                                                          
19 Hans Urs Von Balthasar, Theodrama 4: The Realm of Metaphysics in Antiquity, (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 206), 
289, 466-73. 
20 O’Hanlon, Immutability, 33. 
21 Ibid., 34. 
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passion is in fact a special form of intimacy such as the world has never known. What this 
speaks of is the relational style of Divine persons who are so self-giving that their mutual 
intimacy can contain and surpass all loves and intimacies, and this includes the adverse 
effects of humans who refuse to love God back. 
 
So it is that Balthasar can speak of a supra-kenosis or supra suffering in God, a something 
like suffering.  And he goes on to say that God has a supra-mutability about him.22  This is 
a kind of having your cake and eating it option in which God is both free from the world 
yet can be affected by it without being overcome by it.  Immutability has been redefined. 
 
Here it is worth recalling what I wrote in chapter three about the similarities between 
Jenson and Balthasar in their consideration of the Spirit’s role in overcoming the apparent 
estrangement and distance between the Son and the Father in the events of the Paschal 
Tridium.  “Jenson's pneumatology of renovation and reconciliation in the events 
constellating around Golgotha is a gentler version of this, but it shares with Balthasar a 
willingness to address the crucial and indispensable issues of the Father's surrender of the 
Son, its implications for intra- Trinitarian life, and the reality that the full depth of human 
alienation from God was in some sense brought within the Divine nature to be neutralised 
there.”23  However, Jenson does not tell us how the full depth of human alienation is 
neutralised within the Divine nature, or how the Triune being can firewall himself off 
against the destructive effects of suffering shared around within the Triune persons.  It is 
instructive at this point to consider how Eberhard Jϋngel deals with this issue. 
 
The Jϋngel Solution 
 
Jϋngel defines evil as nothingness.  He writes of: 
 
the annihilating power of nothingness which, in its absolutely undefined and 
empty state as a negatively virulent vacuum without a nameable position, in this 
its ontological placelessness, creates for itself a phantomlike attraction, an 
                                                          
22 Balthasar, Mysterium Paschale, 23-24, 35. 
23 Chapter 3, 13. 
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annihilating undertow into itself, into nothingness.  Nothingness does not let itself 
be located.  It is undetermined.  And for that very reason, that nothingness has no 
place and is undetermined, it leads to chaotic consequences.  It absorbs being until 
it is full, so to speak, by annihilating what exists.  But because it takes being into 
itself only on the attraction of annihilation, it never has being.  And because it 
never has being, it must constantly seize hold of being in the act of annihilation.  
Because it has nothing, its egoism is total, and it wants everything.24 
 
Having defined evil as nothingness Jϋngel goes on to define how God deals with evil 
through the death and resurrection of Jesus.  In these two crucial events God involves 
himself with nothingness by struggling against it, and in so doing gives it a place, a 
location within himself which identifies it for what it is, and thus depotentiates it: 
 
In that God identified himself with the dead Jesus, he located nothingness within 
the divine life.  But by making for nothingness a place within divine being, God 
took away from it the chaotic effect of its phantomlike attraction.  In bearing 
annihilation within himself, God proves himself to be the victor over nothingness, 
and he ends the negative attraction of “hell, death, and the devil.”  By proving 
himself to be this victor, God reveals what he truly and ultimately is.  God is that 
one who can bear and does bear, can suffer and does suffer, in his being the 
annihilating power of nothingness, even the negation of death, without being 
annihilated by it.  In God nothingness loses its negative attraction and thus its 
annihilating effect.  Once it is taken up into God’s being, it creatively sets for itself 
a new function.  It receives its own determination and thus loses its abstract and it’s 
phantomly attraction.25  
 
For Jϋngel this locating of nothingness within the Divine being is an act of Divine self-
determination.  It shows that God is the one who exists for others.  “In this self-determination 
for the sake of others, this peculiar dialectic of being and nonbeing, of life and death, takes 
place, which as pacified dialectic is called love.”26 
 
                                                          
24 Eberhard Jϋngel, God as the Mystery of the World: On the Foundation of the Theology of the Crucified One in the 
Dispute between Theism and Atheism, translated by Darrell L. Gruder (Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. 
Eerdmans Publishing Company 1983), 219.  
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid., 220. 
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What Jϋngel has done is to create a space within God to contain the nihil, a theological 
container as it were within which the destructive effects of sin and evil are held, named 
and neutralised. A follow-on result of this is that the nothingness that wants to suck all 
existent vitality into itself is excluded from the life of the world to come, it cannot enter the 
eschatological realm because it does not lodge permanently in God’s being.  Jϋngel has 
generated the kind of analogical interval between evil and God’s being that David Bentley 
Hart finds missing in Jenson’s theology.  Thus the onus is back on Jenson to say how 
radical evil does not enter God’s being despite his high exposure to it given the way God 
is an unfolding stream of events proceeding in close congruity with history.  Since this 
God lives in and proceeds from the future, the future that the redeemed will one day 
inhabit, it would be helpful if Jenson could say how radical evil cannot enter and poison 
the dwelling place of the totus Christus. 
 
Here we offer an observation and a speculation.  Balthasar and Jϋngel both have a 
theological system in which the cross has central place.  This is their chief resource for 
explaining how God deals with sin, suffering, evil and death.  To quote what I wrote in 
Chapter three of this work, “Thus the overcoming of human sin on the cross, or the notion 
of Christ taking the place of sinful humanity on the cross, does not figure prominently in 
his estimation of the significance of Golgotha, for the defeating of sin is not a major 
priority here.”27  Robert Jenson has de-emphasised the cross in his theological vision.  This 
leaves him less equipped to deal with the issue at hand. 
 
We are left speculating how Jenson might explain the way in which his suffering and 
changeable God remains uncontaminated by evil, and manages to exclude it from the 
fulfilled future.  We have noted before how much weight the Jenson proposals put on the 
role of the Holy Spirit as completer and perfector of salvation.  The Spirit of spontaneity 
and surprise has great tactical agility in responding to and outflanking human refusals 
and spiritual evil.  Might Jenson be counting on the Holy Spirit to outwit the wiles of 
radical evil, to bend the rules of Divine and human freedom if necessary to his own 
advantage to bring about the promised End in which only the good, the beautiful and the 
                                                          
27 Chapter 3, 13-14. 
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true are present?  Just as he supposes that the Father and the Son must trust the Holy 
Spirit to accomplish this in his own way and in his own good time, are the readers of 
Jenson’s theology also required to make a similar act of faith? 
 
The Ontological Distinction between Creator and Creatures 
 
If the Spirit is able to bring about such an End he will be struggling against a fundamental 
problem that dogs all theologians who argue for a suffering God.  Robert Jenson is of 
course one such, and I am not aware that he has resolved the problem, which can be stated 
in this way.    
 
Where does evil come from, where is it located in the constitution of things, and how does 
God relate to evil?  Classical theology, particularly of the Thomist variety, has always been 
clear that evil is located within and contained within the created order.  Although it 
belongs there it is nevertheless not lodged within the very stuff of reality, within as it were 
the very structures of being and matter and the world.  In fact it has no existent reality, 
since it is the privation or absence of a good that should and could be present in it.   Evil 
comes about because human beings misuse the good things of the world.  They 
misappropriate and distort what is to be shared, or is to be used in a self-controlled and 
prudent manner, or should be shunned as unhelpful and a threat to their integrity.  Evil 
thus has the phantomlike nature that Jϋngel writes of, always promising what it cannot 
deliver, and always deceiving in what it offers.  Furthermore it belongs resolutely and 
unalterably on the human and worldly side of the line. 
 
There is a clear distinction between the creator and the creatures he made, between the 
Divine and human orders of reality, between heaven and earth.  Although God made the 
world and sustains it in being he is not of the world he made.  This clear distinction and 
barrier means that evil cannot cross the line to invade and infect the uncreated order, 
where God dwells as the quintessence of goodness.  Of course this is an ontological 
distinction between God and the created order, and it is precisely these ontological 
89 
categories of thinking about God that Robert Jenson has ruled out of order.  It is precisely 
here that the problem comes, for such a distinction protects God from being contaminated 
by evil, while at the same time being the principal positive reason why God does not 
suffer, a conclusion that Jenson does not want to come to as being unbiblical and 
immobilist in its effects on the doctrine of God. 
 
Process theologians, panentheists and supporters of a suffering God (Jenson would only 
admit to being the last and latter) pay a heavy price in downwind philosophical and 
theological consequences for their doctrine of God.  The consequences are as follows.  
Divine suffering places God and everything that exists on the same plane in the same 
ontological order because God can only suffer if he exists in the same reality field, the 
same order of existence as everything else, including the created order. If this is where he 
is located then it calls into question the doctrine of creation since God is as a result just one 
of the created things.  A further consequence is that evil becomes ontological in its 
essential nature, it assumes a far heavier weighting in its nature and in its consequences, 
on a par with the ancient religious and philosophical dualisms.  This makes evil a giant 
because it is now located within the fundamental structures of reality.  To have consented 
to evil, to have co-operated with it in even a mild form, is not just to be morally impaired, 
but also to be ontologically damaged. 
 
A Diminished God 
 
There are also serious consequences for the being of God.  If God suffers then he is 
diminished.  Sin and evil cause suffering, they are a privation of some good or perfection, 
and if this is at work within God then his fundamental nature as pure goodness, pure act, 
fully actualized being turns out to be not true.  He becomes a limited being, a small God, 
perhaps not God at all, but just a benign, struggling spiritual influence for good in the 
universe.  This cannot be, for the truth is that God is pure act, ipsum esse, fully actualised 
being.  This is why Bentley Hart’s criticism of Jenson is valid.  God does not need evil to 
provoke him to further development of his being, nor is it possible for evil to have that 
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effect upon him.  Bentley Hart has made this very clear in his latest book The Experience of 
God: Being, Consciousness, Bliss, where he writes, “God cannot change over time…as he 
would then be dependent upon the relation between some unrealised potentiality within 
himself and some fuller actuality somehow ‘beyond’ himself into which he may yet 
evolve; again, he would be a conditional being.”28  He then goes on to state, “God’s 
knowledge of something created is not something separate from his eternal act of creating 
that thing; so he is not modified by that knowledge in the way that we are necessarily 
modified when we encounter things outside ourselves.”29 
 
This also explains why Jenson’s criticism of the God of classical Theism as being a lazy 
God of frozen, immobilist tendencies is off the mark.  Thomas Weinandy gets to the heart 
of matter when he writes: 
 
God is unchangeable not because he is inert or static like a rock, but for just the 
opposite reason.  He is so dynamic, so active that no change can make him more 
active.  He is act pure and simple…God’s immutability is not opposed to his 
vitality.  Nor need one hold together in some dialectical fashion his immutability 
and his vibrancy, as if in spite of being immutable he is nonetheless dynamic.  
Rather it is precisely God’s immutability as actus purus that guarantees and 
authenticates his pure vitality and absolute dynamism.30 
 
This is in contrast to human beings who are the ones with the low wattage relational and 
warm affectivity capacities.  They are the ones who are short on passion, relational 
vibrancy and loving dynamism. 
 
God cannot become more passionate or loving by actualising, as human beings do, 
some further potential and so become more passionate or loving…God has no self-
constituting relational potential which needs to be actualised in order to make him 
more relational…Because human beings are not fully relational, they must relate 
                                                          
28 David Bentley Hart, The Experience of God: Being, Consciousness, Bliss, (New Haven and London: Yale 
University 
 Press, 2013), 135. 
29 Ibid., 137. 
30 Thomas Weinandy, Does God Suffer? (Notre Dame, Indiana: Notre Dame Press 2000), 124. 
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and be related to one another through mediating actions – hugs and kisses.  They 
must actualise their latent and inert relational potential and so positively become 
related to one another through their actions.  This brings about changes in human 
beings.31   
 
Thus the flow of relational dynamism proceeds from God to human creatures, God is so 
relationally alive that he does not need to be provoked into further relational 
development.  He combines in himself both complete otherness and the passionate vitality 
of pure goodness: 
 
The persons of the Trinity need not, and cannot do this…Thus…to be related to 
the Trinity in whatever manner, is to be related in the most intimate and dynamic 
manner.  No other relationship could exceed their vitality and intimacy.32    
 
David Bentley Hart expresses this another way when he writes: 
 
In the end, the crucial question is whether any of the relations that finite 
contingencies have to God’s infinite absolute being require alterations in God 
himself; and the traditional assumption is that God is not like some finite bounded 
substance that undergoes change as a result of external forces but is the 
transcendent source of the actuality of all substances and forces, and so he does 
not receive anything from “outside” himself, for everything is always in him and 
already realised in his own essence in an immeasurably more eminent way.  More 
simply said, the finite does not add to the infinite but merely expresses the power 
of the infinite in a limited mode.33 
 
Thus to sum up: 
1) There is a clear distinction between the world and the Divine order; 
2)  Evil is located only within the world, and is a limited reality since it feeds on good; 
3) A suffering God is a diminished God, since he must inhabit the same order of 
reality as the world, and must allow evil to work within his inner being since this is 
                                                          
31 Ibid., 127, 128. 
32 Ibid., 129. 
33 Bentley Hart, Being, Consciousness, Bliss, 139. 
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the cause of suffering, thus making him less than he could and should be; 
4) The effect of this is to valorise evil, to make it more damaging in its effects since it is 
now located within the very stuff of reality both in the worldly and the Divine 
order, and can now enter the Divine being with devastating consequences; 
5) The God of classical theism cannot be provoked into further development of his 
being by interactions with humans or with evil.  He is fully actualised, a vital and 
dynamic being, in contrast to the limited and only latent potentiality of human 
beings; 
6) The God who is wholly other is both immune to evil and suffering, and is thus 
wholly available to human beings because he is able to empathise with them and 
assist them without being trapped in their dilemmas or reduced by their 
limitations.  A metaphysical way of thinking about God is a help and not a 
hindrance since it makes God more vital. 
 
Radical Evil and the Church 
 
So far this chapter has focussed on the issues of the possibility of human history in its 
negative aspects entering the being of God, and thus having follow on eschatological 
consequences.  It has also focused on the issue of the origins of evil, and the way in which 
a suffering God is a diminished God.  However, there is another dimension to this issue 
that also requires attention – the consequences of radical evil entering the life of the 
Church. 
 
In Chapter three we noted the extent to which Jenson has valorised the significance of the 
church giving it a dense ecclesial texture exceeding the consensus of mainstream Roman 
Catholic ecclesiology.  Protestant ecclesiology has been deeply reluctant to give the church 
this kind of theological weighting, in part because Protestantism was born out of an 
ecclesiological crisis in the western church.  In its view the church of the Borgia papacy, 
the Avignon papacy, and the Inquisition required the Reformation and the emergence of a 
reformed catholicity to put the church right.  Protestantism also remains keenly aware of 
the continuing possibility of human sinfulness and satanic wiles entering the life of the 
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church with devastating consequences.   A Reich church, or an Apartheid approving 
church, or a church compromised by the complacent acceptance of the sexual revolution 
cannot be described as the true church of God. Nor can it be assumed to be nesting the 
Triune presence by an over pressing of the Body metaphor from the Pauline epistles.  
Perhaps typical of Protestant ecclesiology is Barth’s occasionalist view of the church – 
sometimes, occasionally, it rises to its best game, its truest self, and is an appropriate 
vehicle for God’s purposes in the world – but often, and usually, it is far from that, and 
lapses back into its typical compromised self.34 
 
To some extent Jenson has tried to take account of the church’s compromised state.  He 
writes: 
 
Since believers present deification is their habitation of the gate of heaven, it is the 
difference between the church and the Kingdom that must be grasped.  A first step 
is to remind ourselves that the church is what she is, and the believers in the 
church are what they are, only in anticipation, and so in separation from their own 
truth.  The people of God cannot yet assemble.  This people is the temple of the 
Holy Spirit precisely in a longing for a sanctity she now constantly loses hold of.  
The polity of God still battles with other principalities and powers and is invaded 
by them.  The church is now the body of Christ only in that within herself she 
confronts the body of Christ as an other than herself.  Believers existing 
communion in the Trinity is the painful intrusion there of a plurality of still 
decidedly self-centred persons.  And perhaps most decisively, the church of Jews 
and gentiles is still a separate community from Israel according to the flesh.35 
 
                                                          
34 For an alternative take on Barth’s ecclesiology see Christopher Holmes thoughtful and well-argued paper 
“The Church and the Presence of Christ: Defending Actualist Ecclesiology” in Pro Ecclesia: A Journal of 
Catholic and Evangelical Theology 3 (2012), 268-280. He argues that Barth’s dynamic event oriented Christology 
gives rise to a concrete ecclesiology for Christ always wills to be present with his apostles and his people in a 
concrete form. In this asymmetric relationship it is Christ’s echo, it has an instrumental nature as the place 
where Christ’s saving acts operate effectively in relation to those who respond to the gospel, while at the 
same time being the earthly historical existence of Christ, the place where Christ eloquently speaks of 
himself through the Scriptures. Thus the church cannot exist only occasionally or spasmodically. However, 
one is left pondering a key quote of Barth’s, “She is not the church, she becomes the church again and 
again.” Karl Barth, The Knowledge and Service of God According to the Teaching of the Reformation (Eugene, OR: 
Wipf and Stock, 2005), 160. 
35 ST 2: 323. 
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Despite this acknowledgement of the power of libido dominandi in the life of the church 
Jenson cannot concede its insidious internal effects too far because of other strong 
theological commitments in his ecclesiology.   His scathing critique of western culture 
obliges him to create strong boundaries between the church and its surrounding society 
and culture.  The corrupting and insidious influences of the culture cannot ultimately 
vitiate the life of the church, although he concedes that it is a process that he believes is 
very much at work at present, thus undermining the true nature of the church.  The 
church must be reckoned to be true to itself because it is the crown of creation, its existence 
is the reason God brought the world in to existence.  Furthermore Christ resides there 
having risen into its collective life after the resurrection.  This is where God is available to 
the world, where he may be found, where the “now” of salvation known in Jesus Christ 
reaches out to develop the process of salvation in believers.   
 
Since the second person of the Trinity resides within the life of the church we can note a 
possible line of defence that Jenson could adopt to the possibility of evil infiltrating the 
Divine being and the life of the world to come.  Such a sharp demarcation between church 
and surrounding culture could mean that the world can go to hell in a hand basket while 
the church sails majestically on, untouched in its inner core of true purpose, and thus 
becomes in itself the insulation point between God and radical evil.  Its robust ecclesiology 
and Trinitarian invested life would make it an antiseptic against infiltrating evil.  Its 
existence anyway is the point of history, its boundaries enclose where the action is in 
God’s eyes, and the world to some extent is a backdrop to its high profile existence.  This is 
the part of the world that matters in God’s eyes, and if its life excludes radical evil then 
God too is insulated against it. 
 
Here two counter arguments come to mind, ones that have to some extent already been 
discussed in this work.  What if the church apostatises?  Jenson believes some churches 
may be on the brink of doing this, or may have already crossed the threshold into 
apostasy, particularly in North America.  Yet Jenson has an answer to this.  God will lop 
off these parts off the vine, will withdraw his Shekinah presence from them, as he did 
from the Temple in the time of Ezekiel, so that they become not the church. 
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What if the church becomes so diminished in numbers, becomes so vitiated by the attrition 
of indifference and secularism that it effectively ceases to exist as an organised entity?  
Does this leave God at the mercy of a casually contemptuous or totally unknowing of him 
by human creation, so that his existential buffer zone is removed?  Here too Jenson has a 
possible counter argument.  Just as in the time of Ezekiel when the faithful remnant 
diminished to a very small number, a chastened and purified small group from whom the 
Yahweh only tradition could become the seedbed of a renewed Jewish religion, so too a 
small number of the faithful on whom God’s favour rests can become the nucleus of a 
renewed church.  The church could become as few as the tiny house churches that 
received the Pauline epistles yet this would be enough for God’s life to be adequately 




There is an additional resource that Jenson might deploy with particular reference to 
preventing evil entering the fulfilled future of the Kingdom.  In chapter two we discussed 
the three ontological barriers that maintain Christ’s separation from the totus Christus.36  In 
that discussion the primary focus was on clarifying whether Jenson had put sufficient 
space between Christ as second identity of the Trinity and Christ as totus Christus to 
prevent Christ in his second modality simply dissolving into the community.  The points 
made there are important for the way in which Christ might distance himself from toxic 
elements in the here and now partially fulfilled life of the totus Christus.  This is 
particularly the case with the first buffer, the fact that Christ’s robust risen presence in the 
church is through the medium of the sacraments, especially the Eucharist.  Thus he is in its 
midst, sustaining it, inspiring it and feeding it with his risen life, while at the same time 
not being completely identified with it in every detail. 
 
                                                          
36 Chapter 3, 10-11. 
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However, the second and third buffers are particularly significant for their potential 
capacity to filter out the infiltration of evil into the fulfilled life of the totus Christus as it 
makes the transition from Gesellschaft to Gemeinschaft, and enters the beatitude of the triune 
life.  The second buffer is the way in which Jenson uses the Scriptural metaphor of bride 
for the church so that the risen Christ as groom is clearly distinguished from his marriage 
partner.  The two are sharply distinguished from one another, both in the present life of 
the church, and at the End when Christ brings his bride with him to live within the 
beatitude of the Triune persons.  Here the third buffer comes in to play for at that highly 
desired End point the Divine life will so move the life of the redeemed as to clearly 
distinguish them from one another as distinct identities, while at the same time 
demarcating Christ off from them.  It is worth quoting Jenson at this point.  “Christ is and 
remains the second identity of the community as one only; yet he and the community he 
brings with him into the life of the Trinity are one and the same “whole 
Christ”…Nevertheless, the relation between Christ and the church is the prototype of my 
relation to my body, so that analogies can be drawn: just as I am my body yet can stand 
over against my body to discipline it or harm it or suffer it or enjoy it, so Christ is the 
church yet stands over against the church to discipline and  shape and suffer and enjoy 
it.”37  Thus there is a degree of helpful separation between Christ and his body and bride 
even at the End. 
 
Are the Buffers Sufficient? 
 
While it is helpful that Robert Jenson has provided three degrees of separation between 
Christ and his church the only gain in my opinion is to prevent Christ dissolving in to the 
Totus Christus.  The case made out by Thomas Weinandy on behalf of Thomas Aquinas 
and the advocates of classical theism in the preceding section cannot be answered by the 
Jenson proposals.  By refusing to allow metaphysical or ontological ways of thinking 
about God, by denying the Trinity an immanent or inner life, by closely identifying God 
with the unfolding events of human history as two streams of interweaving teleological 
                                                          
37 Robert Jenson, “Christ as Culture 1: Christ as Polity,” International Journal of Systematic Theology 3 
(November 2003), 325. 
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events, by insisting on a suffering God Jenson has inserted God into the limiting 
dimensions of the world order in which evil thereby becomes an elevated reality.  Such a 
God is not sufficient to protect himself against radical evil.  Jenson may insist that sin, 
suffering and death will not be present in the life of the world to come, but I cannot see 
how they can be excluded given the above. 
 
     The Final Judgement 
 
Towards the end of Systematic Theology 2 Jenson includes a chapter on The Last Judgement.  
Here he writes, “When history is taken into the Kingdom, all its accumulated wrongs must 
be rectified.”38  He quotes with approval Jonathan Edwards that this will include the 
resolution of causes and controversies between the nations, between the generations, and 
between ethnic groups of conquerors and the conquered.  The Son will also exercise his 
judicial power over his Spouse the church.  “The Final Judgement will be the rectification of 
the community of God’s people by bringing them into exact concert with the triune 
community and its righteousness, as this is defined by Christ’s death and resurrection.”39  
This will result in the members of the totus Christus enjoying the blessedness of being unable 
to sin since the entangling and opposed communities of libido dominandi will have been 
abolished and can no longer compete for the loyalty of the faithful.  The great scandal and 
sorrow of the division between church and faithful Judaism will be abolished as the 
eschatological detour is ended with Christ as head of his reunited body.  The Last 
Judgement will bring about a dramatic closure to history, thus delivering humanity from 
the nightmare of a post-modernist futurity that will go on and on without closure or 
meaning. 
 
On the face of it Jenson appears to have found an effective barrier to the irruption of 
radical evil into the transformed life of the Kingdom.  The Last Judgement brings evil to an 
end, resolves the contradictions it has introduced into the structure of reality, rebalances 
                                                          
38 ST 2: 325. 
39 ST 2: 326. 
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the distortions it has brought into the structures of being, and cleanses and purifies the 
church to be what it ought to be.  The problem lies with the kind of God Jenson postulates, 
and whether this God has the heft to deliver the Last Judgement and to thereby halt 
radical evil in its tracks.  Jenson’s economic Trinity is on the wrong side of the ontological 
line to be and do all that.  As previously discussed he is a suffering God located within the 
travails of suffering sinful humanity and is therefore unable to be wholly other, and to 
judge and cleanse it from a transcending distance.   
 
It is worth referencing John Webster at this point in what he calls the “backward 
reference” of the economy of God which obliges theologians to say something about the 
source of God’s dynamic saving energies.  As he puts it, “God’s outer works are not real 
relations between himself and creatures, but the overflow of God’s wholly realised life as 
Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.”40 Christopher Holmes comments on this reference that, 
“without the ‘backward reference’ little recourse is available for resisting the 
immanentizing tendencies of contemporary theology and for doing descriptive justice to 
the biblically attested completeness of God’s inner life…it is necessary, on the basis of 
God’s loving self-disclosure in freedom, to give an account of God as one whose identity is 
forever secure, intact, and complete in relationship to what God does.”41  
 
Robert Jenson’s version of God is not “secure, intact, and complete” in his essential being 
because he has only a forward reference, a future orientation, which means that he is 
shaped by and vulnerable to the developing story of human history.  His saving works 
towards the human race are not an excess of his fully developed life that always was what 
it is.  Rather they are “real relations between himself and creatures,” thus putting him on a 
par with creatures, fully immanent within their world, and thus incapable of standing 
over against it to judge it, purify it, and to edit out the vitiating effects of radical evil.  He 
                                                          
40 John Webster, “Principles of Systematic Theology,” in The Domain of the Word (London: T&T Clark, 2012) 
143. 
41 Christopher Holmes, “The Aseity of God as a Material Evangelical Concern” Journal of Reformed Theology 8 
(2014): 2, 3. 
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cannot stop them invading the life of the world to come because they have provoked 




This appreciative reader of Jenson has struggled in this chapter to provide Jenson with a 
reasoned counter argument to David Bentley-Hart’s accusation.  He has been at a 
disadvantage because Jenson has not to his knowledge directly addressed this issue in the 
Systematics.   
 
Jenson’s analysis of evil in western culture and in the western church was outlined and 
reckoned to be insightful and apposite.  His well-rounded consideration of evil as not just 
privation but also pernicious dynamism was acknowledged.  In this connection his belief 
in the existence of the devil and his habitual style of operation was considered to be 
accurate and true.  The logging of the devil’s ultimate fate as outlined in the book of 
Revelation was thought to be a possible future resource in dealing with Bentley Hart’s 
charge. 
 
We have noted the way in which Balthasar and Jϋngel have provided for themselves 
possible answers to the problem of evil and eschatology, rather wishing that Jenson had 
done the same.  We observed that Jenson cannot utilise the Balthasar solution because he 
does not permit a distinction between the immanent and the economic Trinity, or allow 
the ontological and metaphysical modes of thinking about God that Balthasar combines 
with a commitment to Barth’s way of describing the eventfulness of God.  Jϋngel’s 
positing of a container within God to neutralise the nihil was noted with interest and 
appreciation.  The absence of such a Jenson solution was noted and regretted.  It was 
observed that both Balthasar and Jϋngel are theologians of the cross, that Jenson is not, 
and that this has put him at a disadvantage in this respect.  
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We then outlined the distinction between creator and creatures, and came to the 
conclusion that Jenson’s commitment to a suffering and changeable God who is not 
wholly other and is not a wholly actualised being opens up a fatal weakness in his 
doctrine of God.  Such a God has all the disadvantages and limitations of the God of 
process theology, and is vulnerable to the enhanced status of evil in this way of reckoning 
reality.   
 
We tried to extricate Jenson from this dilemma by recalling the three buffers between 
Christ and the totus Christus, but came to the conclusion that these merely differentiated 
Christ from the totus Christus. They did not firewall him or the totus Christus off from 
radical evil.   
 
We also considered whether Jenson’s consideration of the Last Judgment provided an 
eschatological barrier against the transmission of radical evil into the Kingdom.  We 
concluded that it did not because the lack of backward reference to God’s original 
complete, intact and secure being from before time began put him on a par with suffering 




Content Filled Eschatology 
 
In the introduction we noted that Robert Jenson’s Systematics are motivated in large part 
by a desire to get away from the contentless eschatology of the Bultmann proposals, a 
theologian who had greatly interested him in his youth.  Jenson is part of a movement of 
future oriented systematics in the twentieth century, perhaps its last and greatest 
exponent.1  Has he delivered on his promise to provide a content filled eschatology, to say 
what can be said about what human creatures can expect at the promised End? 
 
In the judgement of this writer he has.  To briefly rehearse the points made in the 
introduction – at the promised End: 
 
1. The Church and Torah observant Judaism will be reunited; 
2. All causes and controversies will be decided by the supreme Judge; 
3. Human beings will not be able to sin any more; 
4. The promised future must include the Trinity; 
5. It will be a polity since it will be a political achievement described in political 
metaphors; 
6. Its shape and content will not contradict the 10 commandments; 
7. The universe will continue to be necessary as the stage for the fulfilment of the 
story of God with his people, though with the difference that matter will have a 
raised and elevated quality;  
8. The appearance of the new spiritual bodies of the redeemed will express their 
special spiritual character; it will be possible to read their Kingdom identity by their 
appearance; 
9. Sexual differentiation will continue; 
10. The redeemed will be incorporated within the totus Christus; 
11. The redeemed will have the privilege of the visio Dei by means of the simultaneous 
gift of Deification that will heal and enhance their minds and organs of perception 
to be able to do this; 
12. The vitiating effects of temporal time will be removed as it becomes congruent with 
the Trinity’s temporality. 
 
                                                          
1 Hunsinger, “Review Essay,” 200. 
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This is a lot of information, a great deal of content, to have provided about the End.  It has 
been culled from a wide variety of sources.  This is one of Jenson’s strengths – his wide, 
omnivorous and appreciative reading from many ecumenical sources. 
 
We note here one feature of the fulfilled future that he has missed out that we referred to 
in Chapter two.  The redeemed can anticipate a healed and re-ordered affectivity, restored 
to what it should have been from the beginning, and now elevated to the enhanced 
emotional capacity of the pioneer of our salvation, the first of the new humanity, Jesus the 
incarnate Word.  Jenson missed this point because of his misreading of Cyril of 
Alexandria’s take on Divine impassibility.   
 
The provision of this thoughtful amount of detail about what will obtain in the life of the 
world to come is a strength of the Systematics.  It is also of considerable assistance to the 
preaching and teaching life of the church since having something to say about what comes 
next, about what can be anticipated in the life of the world to come, is an essential part of 
the church’s proclamation to a doubting and uncertain world, at least in the opinion of this 
parish priest. 
 
Yet this generous amount of eschatological detail raises a problem that comes in large part 
from the way Jenson proposes to describe the End.  It is to be a surprise, but how can it be 
a surprise when we know so much about it thanks to Jenson’s cataloguing of what the best 
of Christian minds have had to say about it.  He has laid out the contours and 
characteristics of life in the world to come in such a way that we know pretty much what 
to expect.  While he has no doubt missed some details, and perhaps even got one or two of 
them wrong, we are proceeding thanks to him in a well-informed way into expected 
scenarios.  The element of surprise has been considerably reduced. 
 
It is for this reason that Jenson has introduced his concept of the antinomy of hope.  In the 
face of defined promises, of clear eschatological expectations, of a love from the future that 
has taken hold of the believer, the element of surprise matters a great deal.  What comes at 
the end will still be unexpected, and it is this that keeps the promises fresh and interesting.  
It is also in the nature of genuine personhood and of love: 
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When my hope to love and be loved by some specified person is fulfilled, what 
then?  The remarkable phenomenon that must be observed at this point is that 
experienced love is itself a new opportunity of love.  Persons live just as they are 
capable of surprising.  To love some person is to accept in advance the surprises 
he or she will bring to me, as revelations of my own proper good.  Therefore when 
love comes, hope comes with it.2 
 
Thus novelty and innovation are hallmarks of the way the God of futurity operates.  They 
are his trademark and signature tune.  Perhaps the biggest surprise of all is where the 
narrative will leave God at the end, the extent to which the story of salvation history, and 
within it the actions and reactions of human creatures, has the capacity to change God in 
unexpected ways, an issue we will address at the end of this conclusion. 
 
The Nature of Surprise 
 
We noted in the introduction that Aristotle does not appear to be the source that Jenson 
supposes him to be for the way in which a satisfying story ends.  This is the notion of the 
suspense filled surprise ending that leaves us thinking “of course, it couldn’t have 
happened in any other way, “even though it wasn’t at all obvious that this was what was 
going to happen as the narrative proceeded.  Furthermore this surprise ending resolves all 
the themes, sub-plots and character developments that were unfolding in its intriguing 
and tension filled main plot lines.  In fact, in the Greek tragedies that Aristotle wrote about 
we know what is going to happen right from the start.  What matters is the essence of 
what goes on inside the story, not the way in which it concludes. 
 
We decided that it doesn’t matter that Aristotle didn’t think this, just in the same way that 
we concluded that it doesn’t matter that Gregory of Nyssa and Cyril of Alexandria are not 
in fact allies of his proposals.  What matters is that Jenson thinks they support his 
proposals, and that they are sufficiently interesting and useful to be worth pursuing in 
their own right.  Furthermore this writer finds the Jenson notion of the surprise ending to 
the human story in a deeply satisfying way to be a credible notion of the way God may 
indeed proceed at the end. 
                                                          
2 ST 2: 321. 
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The problem comes though in the way in which time and surprise are talked about here, 
and their follow on consequences for some of Jenson’s core proposals.  Francesca Aran 
Murphy has highlighted the difficulties in her book God is Not a Story: Realism Revisited.  
She points out that Jenson has concentrated on the notion of story in its most commonly 
perceived mode of understanding in our contemporary culture. In this modern sense of 
story the narrative operates by arousing our curiosity as to what comes next.  Thus the 
plot operates through the mechanism of intrigue, which holds the audience’s interest and 
attention by building up to a sense of high excitement.  The story is ordered to its 
denouement, its suspense filled curiosity satisfying conclusion.3  
 
Two problems follow on from this.  “Despite their efforts to revise our notion of the 
Trinity in a biblical direction, story theologians like Jenson seem to render God more static 
than the classical views did.  Viewers are more likely to recall a movie’s essential plot-line 
than the names of its characters: what they are most likely to recall, however, is its ending, 
because this is what the cinematic plot is for.  It is constructed out of futurity”4  She 
describes this process as “cinematizing the Trinity.”5  She then points out that “Although 
Jenson hopes to differentiate ‘the God of the gospel’ from those of pagan cultures, 
privileging future over past and present is a mark of our secular, technological culture.  
The apocalypticizing orientation of narrative theologies displays the modern equation of 
drama with plot, in which one question leads on to another, and the audience’s attention-
horizon is filled with suspense.”6  On balance I think that Aran Murphy has made a telling 
point here. 
 
Of course a static view of God is precisely what Jenson has sought to avoid all along.  It is 
why he has shunned any metaphysical explanation for the doctrine of God.  Yet it appears 
that an immobilist conception of God has crept in through the back door through what 
appeared to be a very contemporary way of making God and his way with the world 
interesting. 
                                                          
3 Francesca Aran Murphy, God is Not a Story: Realism Revisited, (Oxford: Oxford Scholarship Online, 2007) 
PDF e-book, 294. 
4 Ibid,. 295. 
5 Aran Murphy, God is Not a Story, Chapter 6 
6 Aran Murphy, God is Not a Story, 296. 
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An even more intriguing consequence is that the Holy Spirit as Future Spirit is playing a 
game of hide and seek with the human race, and with the other Triune persons, concealing 
himself within “pockets of unknowability, in the sense of disclosures yet to come.”7  
Concealment within the story in order to keep everyone guessing both promotes interest 
in the story and its final outcome, while at the same time demonstrating the supremacy of 
the Spirit in the ordering of the Triune persons.  It also means that God himself may have 
undergone a surprising development in his own being as the story has progressed to its 
unexpected ending. 
 
Aran Murphy also points out that this stress on the suspense motif has the effect of 
changing the drama of salvation into a melodrama.  The multivalent qualities of good 
drama are thinned out to a simple focus on the curiosity inducing single focus on what 
happens next, with the caveat that it must be a surprise.  Furthermore the plot lines reduce 
to a simple confrontation between good and evil in which God and Satan are opposed in 
melodramatic confrontation.  They are a dramatic necessity to one another.  This of course 
has the effect of making evil a necessary part of the story since Christ’s overcoming of it is 
an essential part of his narrative.8 We will circle back to the issue of evil and eschatology 
later in the conclusion, but for now we note that the quality of drama in the Jenson 
proposals is more of a modern reductionist kind rather than of the classical variety.  Our 
attention may be held by it for the moment, but does it satisfy in an abiding sense, does it 
provide a pleasure that never cloys?   
 
This is also a type of drama that lacks a sense of the sacred.  “Thus, melodrama differs 
from tragedy in that it is secular, or post religious.  The melodramatic cosmos is 
anthropocentric in that the ‘sacred’ does not hover around it.  It gives us ‘combat’ in place 
of the tragic or comic ‘rite of sacrifice.”9  Theologian of culture that Jenson is, highly critical 
of the western church’s post-modernist surrounding culture, and fearful of its encroaching 
inroads into the church’s life, this cannot be what he intended for his Systematics. 
 
                                                          
7 Ibid,. 302. 
8 Ibid,. 132, 151. 
9 Ibid,. 143 
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The Lord of the Future 
 
What then of the Spirit who brings about this surprising end to the story?  How effective 
and credible is Jenson’s pneumatology? 
 
This thesis has been highly appreciative of Jenson’s pneumatology.  It has concluded that 
his Systematics is an exercise in third article rebalancing, rather than third article 
overbalancing.  It has gratefully considered the way in which Jenson has resolved the 
Filioque conundrum by way of a revitalised pneumatology that is a redressing of and a 
catch up on a long overdue deficit in western third order theological thinking. 
 
In Jenson’s pneumatology the Spirit’s primary role description is that of relationship 
initiator, repairer and reconciler.  He animates the church in its transition from its present 
associational nature to its eventual genuine community status.  He is the giver and 
enhancer of individual potentiality and fully realised existence within the completed totus 
Christus.  The Spirit is the freedom between the redeemed that will enable them to be most 
fully themselves while they can, at the same time, relate to others at depth in close 
communal association without being submerged or threatened by such close communal 
abiding.  This freeing of others to love each other in true freedom is of course what that 
Spirit does for the Father and the Son.   
 
The overcoming of oppositional binary patterns of relating is one of the most significant 
works of the Holy Spirit in God’s life and in our life too.  We decided to acquit Jenson of 
the charge of introducing Hegelian motifs in to his understanding of intra-Trinitarian 
relationships.  The issue of lack of embodied status of the Father and the Spirit is a red 
herring.  The master-slave parable from Phenomenology of Spirit is applied by Jenson only 
to asymmetric relationships between the Trinity and humanity, and between human 
persons.  In this latter category of relationships we concluded that, while at first it seemed 
a wild exaggeration to suppose that all human relationships have this antagonistic, 
oppositional nature, it is precisely at this point that Jenson has provided an acute and 
insightful analysis of some of the more toxic elements of contemporary western culture.  
Post-modernist nihilism a la Nietzsche and Derrida has decisively coloured all human 
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relationships in the minds of many with just such a hermeneutic of suspicion, and various 
liberationist motifs from the 1960’s on have led their followers in to self-defeating cul de 
sacs of vitiated relationships.  It is as a theologian of culture that Jenson is at his strongest 
and most valuable.  Conferring on the Holy Spirit the role of overcomer of and deliverer 
from just such opposed and conflicted relationship patterns is one of the most worthwhile 
elements of Jenson’s pneumatology. We note however that he supposes that it is primarily 
Christians and those who live within the church who are likely to receive this gift. 
 
In the Systematics the Spirit is the completer and perfector of our salvation.  As such he is 
the Lord of the future, it is his time because the perfected totus Christus will be the 
disclosure time of the Spirit.  Furthermore we are told that the Spirit of freedom will find 
his ego in the faces of the redeemed.  It is worth recalling at this point that Jenson had 
earlier written of the Son as the space in which the Father deploys his ego, since the Son 
lives only for the mission of the Father in a relationship of love and obedience.   He also 
writes of the resurrection of the Son as a not yet completed process.  This only comes to 
conclusion in the fulfilled and perfected totus Christus.  Yet Christ as the now of our 
salvation is at his most disclosed and influential in the present life of the church, an issue 
we will return to soon.  For now we focus on the futurity of the Spirit, the time dimension 
in which he will disclose himself fully.  There are two paradoxes here. 
 
Just at this point of finding his ego in the faces of the redeemed he is also revealed as the 
self-emptying gift, who is nothing else at all.  This kenotic self-emptying calls to mind 
Jenson’s critique of Barth in You Wonder Where the Spirit Went?  Just when you expect the 
Spirit to turn up he disappears.  In Barth’s case it was supposed that he had made this 
happen by overplaying the amoris vinculum.  Here Jenson has made it happen by 
overplaying his eschatology.  Has the Spirit disappeared and dispersed just when you 
would expect him to come into his own? 
 
In fact Jenson is being true to the Scriptures and the tradition at this point for they both 
insist on the Spirit’s self-effacing nature, his always pointing away from himself to the 
Father and the Son.  He does not want to be a separate person apart from the Father and 
the Son.  In that sense a fully realised personhood of the Spirit at the End is not possible in 
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a satisfactory Trinitarian theology, and to that extent Jenson is being both orthodox and 
faithful to the tradition. 
 
Secondly, this creates the unnerving possibility, touched on at several points in this work, 
that human beings, in this case the redeemed, may change God, may provoke and 
generate changes in God bringing him at the last to an unexpected end point in his life.  
We are left asking, theologically speaking, who is in charge here?   
 
That the Spirit assists in the completion of the fully realised totus Christus few would 
dispute.  That he generates the freedom between the persons of the totus Christus we can 
applaud and affirm.  However, the classic metaphysical teachings are on the mark here.  
There cannot be any real relations between the Trinity and the persons of the totus 
Christus.  God cannot receive anything from us.  There can be no traffic between the 
creator and the created.  God gives to human creatures out of the overflowing excess of his 
being.  God is fully realised, and cannot be added to or modified by the totus Christus.  We 
will explore this theme at greater length in the final section. 
 
What Then of Christ? 
 
In this work we concluded that Christ has four modalities of existence in the Jenson 
proposals.   
 
He has a shadowy phantom like existence as a literary underlying pattern in the pages of 
the Old Testament.  One can only speak of his pre-existence as an incognito subtle 
background influence in the prior history and Scriptures of his people.  Given Jenson’s 
deep reluctance to assign any protological explanation for the being of God one can 
understand why Christ is given such a low key status in this first way in which he 
presents himself.  We concluded that the charge of crypto Arianism against Jenson is 
unfair for it fails to take account of his concept of time.  There never was a time when 
Christ was not.  Indeed, he was a co-creator of the world along with the Father, though 
interestingly that was because the world was made for the sake of the church, the doctrine 
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of creation is ordered to ecclesiology, and of course Christ reigns in power in the midst of 
the church. 
 
Christ then comes from the future to be implanted in the womb of the Virgin Mary.  The 
second modality of existence is his incarnate life on earth.  His death on Golgotha does not 
have the same high profile significance for Jenson that it does for many theologians.  The 
atonement is just the cost of coming in to close contact with deadly human creatures.  The 
resurrection is what matters. 
 
Raised by the Spirit Christ ascends in to the church.  We noted that while Jenson says he 
believes in the Ascension he is really only paying lip service to the doctrine.  Indeed it 
would appear that for him the Ascension is a future event.  Christ is not at the right hand 
of the Father because he is in fact present in the church as the now of our salvation.  He 
rules over it from table, font and pulpit.  We concluded that in many ways this is Christ’s 
optimal time.  He will never be more powerfully influential and available than he is now 
at the heart of the church’s life – these are his glory days.  
 
The resurrection of Christ will be completed when the totus Christus is fully assembled and 
made perfect in the fulfilment of the End.  Christ will not need to discipline his body for it 
will be made clean of any possibility of sin, and of the rival claims of the world’s varieties 
of libido dominandi.  This fourth modality of Christ’s existence is the way the world of 
human creatures finds its eschatological fulfilment.  They are to be located within his 
collective mode of existence.  Yet at the same time Jenson has made it clear that the second 
person of the Trinity, the Word, is distinct from the totus Christus.  The totus Christus does 
not contain and exhaust him as a monadic super person. 
 
At this point one is left pondering whether the Holy Spirit as the Lord of the future trumps 
the other triune persons.  The Spirit is the freedom between the redeemed persons in the 
totus Christus, the relationship enabler of this fourth modality of Christ’s existence.  The 
future, the preferred time zone of Jenson’s Systematics, is the time of the Spirit.  Where 
does this leave Christ?  The Nicene-Constantinopolitan creed has more to say about Christ 
than it does about the Father or the Holy Spirit.  Its long middle paragraph lays out where 
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he came from, whom he came from, what he did for our salvation, and how we will come 
to experience him in the future. The church’s theological reflection has always given him 
pride of place.  Has the Spirit eclipsed him as the centre of theological attention in the 
theology of futurity? 
 
On reflection we are not dealing with a Joachim of Fiore scenario here.  As we discussed 
before, Jenson has retained the Spirit’s self-effacing, self-emptying kenotic character that 
Scripture and the tradition point to.  His argument would be that theology has made too 
much of the protological origins of the Trinity in the past, that the futurity of the Trinity 
now needs emphasis as a rebalancing measure, and that to speak of the Spirit as the 
completer and perfector of our salvation is merely picking up a Cappadocian theme.  By 
making the totus Christus the central content of eschatological salvation he has in fact kept 
Christ in central focus. 
 
The Church and the totus Christus 
 
Throughout this work we have had occasion to marvel at the high ecclesiology of the 
Systematics.  Jenson claims more for it than the Roman Catholic Church does.   
 
In large measure this is because of Jenson’s concerns about the encroachment of a toxic 
surrounding western culture into the life of the church.  Jenson is at his best as a 
theologian of culture, with many shrewd, sharp and insightful insights about what is 
wrong with western culture.  He is clear that the church and western culture are in the 
middle of divorce proceedings.  Thus the church must have high ramparts and a dense 
theological core at its centre to keep at bay the pathogens of post modernity and its 
accompanying nihilism. 
 
The church must also be honoured and valued for the reason we recently discussed – 
Christ rose into it, and reigns in power in its midst.  It is not just a pragmatic platform for 
mission.  It is the crown of creation, the reason God brought the world into existence, and 
its doxological charter of praising and worshipping God matters even more than its 
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missiological imperatives.  God loves the church more than any other part of creation, 
which is an additional reason for its rich and deep theological texture. 
 
However, it is the church as eschatological gateway that is the most important reason for 
the high valuing of the church.  The church is the final delivery vehicle for the 
eschatological End.  The church will eventually morph into the totus Christus.  As the Holy 
Spirit moves it from Gesellschaft to Gemeinschaft, as it thereby acquires a hinterland of deep 
koinonia belonging, as the church as bride comes to live in the groom’s house – the 
dwelling place of the Triune persons, it becomes what it was always intended to be – the 
totus Christus.   
 
Jenson uses the Augustinian concept of the totus Christus as his principal way of talking 
about the content of the End.  In the opinion of this writer it is one of the main strengths of 
his eschatological proposals.  It stresses that the end point of salvation history is a 
collective one of communal belonging in the Kingdom, rather than an individualised gain 
of personal mortality.  It fleshes out with some detail the deification destiny of the 
redeemed that Jenson has endorsed at several points.  It focuses on the fact that inclusion 
in the life of God is what salvation is.  Jenson is one of the standard bearers of the revival 
of Trinitarian theology in the twentieth century, and with the totus Christus he is insisting 
that the life that really is life is life within the Trinity. 
 
However, just at this point an anomaly presents itself: 
 
Since our communion with one another will be established by our inclusion in the 
communion of Father, Son, and Spirit, it will be shaped by the ‘processions’ and 
‘missions’ that make that communion.  The Father will look on us as he looks on 
his Son.  He will know what he is as God by seeing what he has made of us; and 
we will know him and ourselves as the outcome of the utter joyous Freedom that 
he is.  As the Son offers himself in obedience to the Father the church will be both 
the self, the ‘body’ that he offers, and participant in the act of offering.  And it is 
the very freedom of God as the Spirit that will be our freedom in this fellowship.10 
 
This is odd because Jenson has ruled out talk of processions in the Trinity.  The economic 
Trinity is what counts, not the immanent Trinity.  As I pointed out earlier in this work 
                                                          
10 ST 2, 319-20. 
112 
there is an irony in setting out to say what comes next, to provide a content filled 
eschatology, because this means he must talk about the vectors and contours of intra-
Trinitarian relations, something he says he is against, but in fact must do, since 
participation in the Trinity is the content of salvation.11  Again and again in this work we 
have come up against Jenson’s doctrine of God as a stumbling block.  It is to this we must 
now turn. 
 
The Doctrine of God 
 
In order to be faithful to the God of the gospel Robert Jenson proposes that God is 
developing in dialogue with the human story, closely linked in to the developing plot lines 
of salvation history, that he is a dynamic teleological stream of events who goes before his 
people like the pillar of cloud by day and the pillar of fire by night in the wilderness 
wanderings.  To ensure that this God is lively he is not to be described in ontological or 
metaphysical terms.  This would reduce God to the static immobilised status of Greek 
philosophy with its obsession with defeating the attrition of time.   
 
We can note here how old fashioned this distinction between the God of the Bible and the 
God of Greek philosophy is, being a preoccupation and received opinion of late nineteenth 
century German liberal theology.  Contemporary Patristic theologians now point out what 
a complex and nuanced issue this is.  To name but two of their conclusions – the Bible 
itself contains sophisticated Greek thought forms, and the great names of Patristic thought 
worked primarily from the datum of Scripture, while making magpie like borrowings 
from contemporary Greek thought to suit their purposes, without being captured by their 
overall schema. 
 
The effect of this is to place God on the human side of the reality line as the ontological 
distinction between creator and creatures is abolished.  The God of classical metaphysics 
who is both wholly other while at the same time being intimately interior to human 
creatures does not figure in this scheme of things.  God is with us in a very complete sense. 
 
                                                          
11 Chapter 3, 15. 
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Jenson is a theologian of the missions of God but not of his processions.  Talk of the 
immanent Trinity is ruled out.  All that matters is the economic Trinity.  God is as God 
does, and all we need to know is what God does for our salvation.  We note here how very 
Lutheran Jenson is at this point.  Speculation about the interior life of God is irrelevant and 
irreverent.  That kind of a waste of emotional energy and inappropriate intellectual 
activity can be left to Calvinists and Catholics. 
 
Also rejected is any notion of God’s immutability, impassibility or unchangeability.  This 
is a God who feels intensely, changes his mind, who needs the world of human creatures, 
and who thus loves erotically rather than with the disinterested love of agape.  We can 
note how en courant this is with much popular opinion in mid to late twentieth century 
theology. 
 
Several consequences follow.  The stability and continuity of God’s personal identity and 
being is called into question.  Jenson says that what the Patristic church meant by apatheia 
is that God is unwavering in his faithfulness.  While God is affected by changes in 
knowledge, will and emotions, he remains constant in his personal identity, character and 
nature.  Presumably Jenson endorses this also. However he also believes that God’s 
identity is shaped by temporal events.  Human beings can interact with God in such a way 
as to generate changes within him, and there is a considerable element of surprise in the 
way salvation history will play itself out, even to God.  The future is open in its 
possibilities both for the creation and for God.  It is a future of anticipated possibilities and 
scenarios.   
 
What kind of a God will the redeemed meet at the End then?  This makes obsolete the 
traditional assumption that whatever surprise awaits believers at the End it will not 
involve encountering a God who has changed in himself as a result of interactions with 
human creatures.  We recall Timo Tavast’s conclusion that for Jenson the Trinity is free to 
be what God would not necessarily have been, an analysis of Jenson’s doctrine of God that 
he endorsed as accurate and true of him.  “The Spirit is able to bring new aspects to God’s 
reality, and these new, contingent historical matters are now inseparable parts of the 
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Triune God’s deepest nature.”12  Thus the developing interactions between God and 
humankind set the agenda for the final form of God himself.  This agenda is completed by 
the Holy Spirit who has received such a radical charter of freedom that he is ready, willing 
and able to affect and alter God himself. 
 
It might be supposed that believers will be delighted to hear that they have power to 
influence the final eschatological shape and form of God.  However, the prospect is in fact 
concerning and somewhat anxiety inducing at a number of levels.  If the redeemed are to 
be conformed to the image of God, and that is one of the primary understandings of what 
Deification is about, then this is a prospect of radical instability if it means being 
conformed to a God in flux.  What brings peace of mind amongst the redeemed, and 
clarity about the content of salvation, is the prospect of being conformed to a solid state 
God who has continuity, constancy stability and being as his hall marks of identity. 
 
The kind of God that Jenson proposes has a will o’ the wisp style about him that leaves 
one wondering if he has any substance to him that will enable believers to connect with 
him.  If any language of substance or essence has been dismissed as a descriptor of God 
then what is graspable about him?  Is the God who is event, narrative and a set of 
decisions someone one can have an eternal relationship with?  We can recall at this point 
that about the only time Jenson sets out to describe what goes on at the heart of the triune 
being, to give an account of their internal relations, he does so in terms of a kind of 
phantom junction box that co-ordinates the three Triune identities as they deploy in their 
respective poles of time, and as they relate to one another.13 
 
Jenson is again thoroughly Lutheran in describing the beneficia, the affective states, and the 
relational goods that the redeemed receive from God, while at the same time refusing to 
speculate about the God who gives these good things. Yet this gap and lack raises the 
issue of one of the drivers of Luther’s theology, the search for a gracious God, and the fear 
of a God behind God, a dark God who does not wish the human race well.  This thesis has 
concluded that the search for a gracious God can only have a fruitful conclusion in a 
                                                          
12 Timo Tavast, “Challenging the Modalism of the West: Jenson on the Trinity,” Pro Ecclesia 4 (Fall 2010): 361. 
13 Jenson, The Triune Identity. 120.  
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theology firmly focused on the immanent Trinity, so that believers can know with who 
and what they are dealing.  The question of what God is, and how God is are inextricably 
connected to his salvific works. 
 
What further complicates this issue is Jenson’s refusal to interest himself in the origins of 
the Divine persons.  Yet these protological considerations matter because Scripture raises 
the issue of origins at a number of points.  One thinks of the long genealogy at the 
beginning of Matthew’s gospel, and the prologue to John’s gospel, together with the bread 
of life discourse in chapter six.  Scripture does so because it wants to raise the question of 
who and what is the God who comes among us.  It wishes to establish God’s credentials as 
a trustworthy and reliable friend of the human race.  Scott Swain accurately sums up the 
Jenson conception of God as “God is as God does.”14  It is certainly true that we read off 
people’s character and personality from the impact of their actions on us.  However, this 
analysis usually proceeds to investigate and consider where the active agent came from, 
and from whom they came.  Jenson wishes us to make an act of blind faith in a God who 
appears out of nowhere. 
 
In this connection it is useful to recall how we noticed that Jenson privileges two major 
Scriptural events, the escape across the sea of reeds and the raising of Jesus, as the 
centrepiece of his proposals, while ignoring other major Divine disclosure events that 
might be considered disadvantageous to his doctrine of God.  The incident of the burning 
bush, the giving of the Law on Mount Sinai, the baptism and the transfiguration of Jesus, 
the high priestly prayer in John 17 – these are right up there with the Exodus event, and 
deserve to be included with the resurrection as key marker points in the story of salvation.  
Yet they receive little if any consideration.  This thesis proposed that a likely reason is the 
way in which they raise the question of Divine origins in an acute form, and in fact press 
on to provide key information about the God who comes among us.  We can note at this 
point also the way in which Jenson does not work closely with the datum of Scripture in 
the Systematics.  References to it are relatively sparse, a neuralgia point with evangelical 
critics. 
 
                                                          
14 Swain, The God of the Gospel, 137. 
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However, the biggest problem with Jenson’s doctrine of God is the way in which it leaves 
God unable to block the incursion of radical evil in to the eschaton.  The traditional 
metaphysical description of God made a clear ontological distinction between creator and 
creatures, with the result that this clear distinction and barrier meant evil cannot cross the 
line to invade and infect either God or the eschatological order.  Not only has Jenson 
abolished this ontological distinction, God after all is not to be described in ontological 
terms, but he has also posited an empathetic suffering God as essential to the God of the 
gospel.  This divine suffering places God and the creation in the same ontological order.  A 
suffering God must exist in the same reality field as the suffering creation.  This has the 
effect of magnifying evil, making it ontological in its essential nature, thus assuming a far 
heavier weighting in both the world’s affairs and in the final reckoning of things.  It also 
limits God, since he requires evil to provoke the further development of his being.  As a 
result evil to some extent lodges in the being of God.   
 
We can note an interesting and decisive feature here.  Jenson is often dismissed as being a 
process theologian, a charge he would indignantly deny insisting that for him God is the 
sovereign Lord of history.  Yet a suffering God who is on a par with the suffering creation, 
is in the same reality field as it, is a limited God.  This is a needy God, who needs human 
beings and the evil they generate to provoke him to further developments in his being.  
What is in fact required here is a God who combines complete otherness and the 
passionate vitality of pure goodness within himself.  A God who is wholly other is both 
immune to evil and suffering, and is thus wholly available to human beings because he 
can empathise with them without being trapped in their dilemmas, or reduced by their 
limitations.  Thus a metaphysical way of thinking about God is a help and not a hindrance 
since it makes God more vital and more useful, and maps on to the biblical testimony. 
 
Jenson of course would seek to defend himself at this point by pointing out that he agrees 
with the book of Revelation that the devil will be cast into the lake of fire at the End, and 
that there will be a last judgement at which sin, and evil, and those who have given 
themselves over to it, will be excluded from the Kingdom.  The problem is that the God he 
has presented to us lacks the capacity to do this because of his lack of backward reference.  
He does not have the heft to accomplish the last judgement because he is trapped on the 
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same side of the ontological line as the human race.  What is required here is a Trinitarian 
God of processions as well as missions, who is both immanent as well as economic, who 





There is much to admire in the eschatological proposals of Jenson’s Systematics; the content 
and the detail of what can be expected at the End; the astute let out clause of the antinomy 
of hope that prevents the element of surprise being eroded by all this information; and the 
placing of the concept of the totus Christus right at the heart of what can be expected at the 
End. 
 
The pneumatology that goes hand in hand with this has also elicited an appreciative 
response in these pages.   The Spirit who makes relationships work both within the totus 
Christus, and between the triune persons.  The Spirit of freedom and surprise who brings 
freshness and vitality to these relationships, and to the script of the final conclusion.  If the 
human story is a movie the Holy Spirit is both script writer and director, with the proviso 
that human beings have the ability to insert themselves into the writing of the script to 
some extent.  The Spirit is Lord of the future, who has been mandated to complete and 
perfect the story of salvation.  Appreciation has also been expressed for the third article 
rebalancing that Jenson has achieved, together with an elegant solution to the Filioque 
dilemma. 
 
However, what has failed to convince, and what has undermined these proposals to a 
large extent, has been the deficiencies in Jenson’s doctrine of God, as listed above.  This is 
a pity because much of what Jenson has proposed and offered could have been expressed 
within the context of a traditional metaphysical definition of God. 
 
There is a paradox here.  Jenson is a loner, a maverick and an innovator, who at the same 
time insists that he is deeply orthodox.  He is one of the pioneers and promoters of the 
revival of Trinitarian theology in the twentieth century. Yet a number of the peculiarities 
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and central planks of his doctrine of God are in fact the received opinion and 
commonplace assumptions of a liberal theology he so dislikes. The distinction between the 
God of the Bible and the God of unhelpful and mistaken Greek metaphysics, the insistence 
on a changeable and suffering God, the over application of Rahner’s rule in such a way as 
to squeeze out the immanent Trinity by way of an exclusive focus on the economic Trinity 
– these are items in a tick the box standard menu of complacent liberal divinity.  If Jenson 
could have walked away from these, and downplayed his enthusiasm for narrative 
theology, he might have positioned his eschatological proposals within a worthwhile 
revisionary metaphysics, thereby creating a truly revolutionary theology of futurity that 
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